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Abstract
The last decade and a half has seen the rise of a new class of systems loosely
categorized as public ledgers. Public ledgers guarantee that all posted infor-
mation is permanently available to the entire public. Common realizations of
public ledgers include public blockchains and centralized logs. In this work
we investigate novel applications of public ledgers. We begin by describing
enclave ledger interaction, a computational method that allows the execution of
trusted execution environments or cryptographically obfuscated programs
to be conditioned on the contents of the ledger. We then show how this
conditional execution paradigm can be used to achieve fairness in dishonest
majority secure multiparty computation, which is impossible in the plain
model. Finally, we show how conditional execution can be used to build
systems that facilitate law enforcement access to ciphertext while ensuring
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The last decade and a half has seen the rise of a new class of systems loosely
categorized as public ledgers. These systems act as the bulletin boards of the
internet age, where posted information can be reliably retrieved by the public.
In some cases, these public ledgers are run by single, trusted operators, and in
other cases, the systems are comprised of many mutually distrusting parties.
No matter the underlying system structures, public ledgers provide the public
access to some current state. Over time, the ledger protocol participants are
able to update this state while ensuring that all participants have consistent
view of the most recent state. Many realizations of public ledgers make it
difficult for individual parties to tamper with the ledger’s state.
Public ledgers provide the following guarantees:
• Information posted on the ledger is accessible to the entire public
• Information posted on the ledger is permanently accessible
These two guarantees ensure that each member of the public has access
to the same information. Protocol designers use public ledgers to realize
1
other, higher-level applications. For example, cryptocurrency systems like
Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) leverage decentralized public ledgers, realized by
blockchains, to ensure that everyone agrees on the current balances of all
currency holders. Ethereum (The Ethereum Project 2018) extended existing
cryptocurreny techniques to construct a massive distributed virtual machine
capable of arbitrary, verifiable public computation. The Certificate Trans-
parency log leverages centralized public ledgers, realized by a server with a
private signing key, to ensure that browsers can verify that TLS certificates are
issued properly.
While there is a tremendous amount of research focusing on developing
new techniques to realize public ledgers, particularly the decentralized variety
(see (Bano et al., 2017; Raikwar, Gligoroski, and Kralevska, 2019), and the
citations contained therein), relatively little academic focus has been given to
applications of these systems beyond cryptocurrencies. Public ledgers are more
than just an academic concept — public ledgers exist and operate in practice.
Public ledgers are powerful cryptographic building-blocks, so exploring new
applications has the potential for practical impact. In this work, we present
new application powered by public ledgers. These applications make minimal
assumptions about the underlying ledger mechanism, so any realization of a
public ledger can be used as a building-block.
1.1 Blockchains and Decentralized Consensus
The most notable systems to provide the public ledger guarantees are blockchains.
Blockchains were first introduced along with the cryptocurrency Bitcoin in a
2
2008 white paper titled Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, written
under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2008). Since then, the
techniques described in the work have become commonplace in the com-
puter science world and beyond. In 2017 and 2018, a dramatic rise in the
value of the Bitcoin currency accompanied widespread public attention and
excitement from non-technical onlookers. Although the craze quickly settled,
blockchains now underpin thousands of distributed, digital currencies, nearly
a hundred of which have market capitalizations above $50 million. While this
swift technological adoption is widely viewed as a revolution in decentralized
finance, blockchains are still struggling to make an impact in other industries.1
In this work, we focus on exploring new applications of blockchains, when
considered as a cryptographic building block.
Blockchains are a method of achieving consensus among a large number of
distributed, mutually distrusting parties. This consensus can be on any arbi-
trary piece of information. In the case of cryptocurrencies, a given blockchain
comes to consensus about the current balances of each party in the network.
This consensus process must be robust; if a single party can convince the
entire network that their balance should be arbitrarily increased, users of a
cryptocurrency could forge currency. As such, each party participating in
the protocol must be viewed with skepticism and the overall network must
enforce rules that allow the high-level application to function correctly.
It is important to note that blockchains are not the only way to achieve
1There is significant attention on using blockchains to manage and track supply chains.
While this is not strictly a financial application, from a technical perspective it is virtually
identical; instead of tracking the flow of currency, the blockchain must just track the flow of
tokens representing goods.
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distributed consensus. This exact problem has a lengthy history in computer
science, generally referred to as The Byzantine Generals Problem (Pease, Shostak,
and Lamport, 1980; Lamport, Shostak, and Pease, 2019). The study first con-
sidered faulty machines that might inject errors into a replicated system. These
replicated systems might be sensors guiding an aircraft or giving monitoring
information to a controller at a power station. Allowing faulty systems to exert
undo influence in these applications would have devastating effects. While
widely studied by computer scientists, solutions to the Byzantine Generals
Problem rarely scaled efficiently when the number of parties grew very large.
Because blockchains were originally suggested as a consensus mechanism
to support a global currency, scaling to thousands or millions of protocol
participants in the consensus mechanism is crucial. To overcome the limita-
tions of prior work, blockchains run a non-interactive lottery procedure called
“mining,” in which a random party (or possibly set of parties) is selected to
update the state of network. Any party that accepts this update (indicating
that the update is in accordance with the network rules) begins mining state
updates to append to the accepted update. Each of these updates is encoded
into a “block” of information, and the iterated updates are linked together to
create a chain of blocks (thus the name). Under the assumption that a certain
percentage of the network resources are honest, the network is robust.
The exact mechanism for this mining differs depending on the blockchain.
Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and Ethereum (The Ethereum Project 2018) are two
proof-of-work blockchains that make the assumption that the operators of a
majority of the network’s computational power are honest. Mining in these
4
networks takes the form of solving randomized cryptographic puzzles, with a
solver deemed the lottery winner. If honest operators solve a majority of these
puzzles, the blockchain is, over time, robust to malicious activity. Algorand
(Gilad et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018) and Orberous (Kiayias et al., 2017) are two
proof-of-stake blockchains that make the assumption that honest parties hold a
majority of the currency in the network. The lottery for these networks has
currency in the network as lottery tickets, with a random subset of these tickets
being randomly selected as winners. More complex consensus mechanisms
have also been studied, including proof-of-space (Dziembowski et al., 2015;
Park et al., 2015) and proof-of-space-time (Moran and Orlov, 2019).
1.1.1 Blockchains as Public Ledgers
By their very nature, blockchains are a realization of public ledgers. Because
blockchains consider everyone a potential protocol participant, all posted
information is made public. It is straight forward to see why all information
posted on the blockchain becomes public. To achieve consensus, all protocol
participants in the network must know (and agree upon) all information that
is part of the consensus state.
As mentioned before, blockchains consist of a series of state updates en-
coded into blocks. Each update in appended to the previous block. As such,
the current state of the blockchain is defined by looking at the entire history
of the protocol. To provide the required consistency, this means that all the
information on the blockchain is immutable, i.e. it cannot be changed. Indeed,
popular proof-of-stake blockchains like Bitcoin leverage the immutability of
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old information explicitly, requiring that information must be sufficiently “old”
before it is considered part of the consensus state.
1.2 Other Realizations of Ledgers
While blockchains are the most widespread realization of public ledgers, there
are other realizations found in practice. These alternatives use different as-
sumptions to achieve security, but still provide the ledger guarantees. We
briefly describe two prominent realizations of the ledger functionality: cen-
tralized public ledgers and private ledgers.
Centralized Public Ledgers. Centralized ledgers provide the same guaran-
tees as public ledgers realized from blockchains but make stronger assump-
tions about party or parties running the ledger. Specifically, a centralized
public ledger only function correctly if the party or parties running the ledger
are honest. While this is clearly a dramatically stronger assumption, it appears
to hold true in practice for specific applications. For instance, Google has
recently started to run a Certificate Transparency log (Certificate Transparency
2018), which is a functioning centralized public ledger. This log tracks the
list of TLS certificates that are issued by certificate authorities. Providing this
information publicly makes abusing a compromised certificate authority key
more difficult. The security of the ledger requires that Google’s secret signing
key remains private. Additionally, the guarantee that information posted to
the ledger becomes public relies on Google’s infrastructure publishing updates
regularly and in a publicly available way.
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When leveraging centralized public ledgers in our applications, we gen-
erally make the simplifying assumption that the purpose of the ledger is
unrelated to our application. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the
operator of the Certificate Transparency log cares primarily about certificates.
If our application is leveraging ledgers to give stateless execution environ-
ments protections from rollback attacks (see Chapter 3), information posted to
the log for this application does not meaningfully concern certificates. Instead,
we are piggybacking on an service operating independently. A malicious
ledger operator is unlikely to interfere with the execution of our protocol.
Private Ledgers. An important case of public ledgers is the private ledger.
Private ledgers operate in the same way as a public ledger, but require au-
thentication before a party can participate or access data. These protocols may
have fewer mutually distrusting protocol participants, but still use similar
consensus mechanisms to ensure the robustness of the network. For example,
JP Morgan recently developed a private version of Ethereum called Quorum
(Quorum). The Quorum blockchain updates the Ethereum protocol by making
it possible to compute on data that remains secret to observers. Additionally,
Quorum deployments restrict the parties that can update the state of the sys-
tem and can participate in the underlying consensus mechanism. This is a
key difference from public blockchains. To leverage a private ledger in our
applications, the application users must have access to this ledger. In some
cases, this limitation may render a particular ledger inappropriate. Through-
out this work, we focus on public ledgers and note that if all parties using
the application have access to a private ledger, this private ledger may be
7
substituted.
1.3 Applications of Ledgers
In this work, we present new applications of public ledgers. These applications
all take advantage of the core public ledger guarantees, i.e.
• Public Access
• Immutability
Put another way, once information is published on the ledger, it is per-
manently available to everyone. We investigate conditioning various other
events on the publication of information onto the ledger. This is conceptually
straight forward if actual protocol participants can run the conditional events
— the participant simply monitors the ledger and executes subprotocols as ap-
propriate. However, we are interested in building cryptography that is innately
responsive to the publication of information on a ledger. A cryptographic
primitive, i.e. encryption, is not a protocol participant, and thus cannot directly
reach out and monitor events on the network. To overcome this limitation, we
require one additional property of our public ledgers:
• Offline Verifiability
To realize offline verifiability, we assume that public ledgers create an
authenticator or proof of publication that an efficient algorithm can use to decide if
some information has been posted to the ledger. We use the terms authenticator
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or proof of publication interchangeably throughout this work. This algorithm
must be able to run locally — without network access. Importantly, this
algorithm must have an unforgeability property in order to be meaningful.
If a player can locally compute a proof of publication that convinces the
algorithm, then the algorithm does not serve its purpose. A simple solution
with cryptographic security would be to use a cryptographic signature scheme;
any information posted to the ledger is signed under some well-known key.
This signature can then act as the authenticator, and can be verified locally.
Centralized public ledgers, like Certificate Transparency, employ this exact
solution. However, the use of a single secret key makes public ledgers of
this kind prone to abuse. The ledger administrator must ensure the key
is protected, and if the administrator is malicious, they may even give out
signatures improperly. Proof-of-work blockchains generally use the solution
of a sequence of randomized puzzles as an authenticator. This provides
only economic security, rather than cryptographic security — meaning that
forging a proof of publication is economically infeasible for any party to do
alone. Verifying that a piece of information is in a block followed by many
more blocks, each with a valid puzzle solution, is sufficient to verify that the
information is public. In Bitcoin, a sequence of six blocks with valid puzzle
solutions is considered securely part of the public state.
Given this authenticator, it is now possible to build cryptography that is
responsive to the ledger. Upon the publication of some information, a protocol
participant can gather that information along with the appropriate authentica-
tor. This information can be processed by the other cryptographic components
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using the verification algorithm. Once convinced that the information must
indeed be public (i.e. posted), the conditional event can happen (for instance,
decryption of a ciphertext).
With the properties of our public ledger in hand, we now proceed to
describe the three applications contained in this work.
1.3.1 Enclave Ledger Interaction
We begin our study of public ledgers by exploring the interaction between
trusted execution environments, such as trusted hardware and cryptographic
obfuscation, and public ledgers. We name this paradigm enclave ledger interac-
tion (ELI), as enclave is a common name for these trusted computing systems.
These two computation paradigms have highly complementary properties.
Public ledgers are highly distributed and are immutable, while enclaves are
highly localized and innately vulnerable to reset attacks. In these reset attacks,
an attacker tricks the enclave into executing the same logic multiple times on
different inputs, which can be devastating depending on the application. For
instance, a common use of enclaves in mobile devices is to check a user’s pass-
word and make sure that the user cannot guess too many times; this allows
users to use short passwords without compromising security. However, if the
enclave can be reset, this guess limit can be circumvented. These reset attacks
are a consequence of not being able to keep state. We show that combining
public ledgers and enclaves can prevent this class of attack.
Enclaves and ledgers can also complement each other in another way.
Enclaves can keep information secret, whereas all information stored on a
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ledger is publicly visible. When combined, we are able to realize systems
that select the best qualities of each component: private computation that is
contingent on public, immutable events. This combination can be used to
realize blockchains that support arbitrary transactions that are evaluated on
information that is secret. As noted earlier, Quorum (Quorum) leverages this
paradigm to allow secret, robust computation in a private network. 2 This
computation can allow computation over multiple players’ private inputs,
simulating the same primitive as secure multiparty computation, albeit from
different (possibly more powerful) building blocks.
ELI is a protocol between an enclave (either a piece of trusted hardware
or a cryptographically obfuscated program), a host (the machine that runs
the enclave), and a public ledger. The enclave is programmed to run some
step-by-step functionality, in which each step takes in some tuple (old_state,
input) and outputs a tuple (new_state, output). Because the enclave contains
no non-volatile storage, state must be offloaded to the host after each step
of computation, although the state itself may be encrypted, and therefore
opaque to the host. ELI binds enclave execution tightly to a chain of state
updates on the ledger. These chains are linear sequences of updates that are
bound using cryptographic hash functions. Chains are common in blockchain
based public ledgers, and can be simulated on all ledgers (see Section 2.1 for a
description of ledgers with chains). The enclave only executes the next step
of the computation if it can verify that the host has appropriately posted a
commitment to their inputs on the ledger. This commitment is also used as
2While the properties of Quorum are very similar to our work, it became public after initial
publication of the ideas in this work.
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a pseudorandom generator seed, derandomizing the computation; repeated
execution on the same input always yields the same result. The linearity of
the computation (not allowing multiple execution paths to be run from the
same initial starting state) depends on the linearity of the chain present on the
ledger.
ELI realizes a specific form of conditional, secret execution. That is, the en-
clave is able to execute secret computation depending on (possibly encrypted)
public state updates. This paradigm can be used to realize a massive number
of applications. In Chapter 3, we discuss how this can be used to realize
private smart contracts, guaranteed logging before accessing a sensitive file,
security with short passwords, and autonomous ransomware. In fact, the
other applications we discuss in Chapters 4 and 5 can actually be seen as
specific notions of conditional, secret execution as well.
1.3.2 Overcoming the Impossibility of Fairness
A desirable property of interactive protocols is fairness, the guarantee that
either all players learn the output of the protocol or none do. However,
there is a well-known result that achieving fairness is impossible in many
circumstances, specifically when a majority of the protocol participants can act
dishonestly (Cleve, 1986). This impossibility is particularly relevant to secure
multiparty computation protocols (MPC) (Yao, 1986; Goldreich, Micali, and
Wigderson, 1987; Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård, 1988; Ben-Or, Goldwasser,
and Wigderson, 1988). MPC protocols allow mutually distrusting parties to
compute arbitrary functions without revealing their private inputs. Without
12
fairness, these protocols lose some of their utility. Consider a group of parties
computing an auction over secret bids. If an adversarial party learns the
output first, they can abort the computation, claiming a protocol failure. This
party can then adaptively change their input when the protocol is re-executed,
allowing them to win the auction. Put simply, this abort condition is what
makes fair MPC impossible; if we let the adversary always be the party to
send the last message of the protocol, then the adversary can simply abort
instead, and still learn the computation’s output (notice that the adversary
does not need to receive any more messages in the protocol, so it already
knows the output).
We show that it is possible to overcome this impossibility when players
have access to a public ledger. Intuitively, the protocol participants can lever-
age the conditional execution property discussed before, where the program
that is executed conditionally is just decryption. At a high level, this is ac-
complished by modifying the MPC protocol to compute the encryption of the
output, such that decryption is conditioned on each player posting some in-
formation publicly. Importantly, because the information itself must be posted
publicly, this part of the protocol is not vulnerable to early abort attacks. The
adversary can either post its information, thereby letting all players access this
information and decrypt the output, or abort, making it impossible to decrypt
the output for any player — including itself.
Realizing the details of this protocol is slightly more complex. In Chapter 4,
we give two constructions of this protocol. The first is of primarily theoretical
interest. The MPC protocol is modified to compute the witness encryption
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(see Section 2.2.6) of the function output, where the language is formalized
with respect to the public ledger interface. Recall that the execution that is
conditioned on the public ledger in the intuitive solution above is ciphertext
decryption. As such witness encryption is sufficient. The second construction,
intended to be practically interesting, relies on trusted hardware to provide
fairness (but importantly, not privacy). Instead of computing a witness encryp-
tion, this protocol uses an authenticated symmetric key encryption scheme,
where the key is hidden inside of trusted hardware. Only upon seeing that
all players are ready to receive the decrypted output (by examining the pub-
lic ledger for tokens signaling readiness), the trusted hardware outputs the
proper decryption key to all players.
1.3.3 Abuse Resistance Law Enforcement Access System
In the previous applications, the “public” in public ledgers is relatively limited.
For instance, it is important that the MPC protocol participants can access the
ledger to achieve fairness, but the general public need not read any of the
information posted there. We now turn our attention to an application that
leverages the public aspects of public ledgers more expansively.
Proliferation of End-to-End Encryption. As concern for user privacy has
grown, modern communication systems almost universally use some degree
of encryption to protect the contents of messages. A growing percentage of
these systems have also started to deploy end-to-end encryption (E2E), in which
only the sender and the receiver of a message are able to recover the plaintext.
This means that the service provider cannot read the message, and learns
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nothing beyond the metadata associated with the message. E2E systems
include some of the most widely used messaging applications, including
Apple iMessage (iMessage) and WhatsApp (WhatsApp, 2017), as well as the
privacy-focused messaging applications like Signal (Signal Secure Messaging
System) and Telegram (Telegram). Platforms like Apple FaceTime (FaceTime)
also use E2E to keep real-time video and audio data private. The spread of
E2E is widely considered a victory for privacy advocates as it ensures that
companies cannot spy on their users, and sensitive information cannot be
compromised in the event of a breach.
A consequence of the proliferation of E2E systems is that service providers
are unable to provide message plaintext in response to a court order. Members
of law enforcement often refer to this as the “going dark” problem, as law
enforcement is no longer able to access the material to which they had become
accustom (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). In 2016, the closely related
issue of device encryption became the subject of public discourse in the United
States after the FBI was unable to access the iPhone of the San Bernardino
shooter (The Apple-F.B.I. Case 2016). Notable members of law enforcement,
including FBI Director Christopher Wray, testified before Congress on the
detrimental effect of widespread encryption adoption, although it has since
become clear that elements of their testimony were overstated (Wray, 2017).
Starting in 2018, the Justice Department, under Attorney General William Barr,
resurrected government attacks on encryption systems, explicitly addressing
the spread of E2E messaging. In an open letter, Barr, along with officials from
the UK, criticized the technology industry for enabling the spread of child
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sexual abuse material by rolling out E2E (Patel et al., 2019). In December 2019,
another round of congressional hearings featured senators on both sides of the
aisle chastising technology companies for not finding a “workable” solution
and warning about the possibility of future legislation curtailing the legal uses
of cryptography (Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2019).
Achieving Accountability using Ledgers. All existing technical proposals
for encryption systems that provide law enforcement with access to plaintext
fail to provide meaningful abuse resistance properties (e.g. (Denning, 1994;
Savage, 2018; Bellovin et al., 2018; Tait, 2016; Levy and Robinson, 2018; Bellare
and Rivest, 1999)). Generally, these proposals rely on key escrow, in which the
government holds long-term keys that allow for legal access. These solutions
are incredibly vulnerable to abuse; if government key material is compro-
mised, by a foreign government for example, it would be impossible to detect
its misuse. Alternatively, if members of law enforcement decided to surrepti-
tiously decrypt messages, it would be impossible for civil liberty groups to
notice. In fact, there is little transparency in these proposed systems at all.
Noting these problems, recent policy working groups (Encryption Working
Group, 2019; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,
2018) indicate that key escrow solutions are insufficient, with the possible
exception of device encryption. Any truly workable solution must provide
both meaningful transparency and accountability.
In this work, we leverage public ledgers to design encryption systems that
allow for law enforcement access only after law enforcement has published
the proper accountability and transparency information. This information
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can provide civil liberty groups and the general public with confidence that
the law is being properly followed, and zero knowledge proofs can be used
to hide any information that is considered sensitive, e.g. the target of an
active investigation. We provide formal definitions for an abuse resistant
law enforcement access system, and explore the requirements for realizing
it. Specifically, we show that building an abuse resistant system is relatively
straightforward, providing law enforcement posts the accountability informa-
tion before a message is encrypted. Intuitively, law enforcement can generate
and publicly propagate key information such that messages that are the target
of surveillance can be decrypted, and all others will be information theoreti-
cally destroyed. Additionally, law enforcement can use non-interactive zero
knowledge proofs to show that this new key material has been generated in
accordance with valid warrants.
However, achieving abuse resistant law enforcement access for cipher-
text that was encrypted before accountability information is posted publicly
requires extractable witness encryption (see Section 2.2.6.1) for specific lan-
guages. Our construction is similar to the conditional decryption mechanism
leveraged in ELI. Unlike the case where key material is generated before en-
cryption, in this case decryption should only be possible if a specific event
happens after, i.e. law enforcement posts the proper accountability informa-
tion. This is a form of conditioning decryption on public events. Without ex-
tractable witness encryption (or a non-cryptographic assumption like trusted
hardware), it is impossible to realize this functionality.
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1.4 Organization of this work.
Chapter 2 gives notation and definitions required throughout other chapters.
This includes the interface and requirements for the ledger used. Chapter 3
contains a description of the enclave ledger iteration paradigm and discusses
some direct applications. Chapter 4 shows how public ledgers can be used
to overcome prior impossibility results for secure multiparty computation.
Lastly, Chapter 5 investigates the way public ledgers can be used to achieve
abuse resistant law enforcement access systems.
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Notation. Let λ be an adjustable security parameter and negl(1λ) be a neg-
ligible function in λ. Throughout our constructions we will use ∥ to denote
bitwise concatenation,
c≈ to denote computational indistinguishably, and s≈
to denote statistical indistinguishably. Let ← or → denote assignment, as
appropriate. To denote that an algorithm or protocol is parameterized by a
value or other algorithm, we will use superscript.
2.1 Modeling the Ledger
We begin our definitions chapter by formalizing the interface for the public
ledger. The ledger can be thought of as an bulletin board that allows parties
to publish arbitrary information, encoded as bit-strings. Recall from the
introduction that we will require a primitive that provides the following
guarantees:
• Public access to all published information
• Immutability of all published information
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• Offline verifiability of publication
In general, we will accomplish this third property using a publicly-verifiable
authentication tag or proof of publication, which will establish that the string was
indeed published.
In Chapter 3, we require an additionally property of our public ledgers.
Specifically, we require that that information is posted as part of a specific chain
of posted values. This property occurs naturally in blockchains and is easy to
realize in other concrete instantiations of public ledgers. In Chapters 4 and 5,
we do not require this property. As such, we begin by giving a definition of a
public ledger that has this property, followed by a description of the relaxed
public ledger.
2.1.1 Public Ledger with Chaining
Our ideal ledger posts an arbitrary string S as part of specific a chain of posted
values. As an abstraction, we will require each post to identify a chain identifier
CID. While the host may generate many such identifiers (and thus create
an arbitrary number of distinct chains), our abstraction assumes that other
parties (e.g., other host machines) will not be allowed to post under the same
identifier. The exact nature of the identifier CID depends on the specific Ledger
instantiation, which we discuss in detail in Section 2.1.2.1.
The advantage of our interface is that similar checks and chaining are
natural properties to achieve when using blockchain-based consensus systems
to instantiate the ledger, since many consensus systems perform the necessary
checks as part of their consensus logic. Indeed, we can significantly reduce
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the cost of deploying our system by using existing ledger systems, including
Bitcoin and Ethereum, as they provide these capabilities already, as we discuss
in Section 2.1.2.1.
We now define our ledger abstraction, parameterized by a verification function
Verify, which has the following interface.1 Let HL be a collision-resistant hash
function:
• LVerify.Post(Data, CID)→ (post, πpublish).
When a party wishes to post a string Data onto the chain identified by
CID, the ledger constructs a data structure post = (PrevHash, CID, Data)
by performing the following steps:
1. It finds the most recent postprev on the Ledger that is associated with
CID (if one exists).
2. If postprev was found, it sets post.PrevHash ← postprev.Hash. Oth-
erwise it sets post.PrevHash ← (Root: CID), where this labeling
uniquely identifies it as first post associated with CID.
3. It sets post.Data← Data.
4. It sets post.Hash← HL(post.Data∥post.PrevHash).
5. It records (post, CID) on the public ledger.
The ledger computes an authentication tag πpublish over the entire struc-
ture post and returns (post, πpublish) such that Verify(post, πpublish) = 1.
1We omit the ledger setup algorithm for this description, although many practical instanti-
ations will include some form of setup or key generation.
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• LVerify.GetChain(CID)→ (posti, πpublish,i)i∈∗.
When a party wishes to read from the ledger, they specify a chain. This
call then returns all posts associated with that chain, along with their
authenticators.
We require that it is difficult to construct a pair (S, πpublish) such that
Verify(S, πpublish) = 1 except as the result of a call to LVerify.Post(·, ·). Intu-
itively we refer to this definition as SUF-AUTH. This definition is analogous to
the SUF-CMA definition used for signatures. Indeed, looking forward, these
signatures will be one of the techniques used to construct the authentication
tag.
Remark. We note that the functionality of the above ledger can be simulated
from a more simple ledger that has no conception of chaining. For instance,
a local agent can retrieve the full ledger contents L. Each string in the chain
can be tagged, with either an identifier or the public key of a digital signature
scheme (if only a single player should be able to post to each chain). Then,
using the full ledger contents, the agent can compute Hashi−1 and Hashi locally,
performing any hashing required.
Security and finality of the Ledger. Informally, we require that it is difficult to
construct a new pair (S, πpublish) such that Verify(S, πpublish) = 1 except as the
result of a call to LVerify.Post(·, ·), even after the adversary has received many
authenticator values on chosen strings. We refer to this definition as SUF-AUTH,
and it is analogous to the SUF-CMA definition used for signatures. We note that
in some of our proofs we will assume an oracle that produces authentication
tags, optionally without actually posting strings to a real ledger. For example,
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in a ledger based on signatures, our proofs might assume the existence of
a signing oracle that produces signatures on chosen messages. When using
“proof of work” ledgers, the authenticators have economic security instead of
cryptographic security; we discuss this further in Section 2.1.2.1.
2.1.2 Relaxed Public Ledger
We now consider a more relaxed version of the public ledger that does not
have the chaining primitive. We will be using this simplified primitive in
Chapters 4 and 5. The ledger ideal functionality is given below (and a UC
version of it is given in Figure 2.1). This functionality allows users to post
arbitrary information to the ledger; this data is associated with a particular
index on the ledger, with which any user can retrieve the original data as well
as a proof of publication. As before, our functionality encodes a notion we
refer to as ledger unforgeability, which requires that there exists an algorithm to
verify a authenticator that a message has been posted to the ledger, and that
adversaries cannot forge this authenticator.
As noted above, it is possible to realize chaining on these relaxed public
ledger using tagging and local simulation. We now define the ledger abstrac-
tion, parameterized by a verification function Verify:
• LVerify.GetCounter()→ t.
This algorithm allows any party to retrieve the current ledger counter
t ∈N.
• LVerify.Post(x)→ (t, x, πpublish).
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Any party can post some bit-string x to the ledger. The ledger increments
the t by 1, computes the proof of publication πpublish on (t||x) such that
Verify((t∥x), πpublish) = 1. The ledger then adds the entry (t, x, πpublish)
to the set of entries T and respond with (t, x, πpublish)
• LVerify.GetVal(t)→ {(t, x, πpublish),⊥}.
To retrieve any entry in the set of entries on the ledger, a party calls
GetVal on the index t. If LVerify.GetCounter() ≥ t, the ledger returns the
appropriate entry in the set T. Otherwise, the ledger returns ⊥.
As before, we require that it is difficult to construct a new pair (s, πpublish)
such that Verify(s, πpublish) = 1 except as the result of a call to LVerify.Post(·).
In Chapter 5, we will be using the universally-composable (UC) framework
from (Canetti, 2001). We give a UC-style definition for this ledger function-
ality in Figure 2.1. This definition is also parameterized by a verify function
Verify(·, ·).
Functionality LVerify
GetCounter: Upon receiving (GetCounter) from any party, return t.
Post: Upon receiving (Post, x), the trusted party increments t by
1, computes the proof of publication πpublish on (t||x) such that
Verify((t∥x), πpublish) = 1. Add the entry (t, x, πpublish) to the entry table T.
Respond with (t, x, πpublish)
GetVal: Upon receiving (GetVal, t), check if there is an entry (t, x, πpublish)
in the entry table T. If not, return ⊥. Otherwise, return (t, x, πpublish).
Figure 2.1: Ideal relaxed public ledger functionality for a proof-of-publication ledger.
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2.1.2.1 Realizing the Ledger
There are many different systems that may be used to instantiate the ledger.
In principle, any stateful centralized server capable of producing SUF-CMA
signatures can be used for this purpose. We describe four potential realiza-
tions in detail: unstructured, centralized public ledgers such as Certificate
Transparency (Certificate Transparency 2018), proof of work blockchains like
Bitcoin, smart contract systems like Ethereum, and private blockchains.
Certificate Transparency A number of browsers have begun to mandate Cer-
tificate Transparency (CT) proofs for TLS certificates (Certificate Transparency
2018). In these systems, every CA-issued certificate is included in a public
log, which is published and maintained by a central authority such as Google.
Every certificate in the log is included as a leaf in a Merkle tree, and the signed
root and associated membership proofs are distributed by the log maintainer.
Provided that the log maintainer is trustworthy, this system forms a public
bedger with strong cryptographic security. The inclusion of a certificate can
be verified by any party who has the maintainer’s public key, while the tree
location can be viewed as a unique identifier of the posted certificate. Because
many certificate authorities support CT, the ability to programmatically submit
certificate signing requests, using services like LetsEncrypt, allows us to use
CT as a log for any arbitrary data that can be incorporated into an X.509
certificate. In our presentation we implicitly assume that the Enclave can
verify CT inclusion proofs from a specific log i.e., that it has been provisioned
with a copy of the log maintainer’s public verification key.
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A limitation of the CT realization is that, to implement our Ledger func-
tionality of Section 2.1, we require a way to ensure that the PrevHash field of
each record truly does identify the previous entry in the log. Unfortunately,
the current instantiation of CT does not guarantee this; instead, the enclave
must read the entire certificate log to verify that no interceding entries exist.
This makes CT less bandwidth-efficient than the other realizations.
Bitcoin and Proof-of-work Blockchains Public blockchains, embodied most
prominently by Bitcoin, are designed to facilitate distributed consensus as
to the contents of a ledger. In these systems, new blocks of transactions are
added to the ledger each time a participant solves a costly proof of work (PoW),
which typically involves solving a hash puzzle over the block contents. These
PoW solutions are publicly verifiable, and can be used as a form of “economic”
authentication tag over the block contents: that is, while these tags can be
forged, the financial cost of doing so is extremely high. Moreover, because
blocks are computed in sequence, a sub-chain of n blocks (which we refer to
as a “fragment”) will include n chained proofs-of-work, resulting in a linear
increase in the cost of forging the first block in the fragment.
The remaining properties of our ledger are provided as follows: in Bitcoin,
transactions are already uniquely identified by their hash, and each transaction
(by consensus rules) must identify a previous transaction hashes as an input.
Similarly, due to double spending protections in the consensus rules, there
cannot be two transactions that share a previous input. Finally, we can encode
arbitrary data into the transaction using the OP_RETURN script (Bitcoin Wiki:
Script 2018).
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Analyzing the cost of forging blockchain fragments. Proof-of-work blockchains
do not provide a cryptographic guarantee of unforgeability. To provide some
understanding of the cost of forging in these systems, we can examine the
economics of real proof-of-work blockchains. We propose argue that the cost
of forging an authenticator can can be determined based on from block reward
offered by a proof-of-work cryptocurrency, assuming that the market is liquid
and reasonably efficient.
In currencies such as Bitcoin, the reward for producing a valid proof-of-work
block is denominated in the blockchain currency, which has a floating value
with respect to currencies such as the dollar. Critically, because each instance
of a PoW puzzle in the real blockchain is based on the preceding block, an
adversarial miner must choose at mining time if they want to mine on the
blockchain or attempt to forge a block for use in the ELI scheme; their work
cannot do double duty. Thus we can calculate the opportunity cost of forgoing
normal mining in order to attack an ELI system: the real cost of forging a
block is at least the value of a block reward. Similarly, the cost of forging
a blockchain fragments of length n is at least n times the block reward. At
present, the cost of forging a fragment of length 7 would be 87.5 BTC.
Remark. This simple analysis ignores that a single blockchain fragment may
be used by multiple instances of a given enclave. This admits the possibility
that an attacker with significant capital might amortize this cost by spreading
it across many instances. Indeed, if amortized over a sufficient number of
forged ledger posts, this fixed cost could be reduced. For scenarios where we
expect sufficient instances for this attack to be practical, it is necessary to rate
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limit the number of ledger posts included in a given block that the enclave
will accept results from.
Ethereum and Smart Contract Systems A very natural realization of our
ledger system is a smart contract systems such as Ethereum (Nakamoto,
2008; The Ethereum Project 2018). Smart contract systems enable distributed
public computation on the blockchain. Typically, a program is posted to some
specific address on the blockchain. When a user submits a transaction to the
associated address, the code is executed and appropriate state is updated. As
noted previously, our system allows for smart contracts with private data,
which is impossible on current implementations of smart contract system.
Private Blockchains Many recent systems such as Hyperledger (Hyperledger,
2017) implement private smart contracts by constructing a shared blockchain
among a set of dedicated nodes. In some instantiations, the parties forgo the
use of proof-of-work in favor of using digital signatures and trusted hardware
to identify the party who writes the next block (Intel Corporation, 2018).
Private blockchains represent a compromise between centralized systems such
as CT and proof-of-work blockchains. They are able to use digital signatures
to produce ledger authentication tags so the security is not economic in nature.
Moreover, the ledger can be constructed to provide efficient rules for ledger




We now give a definition for pseudorandom functions (Goldreich, Goldwasser,
and Micali, 1984).
Definition 1 (Pseudorandom Function) A pseudorandom function family is a
family of functions indexed by an λ-bit key PRF : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ, for
ℓ = poly(λ). We may also write this as PRFK(m) → r, where K ∈ {0, 1}λ, m ∈




⏐⏐⏐b $←− {0, 1}] < negl(1λ)
Where Ob(·) is an oracle. If b = 1, upon receiving some query m, if there exists
an entry (m, r) in the responses table, Ob(·) returns r. Otherwise, Ob(·) samples
uniform random bit strings r ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, adds (m, r) to the entry table, and returns
r. If b = 0, Ob(·) initially samples K
$←− {0, 1}λ, and responds to queries m with
PRFK(m).
2.2.2 Authenticated Encryption With Associated Data
We require a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme consisting of the
algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec). This notion is most commonly captured in
practice as Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (Rogaway, 2002).
We will not require the authenticated data, and so we just define a simplified
authenticated encryption here (Goldwasser and Micali, 1984; Bellare et al.,
1997; Bellare and Rogaway, 2000; Rogaway et al., 2001).
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Definition 2 (Authenticated Encryption) A symmetric authenticated encryption
encryption scheme ΠAE is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) defined as fol-
lows:
– KeyGen(1λ) generates a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ
– Enc(k, m) takes in a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs
a ciphertext c. This algorithm is either randomized, or can take in explicit
randomness r.
– Dec(k, c) takes in a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs
either a message m or the error symbol ⊥
We require that these algorithms satisfy the following property
Pr
[
Dec(k, c∗) ̸= ⊥
⏐⏐⏐ k← KeyGen(1λ), c∗ ← AEnc(k,·),Dec(k,·)(1λ)] < negl(1λ)
Where Enc(k, ·) and Dec(k, ·) are oracles and c∗ is a ciphertext not output by the
encryption oracle.
For simplicity we further define the specialized algorithm Encpad as one
that pads the plaintext to (a maximum state size) n bits prior to encrypting it,
and define Decunpad as removing this padding.
2.2.3 CCA Secure Public Key Encryption
We now define chosen-ciphertext secure public key encryption
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Definition 3 (CCA Public Key Encryption) A public key encryption scheme ΠPKE
is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) defined as follows
– KeyGen(1λ) generates a public, private keypair (pk, sk).
– Enc(pk, m) takes in a public key pk and a message m and outputs a ciphertext
c.
– Dec(sk, c) takes in a secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs either a
message m or the error symbol ⊥.




λ, pk, c∗, aux)
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ),
m0, m1, aux ← A
Dec1(sk,·)
1 ,
b $←− {0, 1}, c∗ ← Enc(pk, mb)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
< negl(1λ)
where Dec2(sk, ·) is a decryption oracle, with the additional requirment that on
input c∗, it responds ⊥.
2.2.4 Lossy Encryption
Lossy encryption (Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009) is an encryption appli-
cation of lossy trapdoor functions, which were introduced by Peikert and
Waters (Peikert and Waters, 2008). Intuitively, lossy encryption is a public
key encryption scheme that has an algorithm to generate lossy keys that are
computationally indistinguishable from normal keys. When encrypting with
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these lossy keys, the resulting ciphertext contains no information about the
plaintext.
Definition 4 (Lossy Encryption) A lossy public-key encryption scheme ΠLossy
is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen, KeyGenloss, Enc, Dec) defined as
– KeyGen(1λ) generates an injective keypair (pk, sk)
– KeyGenloss(1λ) generates a lossy keypair (pk, ·)
– Enc(pk, m) takes in a public key pk and a plaintext message m and out-
puts a ciphertext c
– Dec(sk, c) takes in a secret key sk and a ciphertext c and either outputs ⊥
or the message m
We require that the above algorithms satisfies the following properties:
– Correctness on real keys: For all messages m, it should hold that
Pr
[
m = Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m))
⏐⏐⏐(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)] = 1
– Lossiness on lossy keys: for all (pk, ·) ← KeyGenloss(1λ) and m0, m1
such that |m0| = |m1|,
Enc(pk, id, m0)
s≈ Enc(pk, id, m1)





In our next definition, we will require the instantiation of lossy encryption
presented in (Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009). For completeness, we include
it here. Let G be a cyclic group of order p (where p is prime) in which the
DDH assumption holds. let g,h denote generators of G.
– KeyGen(1λ): g $←− G, x, r ← Zp. pk← (g, gr, gx, grx) and sk← x. Output
(pk, sk).
– KeyGenloss(1λ): g
$←− G, x, y, r ← Zp such that x ̸= y. pk← (g, gr, gx, gry)
and sk← ⊥. Output (pk, sk).
– Enc(pk, m): (g, h, ĝ, ĥ) ← pk, r1, r2 ← Zp. c ← (gr1 hr2 , (ĝ)r1(ĥ)r2 · m).
Output c.
– Dec(sk, c): (c0, c1)← c, m← c1csk0
For proof that this scheme is indeed a lossy encryption scheme, please see
(Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009).
2.2.4.1 Lossy-Tag Encryption
In Chapter 5 we require a specific generalization of lossy encryption we call
lossy-tag encryption (LTE). Intuitively, this is an encryption scheme with a
single public key in which encryption takes as input a “tag” in addition to the
public key and plaintext. Encrypting under a tag from a specific subset will
produce in an injective ciphertext, while the remaining tags will produce a
lossy ciphertext. This notion is closely related to numerous previous works,
including lossy encryption (Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009), lossy trapdoor
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functions (Peikert and Waters, 2008), identity-based lossy trapdoor functions
(Bellare et al., 2012) all-but-one functions (Peikert and Waters, 2008), and
all-but-n functions (Hemenway et al., 2011). We define lossy-tag encryption
formally as follows:
Definition 5 (Lossy Tag Encryption) A lossy-tag encryption (LTE) scheme
with respect to a tag space T consists of a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec)
defined as follows:
– KeyGen(1λ, T ) takes in a set of tags T ⊂ T of polynomial size in λ and
outputs a public key params and a secret key msk.
– Enc(params, id, m) encrypts the message m under the public key params
and id ∈ T to produce ciphertext c.
– Dec(msk, id, c) takes in the secret key msk, id ∈ T and a ciphertext c and
either outputs a message m or ⊥.
We require that the above algorithms satisfy the follow properties
– Correctness on injective tags:
Pr
⎡⎢⎣m = Dec(msk, id, Enc(params, id, m))
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
id ∈ T
(params, msk)← KeyGen(1λ, T )
⎤⎥⎦ = 1
– Lossiness on lossy tags: for all messages m0, m1 and all sets T , if id ̸∈ T
and (params, msk) ∈ KeyGen(1λ, T ), then
Enc(params, id, m0)
s≈ Enc(params, id, m1)
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A stronger version of this definition could remove the requirement that
|T0| = |T1| for indistinguishability of tag sets. For our constructions, we do
not concern ourselves with this leakage.
Realizing lossy-tag encryption: When the size of T is polynomial in the
security parameter, it is trivial to realize lossy-tag encryption from standard
lossy encryption (Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009) simply by generating
one lossy keypair to represent each “tag”. However, even for small sets T
this may produce unreasonably large public keys. In this work, we present a
direct instantiation of a lossy-tag encryption scheme based on DDH, such that
the public parameters params that are linear in |T |.
Let G be a cyclic group of order p. Define pk = (g, h, g̃, h̃) ∈ G4, and
DoubleEncrypt(pk, m; r1, r2) to output (gr1 hr2 , g̃r1 h̃r2 ·m). As noted in (Bellare,
Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009), if pk is a DDH tuple then this encryption is injective,
but if pk is a random tuple then the encryption is statistically lossy. We now
present a construction ΠLTE for lossy-tag encryption as follows:
• KeyGen(params, T ) → (params, msk). Sample params = p,G, g, h, ĝ, ĥ
where G has order p and g, h, ĝ, ĥ are generators of G. Sample a ran-
dom polynomial A(x) in Zp of degree k = |T | such that for each
s ∈ T , A(x) = 0. Then compute B(x) = d2A(x) for some constant
d2 ̸= d0d1 . Let αi be the i
th coefficient of A(x) and βi be the ith coefficient of
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B(x). Use rejection sampling to sample random η0 . . . ηk such then when
ηi is interpreted as the ith coefficient of a polynomial E(x), E(id) ̸= 0 for
all id ∈ T . Compute params = ((gηk ĝαk , . . . , gη0 ĝα0), (hηk ĥβk , . . . , hη0 ĥβ0)).
Compute msk = (η0, η1, . . . , ηk) and output params, msk.
• Enc(params, params, id, m)→ c.
– Parse
((gηk ĝαk , . . . , gη0 ĝα0), (hηk ĥβk , . . . , hη0 ĥβ0))← params
– Compute the user public key













– Sample r1, r2 ← Zp
– Compute and return DoubleEncrypt(pk, m; r1, r2)
• Dec(params, msk, id, c)→ m Parse (η0, η1, . . . , ηk)← msk Parse (c1, c2)←
c Compute y = ∑ki=0 η0(id)
k Compute and return m = c2
cy1
.
We now prove that ΠLTE above realizes the the functionality of lossy-tag
encryption. To do so, we recall the construction of a lossy encryption scheme
in Section 4.1 of (Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009). As mentioned above,
they observe that ElGamal double encryption is injective when the public
key has the structure (g, h, gx, hx), but is lossy when the public key has the
structure (g, h, gx, hy), for x ̸= y. For completeness, we have included this
algorithm above in Section 2.2.4
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Correctness on injective tags. For injective tags, A(x) = B(x) = 0. Recall that







). Written another way, this is (g, h, gE(id) ĝA(id), hE(id)ĥB(id)). Be-
cause A(x) = B(x) = 0, the public key is (g, h, gE(id), hE(id)), where E(id) is
non-zero. Note that this form is the same form as an injective key from (Bel-
lare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009), so the resulting ciphertext is injective with
corresponding private key E(id).
Lossiness on lossy tags. For lossy tags, A(x) ̸= B(x) ̸= 0. This can be ob-
served because B(x) = kA(x), and there are at most |T | zeros of a degree |T |
polynomial, and all all these zeros were set to be the injective tags. The pub-
lic key used for encryption is, as before, (g, h, gE(id) ĝA(id), hE(id)ĥB(id)). Without
loss of generality, the public key can then be written as (g, h, gE(id)+d0 A(id), hE(id)+d1B(id)).
Note that because B(·) was sampled such that d2A(x) = B(x), and d0d1 ̸= d2
, then E(id) + d0A(id) ̸= E(id) + d1B(id). Thus this public key is structured
exactly like the lossy key from (Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009), so the
resulting ciphertext is lossy.
Indistinguishability of tag sets. Due to the key indistinguishability of (Bel-
lare, Hofheinz, and Yilek, 2009), it is clear that a lossy key and an injective key,
when computed during encryption, are statistically indistinguishable. All that
remains to argue is that the public parameters leak no information about the
tag set besides its size (note that the size of params trivially leaks |T |). Notice
that it is sufficient to show that this property holds when two sets differ in
only a single tag, as a straightforward hybrid argument in which a single
tag is swapped in each hybrid can generalize the result. Next, notice that
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each element in params is formed like a Pendersen commitment (Pedersen,
1992) to αi or βi. Thus, it is clear to see that if there exists an adversary that
can distinguish between sets, it can be used to break the hiding property of
Pendersen commitments.
2.2.5 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) (Yao, 1986; Goldreich, Micali, and
Wigderson, 1987; Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård, 1988; Ben-Or, Goldwasser,
and Wigderson, 1988) allows a set of n player compute a function over their
joint inputs without sharing any information about those inputs. A MPC
protocol is a protocol executed by n number of parties P1, · · · , Pn for a n-party
functionality F. We allow for parties to exchange messages simultaneously.
In every round, every party is allowed to broadcast messages to all parties.
We require that at the end of the protocol, all the parties receive the output
F(x1, . . . , xn), where xi is the ith party’s input.2 There are many properties that
a MPC protocol can have. We begin by giving the classic simulation-based
formalization of MPC with security with abort.
Ideal World. We start by describing the ideal world experiment where n
parties P1, · · · , Pn interact with an ideal functionality for computing a function
F. An adversary may corrupt any subset PA ⊂ P of the parties. We denote
the honest parties byH.
Inputs: Each party Pi obtains an initial input xi. The adversary S is given
2One can also consider asymmetric functionalities where every party receives a different
output. Since there are generic transformations from the symmetric case to the asymmetric
case, we only consider symmetric functionalities for simplicity of exposition.
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auxiliary input z. S selects a subset of the parties PA ⊂ P to corrupt,
and is given the inputs xk of each party Pk ∈ PA.
Sending inputs to trusted party: Each honest party Pi sends its input xi to
the trusted party. For each corrupted party Pi ∈ PA, the adversary may
select any value x∗i and send it to the ideal functionality.
Trusted party computes output: Let x∗1 , . . . , x
∗
n be the inputs that were sent to
the trusted party. If any of the received inputs were ⊥, then the trusted
party sends ⊥ to all the parties.
Adaptive Abort: The trusted party sends F(x∗1 , . . . , x
∗
n) to the adversary. If
the adversary responds with ⊥, the trusted party sends ⊥ to the honest
parties. Otherwise, the trusted party sends F(x∗1 , . . . , x
∗
n) to the honest
parties.
Outputs: Honest parties output the function output they obtained from the
ideal functionality. Malicious parties may output an arbitrary PPT func-
tion of the adversary’s view.
The overall output of the ideal-world experiment consists of the outputs
of all parties. For any ideal-world adversary S with auxiliary input z ∈
{0, 1}∗, input vector x⃗, and security parameter λ, we denote the output of the





Real World. The real world execution begins by an adversary A selecting any
arbitrary subset of parties PA ⊂ P to corrupt.3 The parties then engage in an
3In our work, we concern ourselves only with static corruption models.
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execution of a real n-party protocol Π. Throughout the execution of Π, the
adversary A sends all messages on behalf of the corrupted parties, and may
follow an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. In contrast, the honest parties
follow the instructions of Π.
At the conclusion of all the update phases, each honest party Pi outputs
whatever output it received from the computation. Malicious parties may
output an arbitrary PPT function of the view of A.
For any adversary A with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗, input vector x⃗,





Definition 6 A protocol Π is a secure n-party protocol computing F if for every PPT
adversary A in the real world, there exists a PPT adversary S corrupting the same
parties in the ideal world such that for every initial input vector x⃗, every auxiliary










2.2.5.1 Fair Multiparty Computation
A secure fair multi-party computation protocol is a slight modification of the
security with abort definition given above. The real-world experiment stays
the same as above. The ideal world experiment is modified below:
Inputs: Each party Pi obtains an initial input xi. The adversary S is given
auxiliary input z. S selects a subset of the parties PA ⊂ P to corrupt,
and is given the inputs xk of each party Pk ∈ PA.
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Sending inputs to trusted party: Each honest party Pi sends its input xi to
the trusted party. For each corrupted party Pi ∈ PA, the adversary may
select any value x∗i and send it to the ideal functionality.
Trusted party computes output: Let x∗1 , . . . , x
∗
n be the inputs that were sent to
the trusted party. If any of the received inputs were ⊥, then the trusted
party sends ⊥ to all the parties. Otherwise, the trusted party sends
F(x∗1 , . . . , x
∗
n) to all parties
Outputs: Honest parties output the function output they obtained from the
ideal functionality. Malicious parties may output an arbitrary PPT func-
tion of the adversary’s view.
The overall output of the ideal-world experiment consists of the outputs
of all parties. For any ideal-world adversary S with auxiliary input z ∈
{0, 1}∗, input vector x⃗, and security parameter λ, we denote the output of the





MPC with Complete Fairness. We say that a protocol Π is a secure protocol
if any adversary, who corrupts a subset of parties and runs the protocol with
honest parties, gains no information about the inputs of the honest parties
beyond the protocol output.
Definition 7 A protocol Π is a secure n-party protocol computing F with complete
fairness if for every PPT adversary A in the real world, there exists a PPT adversary
S corrupting the same parties in the ideal world such that for every initial input
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In this section, we define witness encryption (Gentry, Lewko, and Waters,
2014).
Definition 8 (Witness Encryption) A witness encryption ΠWE = (Enc, Dec) for
a NP language L consists of the following algorithms:
– Encryption, Enc(1λ, x, m): On input instance x, message m and it outputs a
ciphertext CT.
– Decryption, Dec(CT, w): On input ciphertext CT and witness w, it outputs
m′.
We require that the following properties hold:
– Correctness: For every x ∈ L, let w be such that (x, w) ∈ R, for every
m ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[m← Dec(Enc(x, m), w)] = 1
– Message Indistinguishability: For every PPT adversary A, there is a negli-
gible function ε, such that for every x /∈ L the following holds:
⏐⏐⏐Pr[1← A(1λ, Enc(x, m0))]− Pr[1← A(1λ, Enc(x, m1))]⏐⏐⏐ ≤ ε.
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2.2.6.1 Extractable Witness Encryption
Some of our constructions require extractable witness encryption (Boyle,
Chung, and Pass, 2014), a variant of witness encryption in which the existence
of a distinguisher can be used to construct an extractor for the necessary wit-
ness (Gentry, Lewko, and Waters, 2014). In the constructions in Chapter 5, all
statements we use are in the corresponding language, but finding a witness
will be difficult for an adversary.
Definition 9 (Extractable Witness Encryption) An extractable witness encryp-
tion ΠWE = (Enc, Dec) for a NP language L associated with relation R consists of
the following algorithms:
– Enc(1λ, x, m): On input instance x and message m ∈ {0, 1}, it outputs a
ciphertext c.
– Dec(c, w): On input ciphertext c and witness w, it outputs m′.
We require that the above primitive satisfy the following properties:
– Correctness: For every (x, w) ∈ R, for every m ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[m = Dec(Enc(1λ, x, m), w)] = 1
– Extractable Security: For any PPT adversary A = (A0,A1), if:
Pr
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
A1(1λ, c, z) = b
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
b← {0, 1}
(m0, m1, z)← A0(1λ, x)






then there exists a PPT extractor Ext such that for all auxiliary inputs aux:
Pr
[
w← ExtA(1λ, x, aux) s.t. : (x, w) ∈ R
]
≥ negl(1λ)
We now define the notion of polynomial witness languages.
Definition 10 (Witness Languages) Consider an NP language L and let R be its
associated relation. We say that L is a polynomial witness language if there exists a
fixed polynomial p such that for every x ∈ L it holds that there exists a size p(|x|)
set of witnesses w such that w ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and (x, w) ∈ R.
The following theorem was shown in (Boyle, Chung, and Pass, 2014).
Theorem 1 Suppose L is a polynomial witness language. Then, witness encryption
for L implies extractable witness encryption for L.
2.2.7 Simulation Extractable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
In our protocols we require non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge that are simulation extractable (Sahai, 1999; De Santis et al., 2001).
Definition 11 (Simulation Extractable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge) A
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge scheme ΠNIZK for a rela-
tionR is a set of algorithms (ZKSetup, ZKProve, ZKVerify, ZKSimulate) defined
as follows:
– ZKSetup(1λ) returns the common reference string and simulation trap-
door (crs, τ).
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– ZKProve(crs, x, ω) takes in the common reference string crs, a statement
x and a witness ω and outputs a proof π.
– ZKVerify(crs, x, π) takes in the common reference string crs, a statement
x and a proof π, and outputs either 1 or 0.
– ZKSimulate(crs, τ, x) takes in the common reference string crs, a state-
ment x and the simulation trapdoor τ and outputs a proof π.
We say that a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument of knowledge is
simulation extractable if it satisfies the following properties:
– Completeness: If a prover has a valid witness, then they can always
convince the verifier. More formally, for all relations R and all x, ω, if
R(x, ω) = 1, then
Pr
⎡⎣ZKVerify(crs, x, π) = 1
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
(crs, τ)← ZKSetup(1λ),
π ← ZKProve(crs, x, ω)
⎤⎦ = 1
– Perfect Zero knowledge: A scheme has zero-knowledge if a proof leaks
no information beyond that truth of the statement x. We formalize this
by saying that an adversary with oracle access to a prover cannot tell if








AZKSimulate(crs,τ,·)(crs) = 1|(crs, τ)← ZKSetup(1λ)
]
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– Simulation Extractability: There exists an extractor Extract such that
Pr




ω ← Extract(crs, τ, x, π)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≥ 1− negl(1λ)
It has been shown that realizing this primitive for languages outside BBP
requires the common reference string model (Oren, 1987; Goldreich and Oren,
1994; Goldreich and Krawczyk, 1996). We present the common reference string
ideal functionality in Figure 2.2, which can be found in Figure 2.2 (Canetti and
Fischlin, 2001).
Functionality FDCRS
FDCRS proceeds as follows, when parameterized by a distribution D:
Common Reference String: When activated for the first time on input
(CRS, sid), choose a value d $←− D and send back to the activating party. In
each other activation return the value d to the activating party.
Figure 2.2: Ideal functionality for generating a Common Reference String,
from (Canetti and Fischlin, 2001).
2.2.8 Authenticated Communication
We use a variant of Canetti’s ideal functionality for authenticated commu-
nication, FAUTH, to abstract the notion of message authentication (Canetti,
2001). This is presented in Figure 2.3. Since we restrict our analysis to static




Sending: Upon receiving and input (Send, sid, Pj, m) from Pi, if it is not
the first instance of (Send, ·, ·, ·), the ideal functionality does nothing. Oth-
erwise, it sends (Sent, sid, Pi, Pj, m) to the adversary. If the adversary re-
sponds with (OK), then the ideal functionality sends (Sent, sid, Pi, Pj, m)
and halts. If the adversary does not approve, the ideal functionality drops
the message and halts.
Figure 2.3: The message authentication ideal functionality FAUTH supporting static
corruption, adapted from (Canetti, 2001).
2.2.9 Commitment Schemes
We now define a commitment scheme.
Definition 12 (Commitment Scheme) A commitment scheme Πcom is a tuple of
algorithms (Setup, Commit, Open), defined as follows:
– Setup(1λ) outputs some parameters for the scheme, PPcom.
– Commit(PPcom, m; r) takes in a message m and some randomness r and outputs
a commitment c
– Open(PPcom, c; r) takes in a commitment c and some randomness r and outputs
either a message m or the error symbol ⊥
4Note that this ideal functionality only handles a single message transfer, but to achieve
multiple messages, we rely on universal composition and use multiple instances of the
functionality.
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m, r, aux ← A1(1λ, PPcom),
c← Commit(PPcom, m; r),
r′ ← A2(1λ, PPcom, c, m, r, aux),
m′ ← Open(PPcom, c; r′)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≤ negl(1λ).
We say that a commitment scheme is binding if
Pr
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
b← A2(1λ, pk, c∗, aux)
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐
PPcom ← Setup(1λ),
m0, m1, aux ← A1(1λ, PPcom),
b $←− {0, 1}, r ← {0, 1}λ,
c∗ ← Commit(PPcom, mb; r)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
< negl(1λ).
Finally, we say that a commitment scheme is secure if and only if it is both hiding
and binding.
2.2.10 Cryptographic Hash Functions
We will now define collision-resistant hash functions.
Definition 13 (Collision-resistant Hash Function) A hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}ℓ compresses arbitrary length input into some fixed length digest. For a hash
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⏐⏐⏐m0, m1 ← A(1λ)] ≤ negl(1λ).
While not strictly required by collision-resistance, we require additionally that H




⏐⏐⏐∀h ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, m← A(1λ, h)] ≤ negl(1λ).
2.2.11 Garbled Circuits
Definition 14 (Garbling Scheme) A garbling scheme for circuits is a tuple of
PPT algorithms GC := (Gen, Garble, Evaluate) such that
– Gen(1λ, input; r): Garble takes the security parameter λ and length of input for
the circuit as input and outputs a set of input labels {labelw,b}w∈input,b∈{0,1}.
When we explicitly need to specify the randomness in Gen we will include it as
r as here.
– Garble(C, {labelw,b}w∈input,b∈{0,1}): Garble takes as input a circuit C : {0, 1}input →
{0, 1}output and a set of input labels {labelw,b}w∈input,b∈{0,1} and outputs the
garbled circuit C̃.
– Evaluate(C̃, labelx): Evaluate takes as input the garbled circuit C̃, input labels
labelx corresponding to the input x ∈ {0, 1}input and outputs y ∈ {0, 1}output.
This garbling scheme satisfies the following properties:
1. Correctness: For any circuit C and input x ∈ {0, 1}input,





C̃ ← Garble(C, {labelw,b}w∈input,b∈{0,1})
.
2. Selective Security: There exists a PPT simulator SimGC such that, for any
PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function µ(.) such that,
|Pr[ExpA,SimGC(1
λ, 0) = 1]− Pr[ExpA,SimGC(1
λ, 1) = 1]| ≤ µ(λ)
where the experiment ExpA,SimGC(1
λ, b) is defined as follows:
(a) The adversary A specifies the circuit C and an input x ∈ {0, 1}input and
gets C̃ and labelx, which are computed as follows:
• If b = 0:
– ({labelw,b}w∈input,b∈{0,1})← Gen(1λ, input)
– C̃ ← Garble(C, {labelw,b}w∈input,b∈{0,1})
• If b = 1:
– (C̃, labelx)← SimGC(1λ, C, x)
(b) The adversary outputs a bit b′, which is the output of the experiment.
2.2.12 Programmable Global Random Oracle Model
In Chapter 5, we will prove the security of one construction in the random
oracle model. More specifically, we will leverage the global random oracle
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model, introduced in (Camenisch et al., 2018). The ideal functionality GpRO is
illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Functionality GpRO.
Initiate with an empty list ListH
Query: Upon receiving message (HashQuery, m) from party P, the ideal
functionality proceeds as follows. Find h such that (m, h) ∈ ListH. If
no such h exists, let h $←− {0, 1}ℓ and store (m, h) in ListH. Return
(HashConfirm, h) to P.
Program: Upon receiving message (ProgramRO, m, h) from adversary A,
the ideal functionality proceeds as follows. If ∃h′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ such that
(m, h′) ∈ ListH and h ̸= h′, then abort. Otherwise, add (m, h) to ListH and
output (ProgramConfirm) to A
Figure 2.4: Ideal functionality for the global programmable random oracle, from (Ca-
menisch et al., 2018).
2.3 Trusted Hardware
Trusted hardware is a non-cryptographic primative that has proliferated in
recent years. Generally, trusted hardware are realized as co-processors, hard-
ened against attack, that can keep secrets hidden even in the presence of a
malicious host machine an operator. The first such co-processors were Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM) (Information technology âĂŤ Trusted platform module
library 2015), capable of performing a limiting number of cryptographic opera-
tions like random number generation, attestation, and public key encryption.
More recent generations of trusted hardware include trusted execution en-
vironments (TEE), including Intel SGX (Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel
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SGX) 2018) and ARM Trustzone (ARM Trustzone). Unlike TPMs, TEEs al-
low for arbitrary private computation — all without leaking any information
about the computation to the host system or operating system. The execution
environment is often referred to as an enclave.
Intel SGX is an extension of the x86 instruction set. When the processor
wants to enter this privileged execution mode, it executes a special instruction
that loads external encrypted state and decrypts it with a device-specific hard-
coded key. The program code is then loaded into the enclave. All computation
is then executed on the processor and cannot be interrupted or observed.
The processor then executes the exit instruction, paging out and encrypting
memory.
Attacks on Intel SGX. Since the introduction and adoption of TEEs, a new
class of attacks has started to call into question the efficacy of these hardware-
backed protections. The most notable of these attacks, named Foreshadow
(Van Bulck et al., 2018), leverages the speculative execution nature of modern
processors (similar to the Meltdown (Lipp et al., 2018) and Spectre (Kocher
et al., 2019) attacks) to extract long-term keys used by SGX to encrypt memory.
There have also been many side-channel attacks used to attack SGX, including
(Weichbrodt et al., 2016; Moghimi, Irazoqui, and Eisenbarth, 2017; Wang et
al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Biondo et al., 2018; Dall et al., 2018). These side
channels allow the host to recover information about the control flow of the
computation or the actual value of variables used in the computation, which
ought to be impossible. While there has been some work to harden TEEs
against these attacks, e.g. (Shih et al., 2017; Seo et al., 2017; Chandra et al.,
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2017; Chen et al., 2018), it is not clear that truly secure TEEs will ever exist. As
such, assuming the existence of secure TEEs can be controversial. In this work,
we make somewhat liberal use of TEEs as a primitive because they exist in
practice, and continue to improve as new attacks are discovered. We note that
if cryptographic obfuscation ever exists, our results naturally extend to the
obfuscation setting.
2.3.1 TEE Theoretical Modeling
In Chapter 4 we give a formal proof using the theoretical modeling of trusted
execution environments provided by Pass et. al in (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr,
2017). This work focuses specifically on the guarantees provided by Intel SGX.
We provide this functionality in Figure 2.5. Notation from (Pass, Shi, and
Tramèr, 2017) used is described below:
– P is the identifier of party.
– reg refers to the registry of machines with the trusted hardware.
– prog is the program.
– inp, outp refers to the input and output.
– mem is the program’s memory tape.




– Upon initialization, set (params, msk) ←
ΠSign.Gen(λ), T = ϕ
//public query interface
– Upon receiving getpk() from some P : send
params to P
Enclave operations
//local interface — install an enclave
– Upon receiving install(idx, prog) from some
P : ∈ reg
– if P is honest, assert idx=sid
– generate nonce eid ∈ {0, 1}λ, store
T[eid,P ] := (idx, prog, 0)
//local interface — resume an enclave
– Upon receiving resume(eid, inp) from some P :
∈ reg
– let (idx, prog, mem) := T[eid,P ], abort if
not found.
– let (outp, mem) := prog(inp, mem), update
T[eid,P ] := (idx, prog, mem)
– let σ ← ΠSign.Signmsk(idx, eid, prog, outp)
and send (outp, σ) to P .
Figure 2.5: A global functionality modeling an SGX-like secure processor. The enclave
program prog may be probabilistic and this is important for privacy-preserving
applications. Enclave program outputs are included in an anonymous attestation σ.
For honest parties, the functionality verifies that installed enclaves are parameterized
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In recent years a new class of distributed system has evolved. Loosely catego-
rized as decentralized ledgers, these systems construct a virtual “bulletin board”
to which nodes may publish data. Many protocols, including cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008), construct such a ledger to record financial
transactions. More recent systems target other specific applications, such as
identity management (Handshake, 2018; Namecoin 2016), or the execution of
general, user-defined programs, called “smart contracts” (The Ethereum Project
2018). Some companies have also deployed centralized public ledgers for spe-
cific applications; for example, Google’s Certificate Transparency (Certificate
Transparency 2018) provides a highly-available centralized ledger for recording
issued TLS certificates.
While the long-term success of specific systems is uncertain, two facts
seem clear: (1) centralized and decentralized ledger systems are already in
widespread deployment, and this deployment is likely to continue. Moreover
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(2) the decentralized nature of these systems makes them potentially long-
lived and resilient to certain classes of network-based attack. This provides
a motivation to identify new ways that these technologies can be used to
enhance the security of distributed systems.
In this chapter we focus on one such application: using ledgers to enhance
the security of Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). In the context of this
work, we use TEE to refer to any limited, secure computing environment that
is dependent on a (possibly malicious) host computer for correct operation.
Examples of such environments include Hardware Security Modules, smart
cards (Poulsen, 2001), and the “secure element” co-processors present in many
mobile devices (Apple Computer, 2016), as well as virtualized TEE platforms
such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), ARM TrustZone, and AMD
SEV (Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) 2018; ARM Consortium, 2017;
Advanced Microchip Devices, 2018). While many contemporary examples
rely on hardware, it is conceivable that future trusted environments may be
implemented using pure software virtualization, general-purpose hardware
obfuscation (Garg et al., 2013; Döttling et al., 2011; Nayak et al., 2017), or even
cryptographic program obfuscation (Lewi et al., 2016).
While TEEs have many applications in computing, they (like all secure co-
processors) have fundamental limitations. A trusted environment operating
perfectly depends on the host computer for essential functionality, creating an
opportunity for a malicious host to manipulate the TEE and its view of the
world. For example, an attacker may:
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1. Tamper with network communications, censoring certain inputs or out-
puts and preventing the TEE from communicating with the outside
world.
2. Tamper with stored non-volatile data, e.g. replaying old stored state to
the TEE in order to reset the state of a multi-step computation.
We stress that these attacks may have a catastrophic impact even if the TEE
itself operates exactly as designed. For example, many interactive cryptographic
protocols are vulnerable to “reset attacks,” in which an attacker rewinds or
resets the state of the computation (Bellare et al., 2001; TPM Reset Attack 2018;
Giller, 2015). State reset attacks are not merely a problem for cryptographic
protocols; they are catastrophic for many typical applications such as limited-
attempt password checking (Skorobogatov, 2016).
When implemented in hardware, TEE systems can mitigate reset attacks
by deploying a limited amount of tamper-resistant non-volatile storage (Parno
et al., 2011).1 However, such countermeasures increase the cost of producing
the hardware and are simply not possible in software-only environments.
Moreover, these countermeasures are unavailable to environments where a
single state transition machine is run in a distributed fashion, with the transition
function executed across different machines. In these environments, which
include private smart contract systems (Hyperledger, 2017) and “serverless”
cloud step-function environments (Amazon, 2018; Google Inc., 2018), state
1
The literature affords many examples of attackers bypassing such mechanisms (Skoroboga-
tov and Anderson, 2003; Kauer, 2007; Skorobogatov, 2016) using relatively inexpensive
physical and electronic attacks.
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protections cannot be enforced locally by hardware. Similarly, hardware
countermeasures cannot solve the problem of enforcing a secure channel to a
public data network.
A hypothetical solution to these problems is to delegate statekeeping and
network connectivity to a remote, trusted server or small cluster of peers,
as discussed in (Matetic et al., 2017). These could keep state on behalf of
the enclave and would act as conduit to the public network. However, this
approach simply shifts the root of trust to a different physical location, failing
to solve our problem because this new system is vulnerable to the same attacks.
Moreover, provisioning and maintaining the availability of an appropriate
server can be a challenge for many applications, including IoT deployments
that frequently outlive the manufacturer.
Combining TEEs with Ledgers In this work we consider an alternative ap-
proach to ensuring the statefulness and connectivity of trusted computing
devices. Unlike the strawman proposals above, our approach does not require
the TEE to include secure internal non-volatile storage, nor does it require a
protocol-aware external server to keep state. Instead, we propose a model in
which parties have access to an append-only public ledger, or bulletin board
with certain properties. Namely, upon publishing a string S on the ledger,
a party receives a copy of the resulting ledger – or a portion of it – as well
as a proof (e.g. a signature) to establish that the publication occurred. Any
party, including a trusted device, can verify this proof to confirm that the
received ledger data is authentic. The main security requirement we require













Figure 3.1: Two example ELI deployments. In the basic scenario (a) a single TEE
(with a hard-coded secret key K) interacts with a ledger functionality via a (possibly
adversarial) host application. Program inputs are provided by a user via the host
machine. In scenario (b) multiple copies of the same enclave running on different host
machines interact with the ledger (e.g., as in a private smart contract system), which
allows them to synchronize a multi-step execution across many different machines
without the need for direct communication. Program inputs and outputs may be
provided via the ledger.
publication cannot be (efficiently) forged.
Our contributions In this work we propose a new general protocol, which
we refer to as an Enclave-Ledger Interaction (ELI). This proposal divides any
multi-step interactive computation into a protocol run between three parties:
a stateless client-side TEE, which we refer to as an enclave (for the rest of this
work, we use these two terms interchangeably) that contains a secret key; a
ledger that logs posted strings and returns a proof of publication; and a (possi-
bly adversarial) host application that facilitates all communications between
the two preceding parties. Users may provide inputs to the computation via
the host, or through the ledger itself. We illustrate our model in Figure 3.1.
We assume that the enclave is a trustworthy computing environment, such
as a tamper-resistant hardware co-processor, SGX enclave, or a cryptographi-
cally obfuscated circuit (Nayak et al., 2017; Lewi et al., 2016). Most notably,
the enclave need not store persistent state or possess a secure random number
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generator; we only require that the enclave possesses a single secret key K that
is not known to any other party. We similarly require that the host application
can publish strings to the ledger; access the ledger contents; and receive proofs
of publication.
As a first contribution, we show how this paradigm can facilitate secure
state management for randomized multi-step computations run by the enclave,
even when the enclave has no persistent non-volatile storage or access to
trustworthy randomness.
Building such a protocol is non-trivial, as it requires simultaneously that
the computation cannot be rewound or forked, even by an adversarial host
application that controls all state and interaction with the ledger.
As a second contribution, we show that the combination of enclave plus
ledger can achieve properties that may not be achievable even when the en-
clave uses stateful trusted hardware. In particular, we show how the enclave-
ledger interaction allows us to condition program execution on the publication
of particular messages to the ledger, or the receipt of messages from third
parties. For example, an application can require that devlopers be alerted on
the ledger that user activity is anomolous, perhaps even dangerous, before it
continues execution.
As a third contribution, we describe several practical applications that
leverage this paradigm. These include private smart contracts, limited-attempt
password checking (which is known to be difficult to enforce without persis-
tent state (Skorobogatov, 2016)), enforced file access logging, and new forms
of encryption that ensure all parties receive the plaintext, or that none do.
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As a practical matter, we demonstrate that on appropriate ledger systems
that support payments, execution can be conditioned on other actions, such
as monetary payments made to the ledger. In malicious hands, this raises the
specter of autonomous ransomware that operates verifiably and without any
need for a command-and-control or secret distribution center.
Previous and concurrent work In previous work, Memoir (Parno et al., 2011)
leverages hashchains, NVRAM, and monotonic counters to efficiently prevent
state rollback in the presence of a malicious host. While Memoir’s protocol
has many similarities to our ELI protocols, the system design is quite different.
In Memoir, each TEE device uses its internal NVRAM to checkpoint state,
while our systems rely on a public ledger and communication through an
untrustworthy host. A second proposal, ROTE (Matetic et al., 2017), uses a
consensus between a cluster of distributed enclaves to in order to address
the rollback problem. Neither Memoir nor ROTE deals with the problem of
conditioning execution on data publication, which is a second contribution
of our work. Several early works have focused on the problem of preventing
reset attacks via de-randomization, i.e., by deriving (pseudo)random coins from
the computation input (Canetti et al., 2000). Unfortunately this approach does
not generalize to multi-step calculations where the adversary can adaptively
select the input prior to each step.
Two concurrent research efforts have considered the use of ledgers to
achieve secure computation. In late 2017, Goyal and Goyal proposed the use
of blockchains for implementing one time programs (Goyal and Goyal, 2017)
using cryptographic obfuscation techniques. While our work has a similar
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focus, we aim for a broader class of functionalities and a more practical set of
applications. Also in 2017, the authors of the present work, along with others,
proposed to use ledgers to obtain fairness for MPC protocols, an application
that is discussed in later sections of this work (Choudhuri et al., 2017). Bow-
man et al. of Intel Corporation (Bowman et al., 2018) independently proposed
“Private Data Objects” for smart contract systems that use ideas related to this
work, and have begun to implement them in production smart contract sys-
tems that support private computation. We believe Bowman’s effort strongly
motivates the formal analysis we include in this work. There have also been a
number of attempts to combine trusted execution environments and public
ledgers, but aimed at slightly different goals (Kosba et al., 2016; Juels, Kosba,
and Shi, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Finally, the Ekiden system (Cheng et al.,
2018), proposed in April 2018, builds on the ideas proposed in this work
and (Choudhuri et al., 2017) to achieve goals similar to those of Intel’s Private
Data Objects.
3.1.1 Intuition
We now briefly present the intuition behind our construction. Our goal is to
securely execute a multi-step interactive, probabilistic program P,
which we will define as having the following interface:
P(Ii, Si; r̄i)→ (Oi, Si+1)
At each step of the program execution, the program takes a user input Ii,
an (optional) state Si from the previous execution step, along with some
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random coins r̄i. It produces an output Oi as well as an updated state Si+1 for
subsequent steps.
(Looking forward, we will add public ledger inputs and outputs to this
interface as well, but we now omit these for purposes of exposition.) For this
initial exposition, we will assume a simple ledger that, subsequent to each
publication, returns the full ledger contents L along with a proof of publication
πpublish.2 We also require a stateless enclave with no native random number
generator, that stores a single, hardcoded, secret key K.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the way the user, host, ledger and enclave can interact.
We now discuss several candidate approaches, beginning with obviously
insecure ideas, and building on them to describe a first version of our main
construction.
Attempt #1: Encrypt program state. An obvious first step is for the enclave
to simply encrypt each output state using its internal secret key, and to send
the resulting ciphertext to the host for persistent storage. Assuming that
we use a proper authenticated encryption scheme (and pad appropriately),
this approach should guard both the confidentiality and authenticity of state
values even when they are held by a malicious host.3
It is easy to see that while this prevents tampering with the contents of
stored state, it does not prevent a malicious host from replaying old state
ciphertexts to the enclave along with new inputs. In practice, such an attacker
can rewind and fork execution of the program.
2In later sections we will discuss improvements that make this Ledger response succinct.
3For the moment we will ignore the challenge of preventing re-use of nonces in the
encryption scheme; these issues will need to be addressed in our main construction, however.
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Attempt #2: Use the ledger to store state. A superficially appealing idea is to
use the ledger itself to store an encrypted copy of the program state. As we
will show, this does not mitigate rewinding attacks.
For example, consider the following strawman protocol: after the enclave
executes the program P on some input, the enclave sends the resulting en-
crypted state to the ledger (via the host). The enclave can then condition
future execution of P on receiving valid ledger contents L, as well as a proof
of publication πpublish, and extracting the encrypted state from L.
Unfortunately this does nothing to solve the problem of adversarial replays.
Because the enclave has no trusted source of time and relies on the host to
communicate with the ledger, a malicious host can simply replay old versions
of L (including the associated proofs-of-publication) to the enclave, while
specifying different program inputs. As before, this allows the host to fork the
execution of the program.
Attempt #3: Bind program inputs on the ledger. To address the replay prob-
lem, we require a different approach. As in our first attempt, we will have the
enclave send encrypted state to the host (and not the ledger) for persistent stor-
age. As a further modification, we will add to this encrypted state an iteration
counter i which identifies the next step of the program to be executed.
To execute the ith invocation of the program, the host first commits its
next program input Ii to the ledger. This can be done in plaintext, although
for privacy we will use a secure commitment scheme. It labels the resulting
commitment C with a unique identifier CID that identifies the enclave, and
sends the pair (C, CID) to the ledger.
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Following publication, the host can obtain a copy of the full ledger L as well
as the proof of publication πpublish. It sends all of the above values (including
the commitment randomness R) to the enclave, along with the most recent
value of the encrypted state (or ε if this is the first step of the program).
The enclave decrypts the encrypted state internally to obtain the program
state and counter (S, i).4 It verifies the following conditions:
1. πpublish is a valid proof of publication for L.
2. The ledger L contains exactly i tuples (·, CID).
3. The most recent tuple embeds (C, CID).
4. C is a valid commitment to the input I using randomness R.
If all conditions are met, the enclave can now execute the program on state
and input (S, I). Following execution, it encrypts the new output state and
updated counter (Si+1, i + 1) and sends the resulting ciphertext to the host for
storage.
Remark. Like our previous attempts, the protocol described above does not pre-
vent the host from replaying old versions of L (along with the corresponding
encrypted state). Indeed, such replays will still cause the enclave to execute P
and produce an output. Rather, our purpose is to prevent the host from replay-
ing old state with different inputs. By forcing the host to commit to its input on
the ledger before L is obtained, we prevent a malicious host from changing its
4If no encrypted state is provided, then i is implicitly set to 0 and S = ε.
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program input during a replay, ensuring that the host gains no new informa-
tion from such attacks. However, there remains a single vulnerability in the
above construction that we must still address.
Attempt #4: Deriving randomness. While the protocol above prevents the at-
tacker from changing the inputs provided to the program, there still remains a
vector by which the malicious host could fork program execution. Specifically,
even if the program input is fixed for a given execution step, the program
execution may fork if the random coins provided to P change between replays.
This might prove catastrophic for certain programs.5
To solve this problem, we make one final change to the construction of the
enclave code. Specifically, we require that at each invocation of P, the enclave
will derive the random coins used by the program in a deterministic manner
from the inputs, using a pseudorandom function (similar to the classical
approach of Canetti et al. (Canetti et al., 2000)).
This approach fixes the random coins used at each computation step and
effectively binds them to the ledger and the host’s chosen input.
Limitations of our pedagogical construction. The construction above is intended
to provide an intuition, but is not the final protocol we describe in this work.
An astute reader will note that this pedagogical example has many limita-
tions, which must be addressed in order to derive a practical ELI protocol. We
discuss several extensions below.
Extension #1: Reducing ledger bandwidth. The pedagogical protocol above
5For example, many interactive identification and oblivious RAM protocols become inse-
cure if the program can be rewound and executed different randomness.
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requires the host and enclave to parse the entire ledger L on each execution
step. This is quite impractical, especially for public ledgers that may contain
millions of transactions.
A key contribution of this work is to show that the enclave need not receive
the entire ledger contents, provided that the ledger can be given only modest
additional capabilities: namely (1) the ability to organize posted data into
sequences (or chains), where each posted string contains a unique pointer to
the preceding post, and (2) the ability for the ledger to calculate a collision-
resistant hash chain over these sequences. As we discussed in Section 2.1 and
Section 2.1.2.1, these capabilities are already present in many candidate ledger
systems such as public (and private) blockchain networks.
Extension #2: Adding public input and output. A key goal of our protocol
is to allow P to condition its execution on inputs and outputs drawn from
(resp. sent to) the ledger. This can be achieved due to the fact that the enclave
receives an authenticated copy of L. Thus the enclave (and P) can be designed
to condition its operation on e.g., messages or public payment data found on
the ledger.
To enforce public output, we modify the interface of P to produce a “public
output string” as part of its output to the host, and we record this string
with the program’s encrypted state. By structuring the enclave code (or P)
appropriately, the program can require the host to post this string to the ledger
as a condition of further program execution. Of course, this is not an absolute
guarantee that the host will publish the output string. That is, the enclave
cannot force the host to post such messages. Rather, we achieve a best-possible
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guarantee in this setting: the enclave can simply disallow further execution if
the host does not comply with the protocol.
Extension #3: Specifying the program. In the pedagogical presentation
above, the program P is assumed to be fixed within the enclave. As a final
extension, we note that the enclave can be configured to provide an environ-
ment for running arbitrary programs P, which can be provided as a separate
input at each call. Achieving this involves recording (a hash) of P within the
encrypted state, although the actual construction requires some additional
checks to allow for a security proof. We include this capability in our main
construction.
Modeling the ledger Several recent works have also used ledgers (or bulletin
boards) to provide various security properties (Goyal and Goyal, 2017; Choud-
huri et al., 2017). In these works, the ledger is treated as possessing an un-
forgeable proof of publication. The protocols in this work can operate under
this assumption, however our construction is also motivated by real-world
decentralized ledgers, many of which do not possess such a property. Instead,
many “proof-of-work” blockchains provide a weaker security property, in that
it is merely expensive to forge a proof that a message has been posted to the
blockchain. This notion may provide sufficient security in many real-world
applications, and we provide a detailed analysis of the costs in Section 2.1.2.1
3.1.2 Applications
To motivate our techniques, we describe a number of practical applications
that can be implemented using the ELI paradigm, including both constructive
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and potentially destructive techniques. Here we provide several example
applications, and provide a more complete discussion in Section 3.5.
Synchronizing private smart contracts and step functions. Smart contract
systems and cloud “step functions” (Ethereum White Paper, 2017; Hyper-
ledger, 2017) each employ a distributed network of compute nodes that per-
form a multi-step interactive computation. To enable private computation,
some production smart contract systems (Hyperledger, 2017) have recently
proposed incorporating TEEs. Such distributed systems struggle to synchro-
nize state as the computation migrates across nodes. Motivated by an inde-
pendent effort of Bowman et al. (Bowman et al., 2018) we show that our ELI
paradigm achieves the necessary guarantees for security in this setting.
Mandatory logging for local file access. Corporate and enterprise settings
often require users to log access to sensitive files, usually on some online
system. We propose to use the ELI protocol to mandate logging of each file
access before the necessary keys for an encrypted file can be accessed by the
user.
Limiting password guessing. Cryptographic access control systems often
employ passwords to control access to encrypted filesystems (Apple Com-
puter, 2016; Project, 2017) and cloud backup images (e.g., Apple’s iCloud
Keychain (Krstić, 2016)). This creates a tension between the requirement
to support easily memorable passwords (such as device PINs) while simul-
taneously preventing attackers from simply guessing users’ relatively weak
passwords (Bonneau, 2012; Ur et al., 2015).6 Attempts to address this with
6This is made more challenging due to the fact that manufacturers have begun to design
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tamper-resistant hardware (Apple Computer, 2016; Project, 2017; ARM Con-
sortium, 2017; Krstić, 2016) lead to expensive systems that provide no security
against rewind attacks. 7 We show that ELI can safely enforce passcode guessing
limits using only inexpensive hardware without immutable state (Skoroboga-
tov, 2016).
Autonomous ransomware. Modern ransomware, malware that encrypts a vic-
tim’s files, is tightly integrated with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, which
act as both the ransom currency and a communication channel to the at-
tacker (Sinegubko, 2016). Affected users must transmit an encrypted key
package along with a ransom payment to the attacker, who responds with the
necessary decryption keys.
The ELI paradigm could potentially enable the creation of ransomware
that operates autonomously – from infection to decryption – with no need
for remote parties to deliver secret keys. This ransomware employs local
trusted hardware or obfuscation to store a decryption key for a user’s data,
and conditions decryption of a user’s software on payments made on a public
consensus network.
3.2 Definitions
Protocol Parties: A Enclave-Ledger Interaction is a protocol between three
parties: the enclave E , the ledger LVerify, and a host application H. We now
systems that do not include a trusted party – due to concerns that trusted escrow parties may
be compelled to unlock devices (Apple Computer, 2017).
7See (Skorobogatov, 2016) for an example of how such systems can be defeated when state
is recorded in standard NAND hardware, rather than full tamper-resistant hardware.
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describe the operation of these components:
The ledger LVerify. The ledger functionality provides a public append-only
ledger for storing certain public data. Our main requirement is that the ledger
is capable of producing a publicly-verifiable authentication tag πpublish over
the entire ledger contents, or a portion of the ledger.
The enclave E . The trusted enclave models a cryptographic obfuscation
system or a trusted hardware co-processor configured with an internal secret
key K. The enclave may contain the program P, or this program may be
provided to it by the host application. Each time the enclave is invoked by the
host applicationH on some input, it calculates and returns data to the host.
The host application H. The host application is a (possibly adversarial)
party that invokes both the enclave and the ledger functionalities. The host de-
termines the inputs to each round of computation — perhaps after interacting
with a user — and receives the outputs of the computation from the enclave.
3.2.1 The Program Model
Our goal in an ELI is to execute a multi-step interactive computation that runs
on inputs that may be chosen adaptively by an adversary. Expanding on our
initial description, we define this program P : I × S ×R → O ×P × S as
having the following input/output interface:
P(Ii, Si; r̄i)→ (Oi, Pubi, Si+1).
When a user inputs Ii, the current program state Si, and random coins r̄i,
this algorithm produces a program output Oi, as well as an optional public
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broadcast message Pubi and new state Si+1.
In our main construction, we will allow the host application to provide the
program P that the enclave will run. This is useful in settings such as smart
contract execution, where a given enclave may execute multiple distinct smart
contract programs. As a result of this change, we will assume that P is passed
as input to each invocation of the enclave.
Maximum program state size and runtime We assume in this work that
the runtime of each P can be upper bounded by a polynomial function of
the security parameter. We also require that for any program P used in our
system there exists an efficiently-computable function Max(·) such that Max(P)
indicates the maximum length in bits of any output state Si produced by P,
and that Max(P) is polynomial in the security parameter.
One-Time vs. Multi-Use Programs In this work we consider two different
classes of program. While all of our programs may involve multiple execution
steps, one-time programs can be initiated only once by a given enclave. Once
such a program has begun its first step of execution, it can never be restarted.
By contrast, multi-use programs can be executed as many times as the user
wishes, and different executions may be interwoven. However each execution
of the program is independent of the others, receives different random coins
and holds different state. In our model, an execution of a program will be
uniquely identified by a session identifier, which we denote by CID. Thus, the
main difference between a one-time and many-time program is whether the
enclave will permit the re-initiation of a given program P under a different
identifier CID.
81
Setup(1λ)→ (K, PPcom). This trusted setup algorithm is executed once to config-
ure the enclave. On input a security parameter λ, it samples a long-term secret
K which is stored securely within the enclave, and the (non-secret) parameters
PPcom which are provided to the enclave and the host.
ExecuteApplication(PPcom, P). This algorithm is run on the host. It proceeds in
an infinite loop, invoking the ledger operations and enclave operations. In each
iteration of the loop, the user selects a step input, commits to it and posts it to
the ledger. It then sends that input and the Ledger’s output into the enclave to
actually execute the next step.
ExecuteEnclaveK,PPcom((P, i,Si, Ii, ri, πpublish,i, posti)) → (Si+1, Oi, Pubi). This algo-
rithm is run by the enclave, which is configured with K, PPcom. At the ith com-
putation step it takes as input a program P, an encrypted previous state Si, a
program input Ii, commitment randomness ri, a ledger output posti and a ledger
authentication tag πpublish,i. The enclave invokes P and produces a public output
Oi, as well as a new encrypted state Si+1 and a public output Pubi.
Figure 3.2: Definition of an Enclave Ledger Interaction (ELI) scheme.
We note that it is possible to convert any multi-time program to a one-time
program by having the enclave generate the value CID deterministically from
its internal key K and the program P (e.g., by calculating a pseudorandom
function on these values), and then to enforce that each execution of the
program P is associated with the generated CID. This enforcement algorithm
can be instantiated as a “meta-program” P′ that takes as input a second
program P and is executed using our unmodified ELI protocol.
While our pedagogical example in the introduction discussed one-time
programs, in the remainder of this work we will focus on multi-use programs,
as these are generally sufficient for our proposed applications in Section 3.5.
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3.3 Security Definitions for Enclave-Ledger Inter-
action
In this section we present formal definitions of security for an ELI scheme.
3.3.1 Ledger Unforgeability
As noted in Section 2.1.1, we require that it is difficult to construct a pair
(S, πpublish) such that Ledger.Verify(S, πpublish) = 1 except as the result of a
call to Ledger.Post. Intuitively we refer to this definition as SUF-AUTH. This
definition is analogous to the SUF-CMA definition used for signatures. Indeed,
in many practical instantiations of ledgers, these signatures will be one of the
techniques used to construct the authentication tag.
3.3.2 Simulation security
Intuition. Our definition specifies two experiments: a Real experiment in
which an adversarial host application runs the real ELI protocol with oracles
that implement honest enclave and ledger functionalities respectively, and an
Ideal experiment that models the correct and stateful execution of the under-
lying program P by a trusted party. In broad strokes, our security definition
requires that for every p.p.t. adversaryH that runs the Real experiment, there
must exist an ideal adversary Ĥ that runs the Ideal experiment such that the
output ofH is computationally indistinguishable from that of Ĥ.
Our first experiment, which we term the Real experiment, we define an
interaction where an adversarial host userH interacts with an honest ledger
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and honest enclave to execute the ELI protocol. These interfaces are provided
to the host in the form of oracles that the host may call an unbounded number
of times. In the Ideal experiment, we consider an adversarial ideal host Ĥ
that interacts with a trusted functionality. This functionality takes as input
a program P and a program input provided by Ĥ, and runs the program
using real random coins. The trusted functionality stores the resulting state
internally, broadcasts public outputs to all parties, and returns user outputs to
the user. This ideal model is intuitively what we wish to accomplish from a
secure multi-step interactive computing system.
Our security definition requires that for every p.p.t. adversarial real-world
hosts H, there must exist a p.p.t. ideal-world host Ĥ that does “as well”
in the ideal experiment as the real host does in the real experiment. More
formally, we define this last notion via an indistinguishability-based definition:
we require that the output distributions of H and Ĥ are computationally
indistinguishable between the two experiments.
What if the ledger is forgeable? In some of our proposed instantiations, the
ledger authentication tags are economically secure, rather than cryptographi-
cally secure. In this setting feasible for an attacker to forge an authentication
tag, but doing so is extremely costly. This setting raises the possibility that a
motivated attacker might be able to forge some limited number of tags. In this
situation, it is reasonable to consider how security degrades in the face of these
forgeries.
For example, it is easy to imagine some ELI protocol that operates securely
when forgeries are infeasible, but that becomes catastrophically insecure when
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the enclave is presented with a single forged authentication tag. For example,
a contrived ELI protocol might be constructed to reveal a share of the secret K
with each output, such that a single adversarial rewind allows the adversary to
obtain K. This would clearly be catastrophic for the security of an ELI! While
we cannot prevent an attacker from obtaining some advantage using forgeries,
we wish to more clearly bound the attacker’s capability in this setting.
Our approach to this problem is to extend both the Real and Ideal exper-
iments with an additional capability. In the Real experiment, the adversary
H is permitted to query a Forgery oracle that, on input a string S, provides a
valid pair (S, πpublish) but does not update the ledger. In the Ideal experiment
we provide a Fork oracle that allows the ideal adversary Ĥ to run a single step
of the computation using an older state (of their choosing). In each experiment,
the adversaries are restricted to querying these respective oracles a maximum
of qforge times, where qforge is a parameter provided as input to the experiment.
(Clearly qforge = 0 implies a definition with no forgeries.)
Intuitively, this extended definition models the ability of an attacker to
rewind a single step of the computation (per forgery) but without giving this
attacker the ability to catastrophically break the security of the system, or even
to run additional legitimate execution steps from this execution step. We stress
that this definition represents a form of best possible security in our model,
when forgeries are allowed.
85
3.3.3 Formal Definitions
We now formally describe the experiments and present our definition of
security.
The Real experiment. The real-world experiment is parameterized by a security
parameter λ, an adversarial hostH and a non-negative integer qforge. At the
start of the experiment, compute (K, PPcom) ← Setup(1λ) and output PPcom
to H. Subsequently, the adversary H is given access to three oracles: an
enclave oracle; a ledger oracle, and a forgery oracle. The adversary can make an
unlimited number of calls to the first two oracles, but is restricted to making
at most qforge queries to the forgery oracle. The oracles operate as follows:
The Ledger Oracle. The ledger oracle honestly implements the ledger inter-
face used in the real protocol (see Section 2.1).
The Enclave Oracle. The enclave oracle is initialized with the secret K and
parameters PPcom. Each time the user executes this oracle on some input
(P, i,Si, Ii, ri, πpublish,i, posti), the oracle runs ExecuteEnclaveK,PPcom(P, i,Si,
Ii, ri, πpublish,i, posti). It returns the resulting output toH.
The Forgery Oracle. This special oracle allows up to qforge queries byH. On
input a string S, the forgery oracle computes a valid ledger authenti-
cator πpublish over S but does not place this data on the ledger. It returns
(S, πpublish).
At the conclusion of the experiment, the adversary produces an output. This
output is the result of the experiment.
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The Ideal experiment. This experiment is parameterized by a security parameter
λ, an ideal-world adversarial host Ĥ and a non-negative integer qforge. The
adversary is given access to two oracles: a compute oracle and a fork oracle.
These oracles operate as follows:
The Compute Oracle. When Ĥ makes the ith query to this oracle on input
(P, I, CID), the oracle first checks an internal table to find the tuple labeled
(j, real, S, CID) where j has the highest value of all matching tuples in the
table. If no such tuple is found, it sets S ← ε. Now it samples random
coins ri uniformly at random and computes:
(O, Pub, S′)← P(I, S; r̄)
The oracle stores (i, real, S′, CID) in its internal table, places Pub on a list
of “public outputs” and returns (O, Pub) to the caller.
The Fork Oracle. This specialized oracle may be called by Ĥ at most qforge
times. It operates similarly to the Compute oracle, except that it allows
the caller execute the program on any any past state in that oracle’s
table. On input (P, Ii, CID, j, l ∈ {real, fork}), this oracle finds the tuple
(j, l, S, CID) in the Compute oracle’s internal table, samples random
coins and computes:
(O, Pub, S′)← P(I, S; r̄)
The oracle now stores (i, fork, S′, CID) in its internal table. It discards Pub
and returns O to the caller.
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At the conclusion of the experiment, the adversary Ĥ produces an output,
which is the output of the experiment. With these considerations in mind, we
now present our main security definition:
Definition 15 (Simulation security for ELI) An ELI scheme
Π = (ExecuteApplication, ExecuteEnclave)
is simulation-secure if for every p.p.t. adversary H, sufficiently large λ, and
non-negative qforge, there exists a p.p.t. Ĥ such that the following holds:
Real(H, λ, qforge)
c≈ Ideal(Ĥ, λ, qforge)
Discussion. The Forgery and Fork oracles in the experiments above have
similar purposes. Each is designed to mimic the degradation in security that
occurs in the event of a ledger forgery. If qforge = 0, neither oracle may ever be
called; this allows us to model the case where the ledger operates perfectly.
If qforge > 0 then we wish our ELI protocol to minimize the damage caused
by such forgeries. In the ideal world, we define that damage as the ability to
execute one additional computation on pre-existing state, without updating the
current state (or producing a public output). An important implication of this
definition is that the resulting output states produced by the Fork oracle may
not be fed to the Compute oracle. This prevents the attacker from spawning
an entirely new execution branch from a single forgery.
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3.3.4 Third Party Privacy
Our main security definition above considers the integrity of ELI computations
in the face of an adversarial host application. However, a useful scheme should
also provide privacy for an honest host (and user) against curious third parties,
who may view the ledger in order to recover confidential user inputs.
For space reasons we leave a formal definition of this property to the
full version of this work. However, we provide an informal discussion here.
We address this concern via a separate security definition that models an
honest enclave, an honest host application and an honest-but-curious ledger
that acts as the observer. Intuitively we wish to that the ledger cannot learn
any information about the Ii, even when she can specify the distribution of
inputs thatH executes on.
In practice we address this property via a real/ideal world definition. In
the real-world experiment, the adversarial ledger LVerify is provided with an
oracle that allows her to request that host run an instance of the computation
on a given input and CID. In response, LVerify receives all data posted to the
ledger. In the ideal-world experiment, we require the existence of a simulator
S that, on input a valid query from LVerify (i.e., a query that would produce
a valid output from P), makes the necessary post to LVerify. The key element
of this definition is that S does receive the input I chosen by LVerify, and so
it necessarily cannot leak information about the user’s input. Our definition




In this section we present a specific construction of an Enclave-Ledger Inter-
action scheme. Our construction makes black box use of public ledger LVerify
with ledger hash HL, commitment schemes Πcom, authenticated symmetric
encryption ΠAE, collision-resistant hash function H that maps to {0, 1}2ℓ, for
ℓ = poly(λ) and and pseudorandom function PRF.
3.4.1 Main Construction
We now present our main construction for a Enclave-Ledger Interaction
scheme and address its security. Recall that an ELI consists of the three
algorithms with the interface described in Figure 3.2. We present pseudocode
for our construction in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 below.
Discussion. The scheme we present in this section differs somewhat from
the pedagogical scheme we discussed in the introduction. Many of these
differences address minor details that affect efficiency or simplify our security
analysis: for example we do not encrypt state directly using the fixed key
K, but instead derive a unique per-execution key k using a pseudorandom
function (PRF). This simplifies our analysis by allowing us to instantiate with
a single-message authenticated encryption scheme (e.g., an AE scheme with
a hard-coded nonce) without concerns about how to deal with encrypting
multiple messages on a single key.
A second modification from our pedagogical construction is that we eval-




Result: Secret K for the enclave and public commitment parameters
PPcom




Data: Input: PPcom, P




// Loop and run the program
while true do
Obtain Ii from the user




Ci ← Πcom.Commit(PPcom, (i, Ii,Si, P); ri)
(πpublish,i, posti)← Ledger.Post ((Pubi, Ci))
(Si+1, Oi, Pubi+1)← ExecuteEnclave(P, i,Si, Ii, ri, πpublish,i, posti)
Output (Oi, Pubi+1) to the user
i← i + 1
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Algorithm 3: ExecuteEnclave
Data: Input: (P, i,Si, Ii, ri, πpublish,i, posti)
Internal values: K, PPcom
Result: (Si+1, Oi, Pubi+1) or ⊥






Parse (Pubi, Ci)← post.Data
Assert(Ci = Πcom.Commit(PPcom, (i, Ii,Si, P); ri))
// Compute the ith state encryption key
(ki, ·)← PRFK(posti.PrevHash)
if Si = ε then





Assert((Si, HP) ̸= ⊥)
Assert(HP = H(P∥i∥Pubi))
// Compute randomness and i + 1th encryption key
(ki+1, r̄i)← PRFK(posti.Hash)
// Run the program and abort if it fails
(Si+1, Pubi+1, Oi)← P(Si, Ii; r̄i)
Assert((Si+1, Pubi+1, Oi) ̸= ⊥)
// Encrypt the resulting state
Si+1 ← ΠAE.Encryptpad(ki+1, (Si+1, H(P∥i + 1∥Pubi+1))
Output (Si+1, Oi, Pubi+1)
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ledger. By the nature of our ledger abstraction, this data structure enforces
a hash chain over all previous transactions; as a result this ensures that all
random coins and keys are themselves a function of the full execution history of
the program. This ensures that an attacker – even a powerful one that can forge
some ledger outputs – cannot use the state resulting from those forgeries to
continue normal execution via the real ledger, since the execution history on
the real ledger will not contain these forgeries.
We remark again that this more powerful ledger abstraction does not
truly represent a stronger assumption when compared to our pedagogical
construction, since the more powerful ledger can be “simulated” by enclave
itself, provided the enclave has access to the full contents of a simple ledger.
Security We now present our main security theorem.
Theorem 2 Assuming a secure commitment scheme, a secure authenticated
encryption scheme (in the sense of (Rogaway, 2002)); that H and HL are colli-
sion resistant; PRF is pseudorandom; and that ledger authentication tags are
unforgeable, then the scheme Π = (Setup, ExecuteEnclave, ExecuteApplication)
presented in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 satisfies Definition 15.
3.4.2 Proof of Security
LetH be an adversarial host that plays the Real experiment. We now construct
an ideal-world adversarial host Ĥ such that, for sufficiently large λ and all
non-negative qforge,
Real(H, λ, qforge)
c≈ Ideal(Ĥ, λ, qforge).
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Proof. [Proof of Theorem 2] To prove this statement, we first describe the
operation of Ĥ. We then proceed to demonstrate that if there exists a p.p.t.
distinguisher algorithm that distinguishes the output of the two experiments
with non-negligible advantage, then one or more of the following are true:
(1) there exists an adversary that breaks the SUF-AUTH security of the ledger
authentication tags, (2) there is an attack on the binding property of the
commitment scheme, (3) there exists a distinguisher for the pseudorandom
function PRF, (4) there is an adversary that succeeds against the authenticated
encryption scheme, or (5) there exists an attacker that breaks the collision-
resistance of a hash function.
The operation of Ĥ. The ideal-world adversary Ĥ runs the real adversary
H internally, and simulates for it the oracles of the Real experiment. We
will assume that Ĥ also has access to an oracle that simulates the real ledger
and produces authentication tags, in addition to a ledger forgery oracle that
allows for the production of “forged” ledger signatures (see Section 2.1 for a
discussion of this model.)
Ĥ runs the Ideal experiment. Internally, it maintains the tables Tenclave,
and Tforge as well as a view of the ledger L. The table Tenclave contains entries
of the following form:
(P, i, Ii, ri,Sin,Sout, post, O, Pub, CID)
At the start of the experiment, our simulation generates PPcom ← Πcom.Setup(1λ).
Each queryH makes to the Real oracles is handled as follows:
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The Ledger Oracle. WhenH queries the ledger oracle on (Data, CID), Ĥ exe-
cutes Ledger.Post algorithm (see Section 2.1). It stores (Data, CID, πpublish)
in a table, and returns (post, πpublish) toH. If two distinct outputs share
the same value post.Hash, the simulation aborts with an error.
The Forgery Oracle. This oracle responds to at most qforge queries made byH.
WhenH queries on an arbitrary string S, Ĥ queries the authentication
oracle for a tag πpublish and records the pair (S, πpublish) in Tforge.
The Enclave Oracle. WhenH queries the enclave oracle on input (P, i,Si, Ii,
ri, πpublish,i, posti), Ĥ performs the following steps:
1. It performs all of the publicly-verifiable checks in the ExecuteEnclave
algorithm (i.e., all checks that do not rely on the secret K.) It will
abort and output a defined error message ifH outputs an authenti-
cator/message pair that was not produced by the Ledger or Forgery
oracles, a hash collision in H or HL, or a collision in the commitment
scheme. Eventhashcoll.
2. It verifies that (post, πpublish) has either been posted to the ledger L,
or exists in Tforge.
3. If Si = ϵ it looks up CID in the table Tenclave and aborts if any
matching entry is found.
4. It searches Tenclave for an entry where S∗out = Si and aborts if no
result is found. Otherwise it obtains the tuple
(P∗, i∗, I∗i , ri∗,S∗in,S∗out, post∗, O∗, Pub∗, CID∗)
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in Tenclave where S∗out = Si.
5. It checks that i = i∗ + 1.
6. It checks that CID = post.CID = post∗.CID.
7. It checks that post.PrevHash = post∗.Hash.
8. It checks that post.Pub = Pub∗.
9. It checks that P = P∗.
If any of the above checks fail, Ĥ aborts and outputs ⊥ toH.
10. Ĥ first samples ki+1 ← {0, 1}ℓ uniformly at random, and computes
a “dummy” ciphertext
S ′out ← ΠAE.Encrypt(ki+1, (1Max(P), 1ℓ)).
Ĥ now selects one of the following three cases. The first case han-
dles repeated inputs that have already been previously seen. The
second case handles inputs that contain valid authenticators from
the Ledger oracle. The final case handles inputs that have been
authenticated by the Forge oracle.
11. Process repeated program inputs. Whenever Ĥ receives an input,
it searches its table for any entry that matches (P, i, Ii,Si, posti).
(Note that we explicitly exclude πpublish,i from this check.8) If a
8Recall that our simulation has already verified that πpublish,i passes the value passes the
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matching entry exists, it obtains (O,Sout, Pubout) from the same
entry in the table and outputs the tuple (Sout, O, Pubout) to H and
halts.
12. Process new, and unforged inputs. Otherwise, if (posti, πpublish,i)
is contained within the table maintained by the Ledger oracle,
then Ĥ looks up posti.Hash in the Ledger’s table to obtain CID. If
this produces multiple possible matches, it aborts and outputs
Eventledgerrepeat.
Next, Ĥ calls the Compute oracle on (P, Ii, CID) to obtain (O′, Pub′).
Ĥ now stores (P, i, Ii, ri,Si,S ′out, post, O′, Pub′) in Tenclave. It returns
(S ′out, O′, Pub′) toH.
13. Process new, forged inputs. Otherwise, if (post, πpublish) is con-
tained within Tforge, then Ĥ identifies the call j at which this value
was added to the table, and calls the Fork oracle on input (P, I,CID, j)
to obtain (O′, Pub′). As in the previous step, it stores
(P, i||j, Ii, ri,Si,S ′out, post, O′, Pub′, CID)
in Tenclave. It returns (S ′out, O′, Pub′) toH.
Discussion. Note that there are three main cases in the simulation above.
Whenever the adversary queries the enclave on an state/counter that has
previously been queried, Ĥ simply returns the same output as it did during





. Provided that this check succeeds, it is easy to
see that the value πpublish,i has no further influence on the output of ExecuteEnclave.
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of the enclave in the protocol is determined solely by the given inputs (if all
public checks pass), and thus repeated inputs cause the enclave to produce
the same behavior.
When the adversary queries on a new input that has been posted to the
ledger, Ĥ queries the ideal Compute oracle to obtain the appropriate output,
and generates a simulated (“dummy ciphertext”) encrypted state to return to
H. Similarly, whenH queries the enclave on a forged (but otherwise correct)
ledger output, Ĥ queries the Fork oracle to obtain the correct output and also
returns a dummy ciphertext toH.
Indistinguishability of Ĥ’s simulation. Let Z be a p.p.t. distinguisher that
succeeds in distinguishing Ĥ’s output in the Ideal experiment fromH’s out-
put in the Real experiment with non-negligible advantage. We now show
that such an adversary violates one of our assumptions above. The proof pro-
ceeds via a series of hybrids, where in each hybridH interacts as in the Real
experiment. The first hybrid (Game 0) is identically distributed to the Real ex-
periment, and the final hybrid represents Ĥ’s simulation above. For notational
convenience, let Adv [Game i ] be Z ’s absolute advantage in distinguishing
the output of Game i from Game 0, i.e., the Real distribution.
Game 0. In this hybrid,H interacts with the Real experiment.
Game 1 (Abort on [adversary-]forged authenticators.) This hybrid modi-
fies the previous as follows: in the event thatH queries the Enclave ora-
cle on any pair (post, πpublish) such that (1) Ledger.Verify(post, πpublish) =
1, and yet (2) the pair was not the input (resp. output) of a previous call
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to either the Ledger or Forgery oracles, then abort and output Eventforge.
We note that ifH causes this event to occur with non-negligible probabil-
ity, then we can trivially useH to construct an attack on the SUF-AUTH
security of the contract authenticator with related probability. Since by
assumption the probability of such an event is negligible, we bound
Adv [Game 1 ] ≤ negl1(λ).
Game 2 (Abort on hash collisions.) This hybrid modifies the previous as
follows: if at any point during the experiment H causes the functions
H, HL to be evaluated on inputs s1 ̸= s2 such that H(s1) = H(s2) or
HL(s1) = HL(s2), then abort and output Eventhashcoll. Under the assump-
tion that the hash functions H, HL are collision-resistant, we have that
|Adv [Game 2 ]−Adv [Game 1 ]| ≤ negl2(λ).
Game 3 (Abort on commitment collisions.) This hybrid modifies the previ-
ous as follows: in the event thatH queries the Enclave oracle at steps i, j
where
Ci = Cj =
Πcom.Commit(PPcom, (i, Ii,Si, P, posti.CID); ri) = Πcom.Commit(PPcom, j∥Ij∥Sj∥posti.CID; rj)
and yet (i, Ii,Si, Pi, posti.CID) ̸= (j, Ij,Sj, Pj, postj.CID), then abort and
output Eventbinding. We note that if the commitment scheme is bind-
ing, this event will occur with at most negligible probability, hence
|Adv [Game 3 ]−Adv [Game 2 ]| ≤ negl3(λ).
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Game 4 (Duplicate Enclave calls give identical outputs.) This hybrid mod-
ifies the previous as follows: whenH queries the Enclave oracle repeat-
edly on the same values (Pi, i, Ii,Si, posti) (here we exclude πpublish,i) and
the oracle (as implemented in the previous hybrid) does not output
⊥, replace the response to all repeated queries subsequent to the first
query with the same result as the first query. Recall that by definition the
Enclave oracle’s ExecuteEnclave calculation is deterministic and solely
based on the inputs provided above. Thus, repeated queries on the
same input will always produce the same output. Hence by definition
|Adv [Game 4 ]−Adv [Game 3 ]| = 0.
Game 5 (Abort on colliding ledger hashes.) This hybrid modifies the pre-
vious as follows: when H calls the Enclave oracle on two distinct in-
puts (Pi, i, Ii,Si, posti, πpublish,i) and (Pj, j, Ij,Sj, postj, πpublish,j), and if the
two inputs do not represent repeated inputs (according to Game 4),
then: if both (posti, πpublish,i) and (postj, πpublish,j) are valid outputs of
the Ledger oracle and yet posti.Hash = postj.Hash then abort and output
Eventledgercoll. By Lemma 1 this event will occur with at most negligible
probability if HL is collision-resistant and the ledger is implemented
correctly. This bounds |Adv [Game 5 ]−Adv [Game 4 ]| ≤ negl4(λ).
Game 6 (Ĥ can always uniquely identify CID.) This hybrid modifies the
previous as follows: if at step i the adversary H calls the Enclave the
oracle (as implemented in the previous hybrid) and (1) the oracle does
not return ⊥, (2) the inputs to the two calls are not identical (this would
be excluded by the earlier hybrids), and (3) the pair (posti, πpublish,i) are
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in the Ledger table, and (4) posti.Hash matches two distinct entries in
the Ledger table, then abort and output Eventledgerrepeat. By Lemma 2
this event will occur with at most negligible probability. This bounds
|Adv [Game 6 ]−Adv [Game 5 ]| ≤ negl5(λ).
Game 7 (Replace the session keys and pseudorandom coins with random
strings.) This hybrid modifies the previous as follows: if Enclave does
not abort or is not called on repeated inputs, then the pair (ki+1, r̄i) is
sampled uniformly at random and recorded in a table for later use. Re-
call that in the preceding hybrid, this pair is generated as (ki+1, r̄i) ←
PRFK(posti.Hash) where (by the previous hybrids) posti.Hash is guaran-
teed not to repeat. Similarly, the output of each call (ki, ·)← PRFK(posti.PrevHash)
is also replaced with a random value when the input posti.PrevHash
has not been queried to PRFK previously, or the appropriate value
(drawn from the table) when this value has been previously queried. If
PRF is pseudorandom then if |Adv [Game 5 ]−Adv [Game 4 ]| is non-
negligible, then we can construct an algorithm that succeeds in distin-
guishing the PRF from a random function. This bounds |Adv [Game 7 ]−
Adv [Game 6 ]| ≤ negl6(λ).
Game 8 (Reject inauthentic ciphertexts.) This hybrid modifies the previous
as follows: ifH queries the Enclave oracle on an input Si ̸= ε such that
(1) the oracle does not reject the input, (2) ΠAE.Decrypt(ki,Si) does not
output ⊥, and yet (3) the pair (Si, ki) was not generated during a previ-
ous query to Enclave, then abort and output Eventauth. We note that that
in the previous hybrid each key ki is generated at random, and only used
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to encrypt one ciphertext. Thus ifH is able to produce a second cipher-
text that satisfies decryption under this key, then we can construct an
attacker that forges ciphertexts in the authenticated encryption scheme
with non-negligible advantage. Because we assumed the AE scheme was
secure, we have that |Adv [Game 8 ]−Adv [Game 7 ]| ≤ negl7(λ).
Game 9 (Abort if inputs are inconsistent.) This hybrid modifies the previ-
ous as follows: onH’s the ith query to the Enclave oracle, when the input
Si ̸= ε, let (post.CID′, P′, i′, Pubi−1′) be the inputs/outputs associated
with the previous Enclave call that produced Si. If (1) the experiment
has not already aborted due to a condition described in previous hybrids
and (2) if the Enclave oracle as implemented in the previous hybrid does
not reject the input, and (3) any of the provided inputs (post.CID, P, i−
1, Pubi−1) ̸= (post.CID′, P′, i′, Pubi−1′) differ from those associated with
the previous call to the Enclave, abort and output Eventmismatch. By
Lemma 3 we have that |Adv [Game 9 ]−Adv [Game 8 ]| = 0.
Game 10 (Replace ciphertexts with dummy ciphertexts.) This hybrid mod-
ifies the previous as follows: we modify the generation of each ciphertext
S ′out to encrypt the unary string (1Max(P), 1ℓ). We first note that the length
of the (padded) plaintext is identical between this and the previous hy-
brid, by the definition of the padding function. Thus if H’s output is
significantly different between this and the previous hybrid, we can
construct an attacker that succeeds against the confidentiality of the au-
thenticated encryption scheme. By the assumption that the AE scheme
is secure, we have that |Adv [Game 10 ]−Adv [Game 9 ]| ≤ negl8(λ).
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We note that Game 10 is distributed identically to the simulation provided
to H by Ĥ. By summation over the hybrids we have that Adv [Game 9 ] ≤
negl1(λ) + · · ·+ negl8(λ) and thus is also negligible in λ. This implies that no
p.p.t. distinguisher can distinguish the output of Real and Ideal experiments
with non-negligible advantage.
Lemma 1 (Uniqueness of Ledger Identifiers) If HL is collision resistant and
the ledger operates as described in Section 2.1, then for non-repeated inputs
(those not caught in Game 4) with all but negligible probability no two calls
i ̸= j to the Enclave oracle in Game 5 will have posti.Hash = postj.Hash.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] Let us imagine that with some non-negligible
probability ϵ, H is able to play Game 5 such that two distinct calls i ̸= j to
the Enclave oracle have posti.Hash = postj.Hash and yet the two calls were not
identified as repeated inputs (according to the conditions of Game 4). We
show that this implies a collision in the hash function HL.
Let (Pj, j, Ij,Sj, postj), (Pi, i, Ii,Si, posti) be the inputs to the Enclave oracle
(we exclude πpublish). Let
(Datai, CIDi, posti.Hash), (Dataj, CIDj, postj.Hash)
representH’s input (resp. output) from the distinct calls to the Ledger oracle.
We now show that if two such calls produce identical posti.Hash, then the
inputs to HL are not equal with probability related to ϵ.
If the two calls to Enclave are not repeated inputs, then for i ̸= j it holds
that:
(Pj, j, Ij,Sj, postj) ̸= (Pj, j, Ij,Sj, postj)
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posti.Data = Πcom.Commit(PPcom, (i, Ii,Si, Pi); ri)
postj.Data = Πcom.Commit(PPcom, (j, Ij,Sj, Pj); rj)
Thus note that if posti.Hash = postj.Hash then this would imply that the
simulation would abort with either Eventhashcoll or Eventbinding. Since this has
not occurred, then the probability of such a collision is 0.
Lemma 2 (No duplicate Ledger identifiers) If HL is collision-resistant, then
for allH, Pr [ Eventledgerrepeat ] ≤ negl6(λ).
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2] Let us assume by contradiction that H is able to
query the Ledger oracle on two distinct inputs such that the oracle returns
(and records in its table) two distinct transactions posti and postj such that
posti.Hash = postj.Hash. Then we construct a second adversary A that outputs
a collision in the hash function HL. A conducts the experiment of Game 6
withH.
Let i, j be any two integers. If at any pointH, at the jth call to the Ledger or-
acle, submits a pair (Data, CID) such that postj.Hash = posti.Hash, thenA termi-
nates and outputs the collision pair (posti.Data∥posti.PrevHash), (postj.Data∥
postj.PrevHash).
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Clearly if postj.Hash = posti.Hash but
(posti.Data∥posti.PrevHash) ̸= (postj.Data∥postj.PrevHash)
then A has identified a collision in HL. It remains only to show that whenH
succeeds in triggering this event, the latter inequality must hold. Our proof
proceeds inductively.
1. If j = 0 then this condition cannot occur, as there is no previous entry in
the table.
2. If j > 0 then there are two subconditions:
(a) IfH has not previously called the Ledger oracle on CID then postj.PrevHash
is set to a unique identifier based on CID. Because there has been
no previous call on input CID, there cannot exist a second value
posti.PrevHash in the table that shares the same value. Thus ∀i it
holds that postj.PrevHash ̸= posti.PrevHash and thus the main in-
equality holds.
(b) IfH has previously called the Ledger oracle on input CID, then (by
the definition of the Ledger interface) there must exist some i such
that postj.PrevHash = posti.Hash = HL(posti.Data∥posti.PrevHash).
We now consider two subcases:
i. If the ith call to the Ledger oracle was the first call made on
input CID, then by definition posti.PrevHash ̸= postj.PrevHash
because as the root of a new chain, posti.PrevHash has a special
structure and cannot be equal to the output of HL.
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ii. If the ith call to Ledger was not the first call on input CID, and if
postj.PrevHash = posti.PrevHash, then by definition there must
exist a third integer k < j such that the kth call to the Ledger
oracle was also on input CID and posti.PrevHash = postk.Hash =
HL(postk.Data∥postk.PrevHash). However, this event cannot oc-
cur, as this would imply that posti.Hash = postk.Hash and thus
A would have already terminated and output a collision prior
to reaching this point.
In all of the above cases
(posti.Data∥posti.PrevHash) ̸= (postj.Data∥postj.PrevHash)
and so ifH triggers this condition, thenA finds a collision in HL. Because
we assume that HL is collision-resistant, we can bound the probability of
Eventledgerrepeat to be negligible in λ.
Lemma 3 (Consistency of encrypted state) For all p.p.t. H, Pr [ Eventmismatch ] =
0.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 3] For Eventmismatch to occur, one of the following
conditions must occur. First, it must be the case thatH has previously called
Enclave on a set of values (post.CID′, P′, i′, Pubi−1′), which produced a state
ciphertext S that embeds
HP = H(post.CID′∥P′∥i′∥Pub′i−1).
And simultaneously it must be the case that, on input the state ciphertext S,
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the assertion Assert(HP = H(CID∥P∥i∥Pubi−1)) would not fail and cause the
oracle to return ⊥.
However, for this event to occur, it would require one of the following to
be true: either the state ciphertext would have to be inauthentic, resulting in a
previous abort Eventauth (or another abort). Or the hash function would have
to include a collision, resulting in Eventhashcoll. Since we require that the sim-
ulation would abort on these other events before it aborts with Eventmismatch,
this event can never occur.
Lemma 4 (Uniqueness of PRF inputs) No adversary playing Game 5 will
(with non-negligible probability) call the Enclave oracle at steps i, j that (1)
the oracle does not return⊥ or the experiment aborts in one of the calls, (2) the
input values (P1, i, I1,S1, CID1) and (P2, j, I2,S2, CID2) to the two oracle calls
are distinct, and (3) during these invocations the evaluation PRFK(posti.Hash)
and PRFK(postj.Hash) uses posti.Hash = postj.Hash.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 4] LetH′ be an adversary that succeeds in triggering
the above condition with non-negligible probability ϵ. We now show this
violates one of the assumptions given above.
Let us define the two (partial) input tuples provided to the Enclave oracle
as
Input1 = (P1, i, I1,S1, CID1) and Input2 = (P2, j, I2,S2, CID2)
where Input1 ̸= Input2 (we also separately define post1, post2 as inputs to the
oracle.) Recall that in the first instance, PRF is evaluated on (K, posti.Hash)
and in the second it is evaluated on (K, postj.Hash). We now argue that if the
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oracle does not output ⊥ (and the experiment itself has not aborted), and if
Inputi ̸= Inputj then this must imply that posti.Hash ̸= postj.Hash.
Note that each of the fields post1.Data, post2.Data embeds a commitment
computed on (I1, i,S1, P1, CID1), (I2, j,S2, P2, CID2) respectively. If the Enclave
oracle does not abort and the experiment does not abort, then if (I1, i,S1, P1,
CID1) ̸= (I2, j,S2, P2, CID2) then it must hold that (1) post1.Data ̸= post2.Data
(if this were not the case then it would imply a violation of the binding
property of the commitment scheme, and hence an abort with Eventbinding), or
(2) post1.Hash ̸= post2.Hash (because each Hash is computed by applying HL
to the Data field, and a collision in these values would imply an abort with
Eventhashcoll).
Since we required that these aborts do not occur, it must hold that if (I1, i,S1,
P1, CID1) ̸= (I2, j,S2, P2, CID2) then posti.Hash ̸= postj.Hash. This concludes
the proof.
3.5 Applications
We now describe several applications that use Enclave-Ledger Interaction and
present the relevant implementations for each. Each application employs the
main construction we presented in Section 3.4 to implement a specific func-
tionality. Except where explicitly noted, these applications are implemented
as many-time execution programs: this means the host can re-launch the same
program P many times, but each execution thread is independent and threads
do not share state.
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3.5.1 Private Smart Contracts
Smart contract systems comprise a network of volunteer nodes that work
together to execute multi-step interactive programs called contracts. These sys-
tems, which are exemplified by Ethereum and the Hyperledger platforms (The
Ethereum Project 2018; Hyperledger, 2017) as well as research systems like
Ekiden (Cheng et al., 2018) maintain a shared ledger that records both the pre-
vious and updated state of the contract following each execution of a contract
program. These platforms are designed for flexibility: they are capable of exe-
cuting many different contracts on a single network. Smart contract systems
come in two varieties: public contract networks (exemplified by Ethereum (The
Ethereum Project 2018)), where all state and program code is known to the
world; and private contract systems where some portion of this data is held
secret. In both settings the computation (and verification) is conducted by
a set of nodes who are not assumed to always be trustworthy. In the public
setting (e.g., (The Ethereum Project 2018)) a single node performs each contract
execution, and the remaining nodes simply verify the (deterministic) output
of this calculation. This approach does not work in the private setting, where
some of the program inputs are unknown to the full network.
Platforms such as Hyperledger Sawtooth (Intel Corporation, 2018) have
sought to address this concern by employing trusted execution technology (Hy-
perledger, 2017). In these systems, contract code executes within a trusted
enclave on a single node, and the TEE system generate public attestation sig-
natures proving the correctness of the resulting output. The network then
verifies the attestation to ensure that the execution was correct. A challenge in
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these systems is to ensure that a smart contract remains synchronized, despite
the fact that execution migrates from one host to another between steps. A
secondary challenge is to ensure that the enclave only executes contract code
on valid inputs from the ledger, and cannot be forced to run on arbitrary input
or perform additional steps by a malicious host.
Bowman et al. of Intel corporation (Bowman et al., 2018) independently
proposed a solution reminiscent of an ELI for securing contracts in this setting.
(Figure 3.1 presents an illustration of this model.) This setting is also a natural
solution for our ELI system, given that the contract system – with many
distinct enclave copies – can be viewed as merely being a special case of our
main construction.
To instantiate an ELI in this setting, we require the contract author to pre-
position a key K within each enclave.9 Encrypted state outputs can now be
written to the ledger as a means to distribute them. Given these modifications,
each enclave can simply read the current state from the ledger in order to
obtain the most recent encrypted state and commitment to the next contract
input (which may be transmitted by users to the network).10 Other enclaves
can verify the correctness of the resulting output state by either (1) verifying
an attestation signature, or (2) deterministically re-computing the new state
and comparing it to the encrypted state on the ledger.
9This can be accomplished using a broadcast encryption scheme or peer-to-peer key
sharing mechanism.
10We assume that the ledger is authenticated using signatures. Systems such as Hyperledger
propose to use TEE enclaves to construct the ledger as well as execute contracts; in these
systems the ledger blocks are authenticated using digital signatures that can be publicly
verified.
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3.5.2 Logging and Reporting
Algorithm 4: File Access Logging Plogging
Data: Input: Ii , Si; Constants: pkauditor
Parse (phase, sk, CT, filename)← Si
if Si = ε then // Generate master keypair
(pk, sk)← PKKeyGen(1λ)
Si+1 = (PUBLISH, sk, ·, ·)
(Pubi+1, Oi+1)← (ε, pk)
else if phase = PUBLISH then // Send filename
Parse filename← Ii
CTauditor ← PKEnc(pkauditor, filename)
Si+1 ← (DECRYPT, sk, CT, Ii)
(Pubi+1, Oi+1)← (CT, post)
else // Decrypt a given file
Parse C ← Ii
(filename′, M)← PKDec(sk, C)
if filename = filename′ then
Si+1 = (PUBLISH, sk, ·, ·)
(Pubi+1∥Oi+1) = (ε∥M)
else
Abort and output ⊥.
output (Si+1, Pubi+1, Oi+1)
Several cryptographic access control systems require participants to ac-
tively log file access patterns to a remote and immutable network location (Foun-
dation, 2018). A popular approach to solving this problem in cryptographic
access control systems, leveraged by systems like Hadoop (Foundation, 2018),
is to assign a unique decryption key to each file and to require that clients
individually request each key from an online server, which in turn logs each
request. This approach requires a trusted online server that holds decryption
keys and cannot be implemented using a public ledger.
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In place of a trusted server, we propose to use ELI to implement mandatory
logging for protected files. In this application, a local enclave is initialized
(in the first step of a program) and stores (or generates) a master key for
some collection of files, e.g., a set of files stored on a device.11 The enclave
then employs the public output field of the ELI scheme to ensure that prior to
each file access the user must post a statement signaling that the file is to be
accessed.12 The logging program is presented as Algorithm 4 and consists of
three phases. When the program is launched, the enclave generates a keypair
for a public-key encryption scheme (PKKeyGen, PKEnc, PKDec) and outputs
the public key.13 Next the user provides a filename they wish to decrypt,
and the program encrypts this filename using a hard-coded public key for an
auditor. When the user posts this key to the ledger, the program decrypts the
given file.
3.5.3 Limited-attempt Password Guessing
Device manufacturers have widely deployed end-to-end file encryption for
devices such as mobile phones and cloud backup data (Apple Computer, 2016;
Android Project, 2017). These systems require users to manage their own
secrets rather than trusting them to the manufacturer.
Encryption requires high-entropy cryptographic keys, but users are prone
11If the Enclave is implemented using cryptographic techniques such as FWE, a unique
Enclave can be shipped along with the files themselves. If the user employs a hardware token,
the necessary key material can be delivered to the user’s Enclave when the files are created or
provisioned onto the user’s device.
12To provide confidentiality of file accesses, the enclave may encrypt the log entry under
the public key of some auditing party.
13Here we require the encryption scheme to be CCA-secure.
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to lose or forget high-entropy passwords. To address this dilemma, manu-
facturers are turning to trusted hardware, including on-device cryptographic
co-processors (Apple Computer, 2016). trusted enclaves (ARM Consortium,
2017), and cloud-based HSMs (LastPass, 2017; Krstić, 2016) for backup data.
A user authenticates with a relatively weak passcode such as a PIN and the
hardware will release a strong encryption key. To prevent brute force attacks,
this stateful hardware must throttle or limit the number of login attempts.14
Enclave-Ledger Interaction provides an alternative mechanism for limiting
the number of guessing attempts on password-based encryption systems. A
manufacturer can employ an inexpensive stateless hardware token to host
a simple enclave, with an internal (possible hard-wired) secret key K. In
the initial step, the enclave takes in a password uses the random coins to
produce a master encryption key kenc that it outputs to the user. The Enclave
is constructed to release kenc only when it is given the proper passcode and the
step counter is below some limit. Note that if the host restarts the execution,
this simply re-runs the setup step which will generate a new key unrelated
to the original. Rate limiting can be accomplished if the ledger has some
approximation of a clock, like number of blocks between login attempts in
Bitcoin. In practice the decryption process in such a system can be fairly time
consuming if the ledger has significant lag. This system may be useful for low
frequency applications such as recovering encrypted backups or emergency
password recovery.
14This approach led to the famous showdown between Apple and the FBI in the Spring of
2016. The device in question used a 4-character PIN, and was defeated in a laboratory using
a state rewinding attack, and in practice using an estimated $1 million software vulnerabil-
ity(Paletta, 2015; Weaver, 2015).
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3.5.4 Paid Decryption and Ransomware
ELI can also be used to condition program execution on payments made on an
appropriate payment ledger such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Because in these
systems payment transactions are essentially just transactions written to a
public ledger, the program P can take as input a public payment transaction
and condition program execution on existence of this transaction. This feature
enables pay-per-use software with no central payment server. Not all of the
Algorithm 5: Ransomware Pransomware
Data: Input: Ii , Si; Randomness ri;
Parse (K, R, pk)← Si
if Si = ε then // Generate Key, Set Ransom
Parse (R, pk)← Ii
K ← KDF(ri)
output Si+1 ← (K, R, pk)
else // Release Key on Payment
Parse (t, σ)← Ii
if (BlockchainVerify(t, σ) = 1) then
if (t.amount > R and t.target = pk) then
output Oi = K
output Oi = ⊥
applications of this primitive are constructive. The ability to condition soft-
ware execution on payments may enable new types of destructive application
such as ransomware (Zetter, 2016). In current ransomware, the centralized
system that deliver keys represent a weak point in the ransomware ecosys-
tem. Those systems exposes ransomware operators to tracing (Technology.org,
2016). As a result, some operators have fled without delivering key material,
as in the famous WannaCry outbreak (Kan, 2017).
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In the remainder of this section we consider a potential destructive ap-
plication of the ELI paradigm: the development of autonomous ransomware
that guarantees decryption without the need for online C&C. We refer to this
malware as autonomous because once an infection has occurred it requires
no further interaction with the malware operators, who can simply collect
payments issued to a Bitcoin (or other cryptocurrency) address.
In this application, the malware portion of the ransomware samples an
encryption key K ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and installs this value along with the attackers
public address within a Enclave. The Enclave will only release this encryption
key if it is fed a validating blockchain fragment containing a transaction
paying sufficient currency to the attacker’s address. Algorithm 5 presents a
simple example of the functionality.
We note that the Enclave may be implemented using trusted execution
technology that is becoming available in commercial devices, e.g., an Intel
SGX enclave, or an ARM TrustZone trustlet. Thus, autonomous ransomware
should be considered a threat today – and should be considered in the threat
modeling of trusted execution systems. Even if the methods employed for
securing these trusted execution technologies are robust, autonomous ran-
somware can be realized with software-only cryptographic obfuscation tech-
niques, if such technology becomes practical(Lewi et al., 2016).
This application can be extended by allowing a ransomware instance to
prove to a skeptical victim that it contains the true decryption key without
allowing the victim to regain all their files. The victim and the ransomware
can together select a random file on the disk to decrypt, showing the proper
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key is embedded. Additionally, the number of such files that can be decrypted
can be limited using similar methodology as in Section 3.5.2.
3.6 Realizing the Enclave
In Section 2.1 we discussed how the ledger interface we require can be realized
in practice. We now proceed to consider realizations of the enclave
3.6.1 Realizing the Enclave
Trusted cryptographic co-processors The simplest approach to implement
the enclave is using a secure hardware or trusted execution environment
such as Intel’s SGX(Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) 2018), ARM
Trustzone (ARM Consortium, 2017), or AMD SEV (Advanced Microchip
Devices, 2018). When implemented using these platforms, our techniques can
be used immediately for applications such as logging, fair encryption and
ransomware.
While these environments provide some degree of hardware-supported
immutable statekeeping, this support is surprisingly limited. For example,
Intel SGX-enabled processors provide approximately 200 monotonic counters
to be shared across all enclaves. On shared systems these counters could be
maliciously reserved by enclaves such that they are no longer available to new
software. Finally, these counters do not operate across enclaves operating on
different machines, as in the smart contract setting.
Many simpler computing devices such as smart cards lack any secure
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means of keeping state. In our model, even extremely lightweight ASICs
and FPGAs could be used to implement the enclave for stateful applications
using our ELI constructions. Along these lines, Nayak et al. (Nayak et al.,
2017) recently showed how to build trusted non-interactive Turing Machines
from minimal stateless trusted hardware. Such techniques open the way for
the construction of arbitrary enclave functionalities on relatively inexpensive
hardware.
Remark. Several recent attacks against trusted co-processors, particularly Intel
SGX (Van Bulck et al., 2018) highlight the possibility that an enclave breach
could reveal the key K. These attacks would have catastrophic implications
for our protocol. We note that there are several potential mitigations for these
attacks. For example, we recommend that an enclave should not directly
expose the key K to a given program, but should instead derive a separate key
for each program P in case the program contains a vulnerability. Similarly,
we emphasize that even in the event of key leakage, industrial systems may
be able to renew security through e.g., a microcode update, which will allow
the system to derive a new key K from some well-protected internal secret
(as Intel did in response to the Foreshadow attack on SGX). Finally, to ensure
that a processor is using the most recent microcode, the microcode maintainer
can list the most recent microcode hash on the ledger and an ELI “bootloader”
could use ELI to enforce that the current microcode is up to date. We leave
exploration of these ideas to future work.
Software-Only Options A natural software-only equivalent of the enclave
is to use pure-software techniques such as virtualization, or cryptographic
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program obfuscation (Barak et al., 2001). While software techniques may be
capable of hiding secrets from an adversarial user during execution, interac-
tive multi-step obfuscated functionalities are implicitly vulnerable to being
run on old state. Unfortunately, there are many negative results in the area
of program obfuscation (Barak et al., 2001), and current primitives are not
yet practical enough for real-world use (Lewi et al., 2016). However, for spe-
cific functionalities this option may be feasible: for example, Choudhuri et
al. (Choudhuri et al., 2017) and Jager et al. (Liu et al., 2018) describe protocols
based on the related Witness Encryption primitive.
3.7 Prototype Implementation
To validate our approach we implemented our ELI construction using In-
tel SGX (Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) 2018; McKeen et al.,
2013; Johnson et al., 2016; Anati et al., 2013; B, 2016; Rao, 2016; Intel Cor-
poration, 2016)to implement the enclave and the Bitcoin blockchain to im-
plement the ledger. We embedded a lightweight Javascript engine called
Duktape (Duktape.org 2018) into our enclave, as similar projects have done
in the past (Milutinovic et al., 2017). Source code can be found at https:
//github.com/JHU-ARC/state_for_the_stateless/.
The host application communicates with a local Bitcoin node via RPC to
receive blockchain (ledger) fragments for delivery to the enclave, and to sends
transaction when requested by the enclave. The enclave requires an indepen-
dent (partial) Bitcoin implementation to verify proof-of-work tags used as
ledger authenticators. We based this on the C++ SGX-Bitcoin implementation
118
Computation Section Running Time Percentage
Bitcoin Operations 7764 µs 100%
Proof Preparation 7094 µs 92.8%
Proof Verification 550 µs 7.2%
Protocol Operations 2006 µs 100%
Ciphertext Decryption 4 µs 0.2%
Javascript Invocation 1920 µs 95.7%
Ciphertext Encryption 82 µs 4.0%
SGX Overhead 1153348 µs 100%
Enclave Initialization 1153308 µs 100.0%
Ecall Entry and Exit 40 µs 0.0%
Figure 3.3: Measured computation overhead for different elements of our ELI experi-
ment using a simple string concatenation program P. Because SGX does not support
internal time calls, these times were measured by the application code. The table
above shows averaged results over 100 runs on a local Bitcoin regtest network
in the Obscuro project (Tran et al., 2017).
At startup, the host application loads the Javascript program from a file,
initializes the protocol values as in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. and launches
the SGX enclave. At first initialization the enclave generates a random, long
term, master key K, which can be sealed to the processor using SGX’s data
sealing interface, protecting the key from power fluctuations. In each iteration
of the protocol, the untrusted application code prompts the user for the next
desired input. It then generates a transaction T using bitcoin-tx RPC. The
first “input” T.vin[0] is set to be an unspent transaction in the local wallet. The
first “output” T.vout[0] spends the majority of the input transaction to a new
address belonging to the local wallet. The second output T.vout[1] embeds
SHA256(i∥Ii∥Si∥P∥CID∥ri) in an OP_RETURN script. The third output T.vout[2]
embeds the public output Pub emitted by the previous step. This transaction
is signed by a secret key in the local wallet and submitted for confirmation.
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The host application now monitors the blockchain until T has been con-
firmed by 6 blocks.15 The host then sets (1) posti.Data← T.vout, (2) posti.PrevHash←
T.vin[0].Hash, (3) posti.CID← chain of transactions from T back to the transac-
tion with hash post0.PrevHash, (4) posti.Hash← T.Hash, and (5) πpublish,i ← 6
blocks confirming T.
The host then submits (posti, πpublish,i) to the enclave which then per-
forms the following checks: (1) verifies that πpublish,i is valid and has suf-
ficiently high block difficulty (2) the blocks in πpublish,i are consecutive (3)
T.vout[0], T.vout[1] embed the correct data and (4) the transactions in posti.CID
are well formatted.
If i = 0 and there is no input state, the enclave generates a zero initial state.
Otherwise it generates the decryption key as described in the protocol using
C-MAC to implement the PRF. The state along with the inputs and random
coins are passed to the Javascript interpreter. All hashes computed in the
enclave are computed using SHA256. One note is that instead of hashing all
of CID into the ciphertext, we include only post0.PrevHash, which keeps CID
constant throughout the rounds.
Implementation Limitations. We chose to use Intel SGX to implement our enclave
because it is a widely accepted, secure execution environment. However, SGX
is significantly more powerful than the enclaves we model, including access
to trusted time and monotonic counters. Although we use SGX, we do not
leverage any of these additional features to make sure our implementation
matches our model. Our Bitcoin implementation of the ledger is slow and
15In general, six blocks is considered sufficiently safe for normal Bitcoin payment operations;
however the number of confirmations blocks can be tweaked as an implementation parameter.
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would likely not be suitable for production release. Finally, we implement our
applications in Javascript so the Javascript virtual machine will insulate the
enclave code from host tampering.
Measurements To avoid spending significant money on the Bitcoin main
network, we tested our implementation on a private regression regtest. This
also allows us to control the rate at which blocks are mined. The most time-
consuming portion of an implementation using the mainnet or testnet is waiting
for blocks to be confirmed; blocks on the main bitcoin network take an average
of 10 minutes to be mined, or an average of 70 minutes to mine a block and its
6 confirmation blocks. If an application requires faster execution, alternative
blockchains can be used, such as Litecoin (2.5 minutes per block) or Ethereum
(approximately 10-19 seconds).
Our experiments used a simple string concatenation program P. For our
experiments we measured three specific operations: (1) the execution time of
the Bitcoin operations (on the host, enclave and regtest network, (2) ELI proto-
col execution time, (3) the time overhead imposed by Intel SGX operations.
Figure 3.3 shows the running times of these parts of our implementation. It is
worth noting that SGX does not provide access to a time interface, and there is
no way for an SGX enclave to get trustworthy time from the operating system.
The times in Figure 3.3 were measured from the application code.
Discussion. Note that initializing an SGX enclave is a one-time cost that must
be paid when the enclave is first loaded into memory. It is a comparatively
expensive operation because the SGX driver must verify the code integrity
and perform other bookkeeping operations. An additional computationally
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expensive operation is obtaining the proof-of-publication to be delivered to
the enclave. This process relies on bitcoin-cli to retrieve the proper blocks,
which can be slow depending on the status of the bitcoind daemon. We note
that these tests were run using the regression blockchain regtest, and retrieving
blocks from testnet or mainnet may produce different results.
3.8 Conclusion
In this work we considered the problem of constructing secure stateful com-
putation from limited computing devices. This work leaves several open
questions. First, while we discussed the possibility of using cryptographic
obfuscation schemes to construct the enclave, we did not evaluate the specific
assumptions and capabilities of such a system. Additionally, there may be
other capabilities that the enclave-ledger combination can provide that are not
realized by this work. Finally, while we discussed a number of applications
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Chapter 4
Achieving Fairness in MPC
4.1 Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a collection of mutually dis-
trusting parties to jointly compute a function on their private inputs while
revealing nothing beyond the function output. Since its conception three
decades ago (Yao, 1982; Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson, 1987), MPC has
found wide applicability to important tasks such as electronic auctions, voting,
valuation of assets, and privacy-preserving data mining.
Fairness. Over the years, several security definitions for MPC have been
studied. One natural and desirable definition for MPC stipulates that either
all parties receive the protocol output or no party does. This is referred to as
fair MPC.
The notion of fairness is very important (and necessary) in applications
such as auctions and contract signing. For example, if Alice is the first to
learn she did not win an auction, she may abort, claim a network failure, and
try again with a new bid that just exceeds the previous winning bid. More
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generally when the “value” of the function output may be enhanced by an
information asymmetry, e.g., if Alice is better off exclusively knowing the true
value of a financial asset than all parties knowing it, fairness is an issue.
In a seminal work, Cleve (Cleve, 1986) proved that fair MPC is impossible
to realize for general functions when a majority of the parties are dishonest.
This result even holds when the parties have access to a trusted setup such as
a common reference string.
The pursuit of fairness. In light of Cleve’s impossibility result, a vast amount
of research effort has been dedicated towards the study of mitigations to the
fairness problem. In particular, two prominent lines of research have emerged
over the years. The first research direction considers the problem of achieving
fairness in the standard model for a restricted classes of functions (Gordon et
al., 2008; Gordon and Katz, 2009; Asharov, Lindell, and Rabin, 2013; Asharov,
2014; Asharov et al., 2015).
The second research direction studies fairness for general functions by
augmenting the computation model and/or by relaxing the definition of
fairness. The prominent examples in this direction range from using a trusted
party to restore fairness (Cachin and Camenisch, 2000), to weaker models
where the honest parties can recover the output at computational cost or time
at most ∆-times that of the adversary (Even, Goldreich, and Lempel, 1982;
Beaver and Goldwasser, 1989; Goldwasser and Levin, 1991; Pinkas, 2003;
Garay et al., 2006; Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017) (where ∆ is a constant), to
penalizing aborting parties monetarily (Andrychowicz et al., 2014; Bentov
and Kumaresan, 2014; Kumaresan, Moran, and Bentov, 2015; Kumaresan and
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Bentov, 2016). (See Section 4.2 for a more elaborate discussion.)
While these mitigations are helpful, they fall short of solving the problem
in many circumstances. In particular, they either require appointing trusted
parties for very specific tasks (related to the protocol) that can be hard to
find, or require that the parties’ possess precise estimates of the adversary’s
resources and incentives. If the adversary values exclusive knowledge of the
output very highly, it may not be practical to have a large enough computa-
tional differential or penalty to deter aborts. Indeed, in many cases it may be
impossible value the MPC output at all.
4.1.1 Our Results
In this work, we construct theoretical and practical fair MPC protocols for
general functions in the bulletin board model. We, in fact, provide general
transformations from any (possibly unfair) n-party MPC protocol that sup-
ports t < n corruptions to a fair MPC protocol secure against the same number
of corruptions. Crucially, the assumptions used in our transformations affect
fairness only: the correctness and privacy properties of the underlying MPC
scheme are completely preserved even if the assumptions were not to hold.
I. Fair MPC from Witness Encryption. Our first contribution is a fair MPC
protocol in the bulletin board model assuming the existence of witness en-
cryption (WE) (Garg et al., 2013) and injective one-way functions. In order to
rely on the standard security of WE, we require the bulletin board’s proof of
publish to be implemented via unique signatures (Goldwasser and Ostrovsky,
1993; Lysyanskaya, 2002). If the bulletin board is implemented via standard
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signatures (e.g., in Google Transparency Certificates) or proofs of stake (e.g.,
in Etherium), then we require the stronger assumption of extractable witness
encryption (Boyle, Chung, and Pass, 2014).
Candidate constructions of WE for NP (Garg et al., 2013; Gentry, Lewko,
and Waters, 2014) are known from multilinear maps (Garg, Gentry, and Halevi,
2013). Since present constructions (Garg, Gentry, and Halevi, 2013; Coron,
Lepoint, and Tibouchi, 2013; Gentry, Gorbunov, and Halevi, 2015; Coron,
Lepoint, and Tibouchi, 2015) of multilinear maps are quite inefficient, we
view our first construction as a feasibility result. We note, however, that our
construction requires WE for a specific NP language for which constructing
efficient schemes from simpler assumptions might be easier. Indeed, a fasci-
nating open question for future work is whether WE for the specific language
used in our constructions can be implemented from existing constructions for
the related notion of hash proof systems (Cramer and Shoup, 1998).
II. Fair MPC from Secure Processors. Our second contribution is a fair MPC
protocol in the bulletin board where all the parties have access to secure
processors. In fact, Cleve’s impossibility result holds even in the presence of
secure processors, and was proved recently in (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017).
For concreteness, we work with Intel SGX as a secure processor, following
the formalization of (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017). For this result, we only
need standard cryptographic assumptions such as secret-key authenticated
encryption and signatures. We provide an implementation of this protocol in
Section 4.6.
Comparison with recent works. Recently, (Andrychowicz et al., 2014; Bentov
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and Kumaresan, 2014) showed how block-chain based decentralized cryp-
tocurrencies such as Bitcoin can be used to achieve a notion of fairness with
penalties where aborting parties are forced to pay a pre-agreed financial penalty.
We note that while we also use blockchain based bulletin boards in our work,
our end result is quite different in that we achieve the standard notion of
fairness – either all parties get the output or none do.
Very recently, (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017) studied fairness in the model
where each party has access to a secure hardware equipped with secure clock.
They achieve a notion of ∆-fairness which guarantees that if an aborting
adversary can learn the output in time T, then the honest party can also learn
the output in time ∆ · T for ∆ = 2. A disadvantage of this model is that T is
controlled by the adversary, who can set it arbitrarily to create large delay
(e.g., in the order of several minutes or hours) between the times when it gets
the output and when the honest party does.
We note that while we also use secure hardware for our second result,
we do not require them to implement secure clocks.1 More importantly, we
achieve the standard notion of fairness.
4.1.2 Technical Overview
We now describe the main ideas used in our constructions. For simplicity
of exposition, we restrict this discussion to the two-party case. It is easy to
generalize the ideas presented below to the multiparty case.
1In the specific case where the bulletin board is implemented using a proof of work
blockchain, we can use secure clocks to achieve stronger security guarantees. This is unneces-
sary when the bulletin board uses signatures. We discuss this further in Section 4.6.
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Starting Ideas. Our starting idea is to run an unfair MPC protocol to compute
an encryption of the function output as opposed to computing it in the clear.
We then design a special decryption procedure such that either no party is
able to perform the decryption or both parties can. In other words, we reduce
the fairness problem in MPC to the problem of fair decryption.
At first, it may seem that we haven’t made any progress because it is
unclear why fair decryption would be any easier than achieving fairness
for general functions. Indeed, fair decryption was shown to be a complete
functionality for fair MPC in (Gordon et al., 2010).
Our key insight is that a public bulletin board can be used to implement a fair
decryption protocol for a witness encryption scheme. We elaborate on this idea
below.
Fairness from Witness Encryption. A witness encryption scheme for a lan-
guage L can be used to encrypt a message m with a statement x in such a
manner that the resulting ciphertext can only be decrypted using a witness w
for x. We now explain how we use witness encryption to implement our fair
MPC protocol.
In order to securely compute a function f with complete fairness, the
parties first run a standard (possibly unfair) MPC protocol to compute a
randomized function that takes the private inputs say (y1, y2) of the parties
and returns a witness encryption ciphertext CT of the desired output F (y1, y2).
The statement x associated with CT is set to be such that a valid witness for
x corresponds to the proof of posting a “release token” α (to be determined
later) on the bulletin board.
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The only way for any party to obtain such a witness is to post α on the
bulletin board and obtain the corresponding proof of posting σ. However, in
doing so, the pair (α, σ) is made public, and therefore, anyone can obtain it.
Thus, if a malicious adversary learns the witness for decrypting CT, then so
can the honest party since it can simply read the public bulletin board. This
mechanism puts the honest party and the adversary on equal footing and
resolves the fairness problem.
While the above constitutes the core idea behind our work, we run into
several technical issues in implementing this idea. We discuss these next,
together with the solutions.
Issue #1: Setting the release token. An immediate issue with implementing
the above idea is that we cannot set the release token α to be an a priori fixed
value that is known to the adversary. Indeed, if this is the case, then the
adversary can simply abort during the execution of the unfair MPC protocol
so that it learns the ciphertext CT, but the honest party does not. Now, even
if the honest party can obtain (α, σ) once the adversary has posted it on the
bulletin board, it cannot learn the output F (y1, y2) since it does not have CT
to decrypt.
To address this issue, we set α to be a pair of random values (α1, α2) where
αi is chosen by the i-th party. During the initial MPC phase, each party uses
αi as an additional input such that the output of the MPC is (β, CT) where
βi = f (αi) for some one-way function f and β = (β1, β2). Now, even given
(β, CT), the value α is not completely known to the adversary. Therefore, if
it aborts prematurely, then the honest party aborts as well, knowing that the
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adversary would not be able to recover the output.
On the other hand, if the first phase is successfully completed, then the
parties execute a second phase where each party i simply sends over αi to the
other party. Of course, the adversary may abort in this phase after learning α.
However, in order to decrypt CT, it will have to post α on the bulletin board
which means the honest party would learn it as well. This restores the balance
between the honest party and the adversary.
Issue #2: Security of WE. The standard definition of witness encryption only
guarantees semantic security for a ciphertext CT if the statement x associated
with it is false. In our case, the statement is always true. The only way to
argue security in this case is to use a stronger notion of extractable witness
encryption (Boyle, Chung, and Pass, 2014) which guarantees that for any
statement x, if an adversary can distinguish between witness encryption of
m from an encryption of m′ ̸= m, then one can efficiently recover from that
adversary a witness w for x. Now, if the witness w is computationally hard to
find, then we can get a contradiction.
It was shown in (Boyle, Chung, and Pass, 2014) that for languages with
statements that have only polynomially many witnesses, the standard defini-
tion of WE implies the stronger definition of extractable WE. We note that if we
set f to be an injective one-way function and implement the proof of posting
on the bulletin board via unique signatures (Goldwasser and Ostrovsky, 1993;
Lysyanskaya, 2002), then we can bound the number of valid witnesses. In this
case, we can rely on the standard definition of WE.
Issue #3: Rewinding. We run into yet another issue while arguing security of
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the above construction. Recall that in order to prove security of a fair MPC
protocol, we must construct a simulator who can “force” the correct output on
the real adversary, provided that the adversary did not abort prematurely. In
our protocol, the only opportunity for the simulator to “program” the output
is inside the ciphertext CT computed during the initial MPC phase. However,
this point in our overall protocol is “too early” for the simulator to determine
with enough confidence whether the real adversary is going to later abort or
not. If the simulator’s decision to program the output turns out to be wrong,
then it would immediately lead to a distinguisher between the outputs of the
real and ideal experiments.
To deal with this issue, we use a rewinding strategy previously used in
(Goldreich and Kahan, 1996a; Gordon et al., 2010; Gordon, 2010) to determine
the aborting probability of the adversary with enough accuracy, while still
ensuring (expected) polynomial running time for the simulator. In order
to ensure indistinguishability of the adversary’s view in the real and ideal
experiments, we allow the simulator to also rewind the bulletin board to
a previous state, as and when necessary. Indeed, without this capability,
the simulator cannot prevent an adversary from “detecting rewinding” by
continuously posting on the bulletin board. A consequence of this is that
we must model the bulletin board as a “local” functionality as opposed to a
“global” functionality (Canetti et al., 2007; Canetti, Jain, and Scafuro, 2014).
Furthermore, since our simulator performs rewinding, we only achieve stand-
alone security.
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Fairness from Secure Hardware. Roughly, the main idea in our second pro-
tocol is to replace the witness encryption in the plain model with a secure
hardware that implements (essentially) the same functionality as witness en-
cryption. We require that each party is equipped with such a secure hardware
(e.g., Intel SGX). While much of the details in this protocol are similar to the
previous one, there are some key differences. We explain them below.
Once the parties have “installed” an appropriate program P (discussed
below) in their own local secure hardware and attestation of the same is
successfully performed by everyone, they run (as in the previous protocol)
an execution of a standard MPC protocol to compute an encryption CT of the
desired output. Unlike the previous scheme where CT was computed using
witness encryption, here we use a regular secret-key encryption scheme. The
secret key K used for encryption is secret-shared amongst the parties who
use their respective shares as additional inputs to the MPC. The key K is also
loaded in each party’s secure hardware, and is in fact computed by the secure
hardware devices during an initial key-exchange phase.
As in the previous protocol, we require that the ciphertext CT can only
be decrypted if the release token α has been posted on the bulletin board.
The program P loaded in each party’s secure hardware implements such a
conditional decryption mechanism. Specifically, upon receiving a ciphertext
CT, a release token α and a corresponding proof of posting σ, the program P
verifies the validity of α and σ. If the verification succeeds, then it decrypts
CT and returns the output; otherwise it returns ⊥.
We remark upon two security issues: first, in order to prevent malleability
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attacks, we require that an authenticated encryption scheme is used in order
to compute CT. Further, to prevent an adversary from performing a related
key attack (by changing its input key share in the MPC), we require that the
secure hardware also provide commitments Ci of each key share Ki to all the
parties upon generation of K. A party i is required to input the decommitment
to Ci in the MPC protocol, and the MPC functionality checks that all the input
key shares are valid by verifying the decommitment information.
Second, for this protocol, we can completely dispense with rewinding
and instead construct a black-box, non-rewinding simulator. This is because
the use of secure hardware allows the simulator to “program” the output
at the very end, when the adversary makes a decryption query to its secure
hardware.2 Indeed, in the secure hardware model, the simulator has the
ability to observe (and modify) the queries made by the adversary to its secure
hardware. This means that when the adversary makes a final decryption
query, the simulator can check if it is valid. If this is the case, then it queries
the trusted party to obtain the function output. At this point, the simulator
sends a “fake” decryption query to the secure hardware that already contains
the desired output. Upon receiving this query, the secure hardware returns
the programmed output to the adversary. We note that this programming
technique for secure hardware was recently used in (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr,
2017).
Because of the above modifications, in this protocol, we can model the
2We also use an MPC in the common random string (CRS) model (e.g., (Canetti et al.,
2002)) to implement the first phase of the protocol. By using the CRS trapdoor, the simulator
for this phase can avoid any rewinding of the adversary.
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bulletin board as a global functionality. In this manuscript, however, we do
not prove UC security of our protocol and leave it for future work.
Realizing the Bulletin Board. Our constructions assume a public bulletin
board that is capable of producing an unforgeable proof that a string has been
published to the bulletin board. Such bulletin boards can easily be constructed
practice if one is willing to instantiate the board using a single trusted party.
While this seems a strong assumption, the advantage of this approach is that
such systems already exist and have been widely deployed in practice for
applications such as Certificate Transparency (Certificate Transparency 2017).
Re-using them to achieve fairness in arbitrary MPC protocols requires no
specific to the existing systems.
Alternatively, a bulletin board can be realized using a decentralized sys-
tems such as proof of stake blockchains (e.g., (Kiayias et al., 2017)). These
systems allow a quorum of honest users – who together possess a majority
ownership “stake” in a cryptocurrency – to securely authenticate an append-
only log using signatures. Finally, a weaker notion of security can be achieved
using a proof of work blockchain. In the latter case, the “proof” of publication
is not a cryptographically unforgeable signature, but rather the solution to a
sequence of one or more computational puzzles which may be, in practice,
prohibitively expensive for an attacker to forge.3 We explore this approach in
our experimental implementation, although we stress that this is merely an
3In practice, such proof of work blockchains provide a slightly weaker security that is
related to ∆-fairness. An attacker, given enough time, may be able to forge the proof of work
necessary to prove publication. However, in the trusted hardware setting we are able to
mitigate this concern to some extent by requiring the attacker to provide a proof in a limited
period of time, as judged by the hardware.
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implementation detail. Our bulletin board could easily be replaced with one
of the alternatives above.
Optimizations. We mention a few optimizations to the above protocols to
improve efficiency. First, we can add an optimistic decryption phase in the
above protocols that allows the parties to learn the output using a simple
decryption process, without using the bulletin board, provided that all the
parties are honest. Roughly, the MPC protocol executed in the first phase
now additionally computes another encryption CT′ of the function output,
where CT′ is implemented using a regular encryption scheme. The decryption
key K′ corresponding to CT′ is secret-shared between the parties. Now, if the
release-token exchange performed in the second phase is successful, then the
parties execute a third phase (that we refer to as the optimistic decryption
phase) where they exchange the key shares corresponding to K′. If all the
parties are honest, then they all learn K′ and use it to decrypt CT′, without
using the bulletin board. However, if one or more parties are adversarial and
abort in this phase, then the honest parties can still post the release token α
(that they learned in the second phase) on the bulletin board and then use the
proof of posting to decrypt CT as before.
We remark that in order to avoid related key attacks by an adversary,
we would need a slight modification to the above protocol where the MPC
in the first phase outputs commitments to each key share K′i to both the
parties. During the optimistic decryption phase, each party must reveal the
decommitment value together with K′i . A party only accepts the key share as
valid if the associated decommitment information is correct.
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Finally, we note that the size of the release token α = (α1, α2) used in the
above described protocols grows with the number of parties N. However, it is
easy to make it independent of N by setting α = ⊕iαi and using β = f (α) to
verify the correctness of release token. An advantage of this modification is
that the witness length for the witness encryption used in our construction, as
well as the length of the string that is posted on the bulletin board becomes
independent of the number of parties.
4.2 Related work
A large body of research work has addressed the problem of fairness in secure
protocols over the years. Below, we provide a non-exhaustive summary of
prior works. A more elaborate summary can be found, e.g., in (Bentov and
Kumaresan, 2014).
Fairness in Standard Model. Assuming an honest majority of parties, fair
MPC can be achieved in both computational (Goldreich, Micali, and Wigder-
son, 1987) and information-theoretic setting (Rabin and Ben-Or, 1989). Cleve
(Cleve, 1986) proved the impossibility of MPC for general functions n the
dishonest majority setting. Subsequently, an exciting sequence of works (Gor-
don et al., 2008; Gordon and Katz, 2009; Asharov, Lindell, and Rabin, 2013;
Asharov, 2014; Asharov et al., 2015) have shown that complete fairness can
still be achieved for a restricted class of functions. The works of (Gordon and
Katz, 2010; Beimel et al., 2011; Alon and Omri, 2016) study the problem of
partial fairness.
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Optimistic Models. Starting from the early work of (Ben-Or et al., 1985),
optimistic models for fair exchange have been studied in a long sequence of
works (Asokan, Schunter, and Waidner, 1997; Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner,
1998; Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie, 1999; Micali, 2003; Dodis, Lee, and
Yum, 2007; Küpçü and Lysyanskaya, 2010). An optimistic model for fair two-
party computation using a semi-trusted third party was studied in (Cachin
and Camenisch, 2000; Kilinç and Küpçü, 2016).
Gradual Release Mechanisms. A different approach to fairness that avoids
trusted third parties was considered in a long sequence of works (Boneh
and Naor, 2000; Garay and Jakobsson, 2003; Garay and Pomerance, 2003;
Pinkas, 2003), following the early works of (Even, Goldreich, and Lempel, 1982;
Beaver and Goldwasser, 1990; Goldwasser and Levin, 1991). The protocols
in these works employ a “gradual release” mechanism where the parties
take turns to release their secrets in a bit-by-bit fashion. The intuitive security
guarantee (formalized in (Garay et al., 2006)) is that even if an adversary aborts
prematurely, the honest party can recover the output in time comparable to
that of the adversary by investing equal (or more) computational effort.
∆-Fairness. Very recently, (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017) considered a notion of
∆-fairness with the guarantee that if an adversary aborts, then the honest party
can learn the output in time ∆ · T, where T is the time in which the adversary
would learn the output. They propose a fair two-party computation protocol
with (∆ = 2)-fairness assuming that all the parties have secure hardware
equipped with secure clocks.
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Fairness with Penalties. Recently, with the popularity of decentralized cryp-
tocurrencies such as Bitcoin, a sequence of works (Andrychowicz et al., 2014;
Bentov and Kumaresan, 2014; Kumaresan, Moran, and Bentov, 2015; Kumare-
san and Bentov, 2016) have shown how to implement a fairness-with-penalties
model for MPC where adversarial parties who prematurely abort are forced
to pay financial fines. Prior works in similar spirit considered fairness with
reputation systems (Asharov, Lindell, and Zarosim, 2013) and legally enforced
fairness (Chen, Kudla, and Paterson, 2004; Lindell, 2009).
4.3 Fair MPC from Witness Encryption
Overview. We start by giving an overview of our protocol. Our protocol
builds on an MPC protocol that achieves the weaker notion of security with
abort, where the fairness condition is not required to hold. The initial phase
constitutes of the parties using this unfair MPC protocol to compute a witness
encryption ciphertext of the function value they wish to compute. To decrypt,
a party must post messages of a specific form (referred to as “release tokens”)
on to the bulletin board which the bulletin board validates with an authen-
tication tag. The idea then is that any party can use this posted information
and authentication tag to decrypt the witness encryption ciphertext. The
release token must include shares of all parties that are secret prior to the
completion of this initial phase. These shares must also be easily verifiable.
Our construction uses injective one-way functions, where the images of these
shares are sent out during the initial phase.
The next phase, on completion of the initial phase, constitutes of parties
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sending these secrets to every other party. Once a party releases its share, it
must not abort until it is sure that the other parties cannot post to the bulletin
board, and hence decrypt the message thereafter. Otherwise, the adversary
on receiving the secret shares will wait for the honest parties to abort before
posting to the bulletin board. This is resolved by parameterizing the protocol
by a cut-off period which once elapsed, effectively ends the protocol. If there
isn’t a valid post to the bulletin board at this time, no party gets the output.
To argue security, we require each statement in the language corresponding
to the witness encryption to have only a polynomial size witness set. To do
so, we use an injective one-way function and a unique signature scheme. The
witness for the statement are the pre-images of the values sent during the
initial phase, and the corresponding tag from the bulletin board. This pair is
unique for a given statement. But we need to incorporate the cut-off period
into the witness. This is enforced by the counter in the bulletin board as
described in Section 2.1. In the protocol, this translates to a window (set) of
counter values which qualify as the additional variable in the witness. To
ensure that the number of witnesses are still polynomial, the window size has
to be polynomial. We parameterize the protocol with the size of this window,
and the parties choose the start point of the window.
As discussed in the introduction, for the proof in this model, it is essential
that the simulator is able to reset the bulletin board to a prior point (in essence,
rewinding).
– rewind: This functionality is reserved for the simulator in the ideal world.
On receiving additional input t, the bulletin board internally resets its
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counter to t and clears all data stored beyond the counter value t. The
simulator gets no output on this query.
⊥← Ledger.rewind(t)
We want to stress that this additional capability is only limited to the
construction in this section and the construction in the next section (using
trusted hardware) we will not require this.
We additionally discuss an extension to an optimistic phase where the
parties can share some additional secrets (different from before) that enable
them to decrypt a (different) ciphertext containing the output, without having
to post to the bulletin board. Of course, the adversary can prematurely abort
in this phase and obtain the output for itself. To protect against this, the
optimistic phase is reached only once it has been established that the parties
have enough information that would enable them to use the bulletin board, to
decrypt to the output, in case the adversary aborts in this phase.
Construction. We now proceed to describe our protocol Πfair. It uses the
cryptographic primitives and a bulletin board as described below. The formal
protocol description is given in Figure ??.
1. A injective one-way functions f .
2. An authentication scheme with public verification (Gen, Tag, VerifyLedger)
such that the authentication tags are unique for a given message.
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) ⏐⏐⏐ ∃ (t, σ, {ρi}i∈[n]) s.t.
(∀i ∈ [n], yi = f (ρi)) AND
t ∈ {T, T + 1, · · · , T + ∆t} AND
VerifyLedger((t||ρ1|| · · · ||ρn), σ) = 1
}
For a given x ∈ LWE,∆t, if f is an injective one-way function and (Gen,
Tag, VerifyLedger) is a scheme that generates unique authentication tags,
it is easy to see that there are only ∆t + 1 witnesses for x. If ∆t is set
to be polynomial in the size of x, there are only polynomially many
witnesses for any given statement, and thus LWE,∆t is a polynomial
witness language (see Definition 10). From Theorem 1, given LWE,∆t is
a polynomial witness language, we know that a witness encryption for
LWE,∆t is also an extractable witness encryption for LWE,∆t.
4. An MPC protocol that computes:
F ′∆t((x1, ρ1, t1), · · · , (xn, ρn, tn)) =
(
c, { f (ρi)}i∈[n] , T
)
where T = max(t1, · · · , tn) and c = ΠWE.Enc(xWE,∆t,F (x1, · · · , xn)) for
xWE,∆t = ({ f (ρi)}i∈[n] , T). We do not require this protocol to be fair.
Importantly, we use the MPC protocol in the common random string
(CRS) model. This allows for black-box simulation of the adversary
without the necessity of rewinding. For this section, we shall drop the
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CRS notation, but it will be implicit.
Protocol Πfair in the F ′∆t-Hybrid model
Inputs: Each party Pi has an input xi.
Common input: The verification key for the bulletin board vkLedger.
The protocol:
1. Computation of F ′∆t.
– Pi samples token ρi
$← {0, 1}poly(λ).
– Pi queries the bulletin board to get the current counter value, i.e. ti ←
Ledger(getCurrentCounter).





It aborts if it receives ⊥ from the ideal functionality.
2. Exchange of tokens. Pi broadcasts ρi to all other parties, and receives {ρ̂l}l∈[n]\{i}.
3. Obtaining the output. We split this into three cases, where either (i) Pi can post
on the bulletin board to receive a valid witness; or (ii) Pi waits for another party
to post to the bulletin board; or (iii) no party posts to the bulletin board.
(a) Pi received ρj from all the other parties, such that ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i} : f (ρj) = yj.
In this case, Pi waits for the counter to get to T before posting to the bulletin
board. Prior to posting, it check to see if another party has already posted
the same. This could be done either by observing the broadcasts sent (to
the bulletin board), or querying the bulletin board at most ∆t times. On
obtaining the appropriate authentication tag, the witness encryption can be
decrypted to get the output.
(b) Pi received a ρj such that f (ρj) ̸= yj, or ρj =⊥ (i.e. a party didn’t send its
token). In this case, Pi checks if the right message is posted to the bulletin
board for counter values between T and T + ∆T. If it finds the right value,
it obtains the authentication tag and decrypts the witness encryption to get
the output.
(c) If there are no posts on the bulletin board satisfying the given requirements,
and the counter has progressed beyond T + ∆t, Pi aborts.
Figure 4.1: Πfair in the F ′∆t-Hybrid model. The protocol relies on the security of
witness encryption for a polynomial witness language, injective one-way functions
and authentication scheme with public verification and unique tags.
Remark 1 In the construction described above, the size of the witness encryption
circuit is dependent on the number of parties in the protocol. This can be remedied
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by using the XOR of the ρi values as the release token, and applying the injective
one-way function on this. The rest of the protocol remains the same.
4.3.1 Proof of Security
We prove the security of our construction in the F ′∆t-hybrid model.
Simulator S . We start by constructing a simulator S . Our simulator uses
rewinding strategy similar to the one described in (Gordon, 2010) (which in
turn builds on (Goldreich and Kahan, 1996b)). The simulator has access to
an ideal functionality for computing F , and simulates F ′∆t for the real world
adversary. In addition, for the proof in this model, the simulator reserves the
right to reset the bulletin board to prior point (in essence, rewinding). (We will
not require this property in the protocol based on secure hardware.) Further,
S forwards any queries the adversary makes to the bulletin board, and returns
the corresponding response from the bulletin board.
1. S receives inputs {(xa, ρa, ta)}a∈A sent by the adversary that are in-
tended for F ′∆t.
2. Mark the current value of the counter so that S can rewind the bulletin
board to this point.
tmark ← Ledger.getCurrentCounter()
3. S simulates the output of ideal functionality computing F ′∆t as follows:
(a) Set T = max{{ta}a∈A, tmark}.
(b) Randomly pick {ρh}h∈H for the honest parties.
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(c) ∀i ∈ [n], yi := f (ρi).
(d) Compute ôut← F (x̂1, · · · , x̂n) where x̂h = 0 for all h ∈ H.










(f) Send (c, {yi}i∈[n], T) to the adversarial parties.
(g) If the adversary responds with an abort, S sends abort to the ideal
functionality computing F , and exits. For our analysis, we denote
this by abort1.
4. S sends values {ρh}h∈H to the adversary. If the adversary sends values
{ρa}a∈A such that ∀a, ya = f (ρa); or sends a post query to the bulletin
board with value (ρ1|| · · · ||ρn) when counter value is between T and
T + ∆t such that ∀i, yi = f (ρi), the adversary has not aborted.
5. If the adversary aborted in the previous step, S sends abort to the ideal
functionality computing F , and exits. For our analysis, we denote this
by abort2.
6. If the adversary didn’t abort prior to this, we need to estimate the proba-
bility of the adversary not aborting. Let q represents the true of proba-
bility of this event, where the randomness is over random coins used in
step 3(b) and 3(e). The estimated probability will be denoted by q̃.
(a) S fixes some number t = poly(λ).
(b) S rewinds the adversary to step 3, rewinds the bulletin board
Ledger.rewind(tmark) and repeats steps 3 and 4 (other than 3(g)) with
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fresh randomness each time. Repeat till the adversary has not
aborted t times.
(c) S estimates q as q̃ = t# of repetitions . The polynomial defining t is










7. The simulator sends {xa}a∈A to the ideal functionality forF and receives
out. S repeats the following at most tq̃ times.
(a) With fresh randomness each time, S rewinds the adversary to step
3, rewinds the bulletin board Ledger.rewind(tmark) and repeats steps
3 and 4 (other than 3(g)) replacing ôut with out.
(b) If the adversary does not abort, we output its view and the simula-
tor terminates.
8. If S has not terminated yet, output fail and terminate the simulation.
Claim 1 If simulator S does not outputs fail, the hybrid world and the ideal world
are indistinguishable.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 1] We split the analysis into two cases:
– Case 1: The adversary does not abort. Since the simulator does not output
fail, it has successfully got the adversary to accept the transcript for the
right output. In this case, the main thread of the adversary is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from the real execution. Additionally, since the
simulator is able to rewind the bulletin board, the adversary’s view of
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the bulletin board is that of a straight line execution. Thus the joint
distribution consisting of the view of the adversary and the honest party
outputs is indistinguishable.
– Case 2: The adversary aborts. As noted in the simulator, the adversary
can abort in two phases of the protocol. We deal with the two case
separately: abort1: The adversary aborts immediately after running the
MPC for F ′∆t. In both the real and ideal world, honest parties do not
get any output. Thus, we need to argue that the adversary’s view is
indistinguishable when he receives a witness encryption of the actual
output as opposed to when he received the witness encryption of a ran-
dom string. To the contrary, assume that the adversary can distinguish
between these two cases. Since there only polynomially many witnesses,
we use the extractor for the adversary to recover the witness. Since the
honest parties aborts without revealing its share of the token, we can use
the extractor to construct an adversary that breaks the security of the
injective one-way function. abort2: The adversary aborts on receiving
the honest party’s tokens without posting to the bulletin board. We
use the same technique as above, leveraging the extractor for witness
encryption, to construct an adversary that breaks the unforgability of
the authentication tags issued by the bulletin board.
Claim 2 The simulator S outputs fail with only negligible probability.
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Proof. [Proof of Claim 2] The analysis for the proof below is taken from
(Gordon, 2010; Goldreich and Kahan, 1996b). The simulator S outputs fail
only if it has reached step 7 and then fails in producing an accepting transcript.
S fails to reach step 7 with probability q.
We denote by p, the probability that the adversary does not aborts when
given the witness encryption of the correct functionality, i.e., p is the proba-
bility when the adversary is given the witness encryption of F (x1, · · · , xn).
Recollect that q is the probability of the adversary not aborting when given
the witness encryption of F (x̂1, · · · , x̂n) where ∀a, x̂a = xa and ∀h, x̂h = 0.
From the security of witness encryption, we require |q− p| is negligible in
the security. (probability is taken over the random coins used to generate the
output of F ′∆t.)





























2q + negl(λ) (4.1)
To show that the above equation is negligible in λ, we split the analysis
into two cases:












which is negligible is λ since t is polynomial in λ.
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– Case 1: p < q2 . To the contrary, let us assume Equation 4.1 is non-
negligible. Then, there is a polynomial poly and infinitely many values
λ such that
q ≥ q(1− p)
t
2q + negl(λ) > 1
poly(λ)
.
Thus q > 1
poly′(λ)







This breaks the security of the witness encryption scheme.
Thus S outputs fail with only negligible probability.
We assume that the value of T chosen in the protocol is such that the real
execution of the protocol ends in time bounded above by a polynomial g(λ).
Otherwise F ′∆t implements an additional check to ensure this.
Claim 3 The simulator S runs in expected polynomial time.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 3] With probability 1− q, the simulator aborts prior to
step 6. With probability q, the simulator goes through the estimation phase
and then attempts to force an accepting transcript onto the adversary. The
expected number of iterations for the estimation phase is tq and the cut-off
point for forcing the transcript is tq̂ <
t
2q . Hence the total expected running
time is bounded by









Thus S runs in expected polynomial time.
Given the above claims, the following theorem follows.
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Theorem 3 Assuming the security of injective one-way functions, witness encryp-
tion for polynomial witness language and the unforgeability of the authentication
scheme, the above protocol satisfies Definition 7 in the F ′∆t-hybrid model.
As mentioned in the introduction, in order to rely on the standard security
of WE, we require the bulletin board’s proof of publish to be implemented
via unique signatures (Goldwasser and Ostrovsky, 1993; Lysyanskaya, 2002).
If the bulletin board is implemented via standard signatures (e.g., in Google
Transparency Certificates) or proofs of stake (e.g., in Etherium), then we
require the stronger assumption of extractable witness encryption (Boyle,
Chung, and Pass, 2014).
4.4 Fairness from Secure Hardware
A key limitation of our previous constructions is the need to use Witness
Encryption (WE) to protect the output of the MPC protocol. Unfortunately,
current proposed WE construction are inefficient, due to the high overhead of
current constructions of multilinear maps. Moreover, the Witness Encryption
paradigm requires the parties to compute a new WE ciphertext for each
invocation of the MPC protocol.
In this section we investigate an alternative paradigm that uses secure
hardware. Our work is motivated by the recent deployment of commodity
virtualization technologies such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX).
These technologies allow for the deployment of secure “enclave” function-
alities that can store secrets and perform correct computation even when
executed in an adversarial environment. Moreover, these systems allow an
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enclave to remotely attest to their correct functioning, which allows for the
establishment of trustworthy communications between enclaves running on
different machines.
Model. Following the approach of Pass et al. (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017) we
model all available trusted hardware processors from a given manufacturer
as a single, globally shared functionality denoted Gatt (see Figure 2.5). We
describe the functionalities required for our construction, and refer the reader
to (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017) for details. install loads the program prog
onto the attested hardware. It returns an enclave identifier eid. (For simplicity,
we skip the session identifier used in (Pass, Shi, and Tramèr, 2017).) The
enclave identifier is be used to identify the enclave upon resume. resume
allows for a stateful resume using the unique enclave identifier generated. On
running over a given input, the output produced is signed to attest that the
enclave with identifier eid was installed with a program prog, which was then
executed to produce the output. The program’s input is not included in the
attestation.
Description. We describe here the main ideas in this construction that differ
from the previous construction. Upon loading the program onto the attested
hardware (enclaves), there is an initial key exchange to establish a secure
authenticated channel between the enclaves. Any information passed over
this channel is hidden from the parties. It is important that enclaves attest to
the fact that they are running the correct programs prior to the key exchange.
Next, the shares of the release token and the key are input to the enclave.
The enclaves use the established secure authenticated channel to exchange
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this information and set up consistent parameters (over all enclaves) for the
decryption circuit. The parties then run an MPC protocol external to the
enclaves to compute an encrypted version of the output. As in our previous
construction, the players exchange shares of the release token that they are
required to post onto the bulletin board in order to decrypt.
For technical reasons, we need to ensure that the key share that a party
sends to the enclave is the one used in the MPC. This is ensured by using a
commitment scheme which the MPC computation verifier before returning
the output.
Our protocol requires the following primitives:
1. A one-way function f .4
2. A signature schemes (Gen, Sign, Verify).
3. An authentication scheme with public verification (Gen, Tag, VerifyLedger).


















⊥ if ∃i s.t. comii ̸= Com(ki; ri)
y otherwise
where y = AE.Enc⨁n
i=1 ki
(F (x1, · · · , xn)). Essentially the MPC takes in
a the input, key share, a commitment tuple and a decommitment from
4In practice we suggest using a hash function.
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each party. It checks if the tuple pairs received are the same throughout
and the commitment linked to each party decommits to the key share. If
this check fails it just returns ⊥, or it returns the output y.
5. Two instances of AE scheme (Enc, Dec) with INT-CTXT security for
authentication and semantic security.
6. A commitment scheme (Com) with computational hiding and statisti-
cally binding.
We describe and prove the protocol in the two party setting. Both extended
naturally to the multi-party setting. The protocol is described in Figure ??.
We note that there are two trapdoors installed into functionalities of progfair.
These are used for the security reduction of the one-way function, and to
program the output correspondingly. Specifically, the trapdoor is used to get
the enclave to attest to a value of choice. These trapdoors can be used by
an adversarial party, but this makes no difference to the security since these
values are not sent across to the other party.
Theorem 4 Assume that F is one-way, the signature scheme is existentially unforge-
able under chosen message attacks, the authentication scheme satisfies standard notion
of unforgeability, the encryption scheme is perfectly correct, authenticated encryption
scheme that is perfectly correct and satisfies standard notions of INT-CTXT and
semantic security, decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the algebraic group
adopted. Then, the above protocol satisfies Definition 7 in the (Gatt,F ′)-hybrid model.
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4.4.1 Proof of Security
We now prove Theorem 4. We consider the two party setting where P1 is
corrupted. The other case is symmetric. The simulator S works as follows:
1. Unless otherwise mentioned, S passes through messages between ad-
versary A(P1) and Gatt.
2. S loads the program to get the corresponding eid0, i.e.
eid0 ← Gatt.install(progfair[∆t,P0,P1, vk
Verify
L , 0])
3. Next, S initiates the key exchange phase (ga, σ0)← Gatt.resume(eid0, “keyex”)
and sends (eid0, ga, σ0) message to A.









sent by A is different from the corresponding tuple it received from Gatt.
If the tuples differ and the signature verifies, output ⊥Gatt and exit.
5. Pick k0
$← {0, 1}λ, ρ0
$← {0, 1}λ, r0
$← {0, 1}λ, t0 ← LVerify.GetCounter()
and initialize Gatt with these values, (com0, _)← Gatt.resume(eid0, “init”, ρ0, k0, t0, r0).
Simulator sees the values (ρ1, k1, t1, r1) that A sends to Gatt.
6. S calls (ct1, _)← Gatt.resume(eid0, “send”), sends ct1 to A and waits for
ct0.
As before, the simulator observes if ct0 sent by A is different from the
value it received from Gatt. If so, and Gatt doesn’t throw an exception,
output ⊥AE1 and exit.
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7. Make a call to Gatt to get the parameters,
(T, y, _)← Gatt.resume(eid0, “getParams”,⊥)
8. Wait for A to send (x1, k′1, com′0, com′1, r′1) intended for F ′. If the commit-
ment values are not the same as the ones received earlier, send abort
to the ideal functionality and send ⊥ to the adversary. If k′1 ̸= k1, i.e.
the key shares sent at different points differ, and if com′1 = Com(k′1; r′1)
output ⊥com and exit. Else, pick K′ randomly and compute ctMPC ←
AE.EncK′(F (0, x1)) to send to A.
9. S obtains its token share from Gatt,
(ρ0, _)← Gatt.resume(eid0, “getTokenShare”,⊥)
10. If A aborts immediately after receiving the output from F ′ without the
honest party getting it, send abort to the ideal functionality. But continue
running S . If the adversary sends to the bulletin board or enclave the
correct pre-image of y, S outputs ⊥ f and exits.
11. If A has not aborted, send ρ0 to A. If the adversary does not send ρ1, or
post a valid pre-image during the interval T to T + ∆T, but queries Gatt
for the output on a valid authentication tag, then we output ⊥Ledger and
exit.
12. Alternatively, we split the behavior of the simulator three cases:
– If A responds with a valid ρ1 (i.e. f (ρ0 ⊕ ρ1) = y), then post to the
bulletin board. Recollect that S has reached this point only if the key
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shares sent by A were consistent. Send x1 to the ideal functionality
to receive out. If Amakes the correct query to the enclave, i.e. the
ciphertext sent is the same as the one from the MPC, S programs the
output by returning Gatt.resume(eid1, “output”, tVerifyL , σ
Verify
L , out). If
the ciphertext is different and authenticates under key K′, then
output ⊥AE2 and exit.
– If the adversary does not send ρ1 but posts a pre-image of y dur-
ing the interval T to T + ∆T, S follows the same approach as the
previous step.
– If A attempts to use the backdoor, forward the message to Gatt
without modification.
We prove indistinguishability of the real and ideal worlds through a se-
quence of hybrids.
H0: Identical to the real execution.
H1: Identical toH0 except that we introduce the following check. Observe the




sent byA is different
from the corresponding tuple it received from Gatt. If the tuples differ and the
signature verifies, output ⊥Gatt and exit.
Claim 4 Assuming that the underlying signature scheme is secure,H1 is computa-
tionally indistinguishable fromH0.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 4] H1 exits with output ⊥Gatt with only negligible
probability. If not, we can use A to construct an adversary that breaks the
signature scheme.
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H2: Identical toH1 except that we replace all occurrences of sk = gab with a
random key.
Claim 5 Assuming that DDH holds,H2 is computationally indistinguishable from
H1.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 5] Follows directly from DDH security.
H3: Identical toH2 except that we add the following additional checks:
– observe if ct0 sent by A is different from the value it received from Gatt.
If so, and Gatt doesn’t throw an exception, output ⊥AE1 and exit.
– ifA sends a different key share k′1 intended forF ′∆t and com′1 = Com(k′1; r′1),
output ⊥com and exit.
– if A aborts immediately after receiving the output from F ′ (without the
honest party getting it), send abort to the ideal functionality. Addition-
ally, wait to see if the adversary sends to the bulletin board or enclave
the correct pre-image of y. If so, outputs ⊥ f and exit.
– if the adversary does not send ρ1 and does not post a valid pre-image
during the interval T to T +∆T but queries Gatt on a valid authentication
tag, output ⊥Ledger and exit.
Claim 6 Assuming the security of one-way permutation, statistical binding of the
commitment scheme INT-CTXT security of AE and unforgeability of the authentica-
tion schemeH3 is computationally indistinguishable fromH2.
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Proof. [Proof of Claim 6] The only changes are in the checks performed. We
argue thatH3 will output a special abort with only negligible probability:
– ⊥AE1 is output with only negligible probability. Else, we can leverage
the adversary to break the INT-CTXT security of the AE scheme.
– ⊥com is output with only negligible probability. Else, we can leverage the
adversary to break the statistical binding property of the commitment
scheme.
– ⊥ f is output with only negligible probability. Else we can break the
security of the one way function. This follows from the fact that the
simulator is see the queries that the adversary makes to the enclave and
the bulletin board. Since we want to force the challenge value y∗ onto
the adversary, we use a backdoor in the function. This backdoor does
not give the adversary any undue advantage as the value is not sent
across to the other party.
– ⊥Ledger is output with negligible probability. Else, we can leverage the
adversary to break the unforgeability of the authentication scheme for
the bulletin board. This is because the adversary was able to produce a
signature that has not been queried for before.
H4: Identical to H3 except that we intercept the ciphertext query for the
output, and program the output using the trapdoor to be AE.DecK(ct) if the
other conditions are satisfied. Here K is the key in the enclave.
Claim 7 H4 is statistically indistinguishable fromH3.
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Proof. [Proof of Claim 7] This follows from the fact that it was only a statistical
change. This is because we moved the exact check to the outside of the
enclave.
H5: Identical toH4 except that replace com2 to be a commitment of a random
value.
Claim 8 If the commitment scheme is computationally hiding,H5 is computationally
indistinguishable fromH4.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 8] If the two hybrids are distinguishable, we can
leverage the adversary to break the computational hiding of the commitment
scheme.
H5: Identical toH4 except that we pick K′ randomly and use K′ to encrypt the
output. Now, the output is programmed in the last round with respect to the
key K′.
Claim 9 If the semantic security of the AE scheme holds, H5 is computationally
indistinguishable fromH4.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 9] If the two hybrids are distinguishable, then we can
build an adversary that breaks the semantic security of the AE scheme.
H6: Identical to H5 except that we add the following additional checks. If
the ciphertext differs from the MPC output and it authenticates under key K′,
then output ⊥AE2 and exit.
Claim 10 If INT-CTXT security of the AE scheme holds, H6 is computationally
indistinguishable fromH5.
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Proof. [Proof of Claim 10] Since the only changes are additional checks, it is
enough to show that S outputs ⊥AE2 with only negligible probability. This
follows directly from the INT-CTXT security of the AE scheme. Specifically,
we can receive the challenge ciphertext to the be the encryption of the function
value (either under the challenge key, or a random key). If the adversary
is able to produce a verifying ciphertext different from the one it receives it
constitutes a forgery, thus breaking the INT-CTXT security of the AE scheme.
H7: Identical toH6 except that if check did not result in a failure, send x1 to
the trusted party to obtain out. If the witness checks succeeds, program the
output of the enclave to be out. Else program output to be ⊥.
Claim 11 H7 is statistically indistinguishable fromH6.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 11] The change is only statistical since the execution
thread reaches the point only if all prior checks pass.
H8: Identical toH7 except that we replace the value inside the ciphertext to
be F (0, x1).
Claim 12 If the semantic security of the encryption scheme holds, H8 is computa-
tionally indistinguishable fromH7.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 12] If the two hybrids are distinguishable, then we
can build an adversary that breaks the semantic security of the encryption
scheme.
H9: Identical toH8 except that we replace all occurrences of sk with gab again.
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Claim 13 Assume DDH is hard,H9 is computationally indistinguishable fromH8.
Proof. [Proof of Claim 13] Follows directly from DDH security.
H9 is the same as our simulator, and hence we’re done.
4.5 Instantiating the Bulletin Board
Our proposed paradigm relies on a verifiable public bulletin board that makes
three guarantees about entries posted to it:
– The entry’s presence can be cryptographically verified using a public
operation.
– Once posted, the entry is available to all parties.
– Entries are assigned a unique monotonically increasing sequence num-
ber.
We now consider several existing techniques that we can leverage to obtain
such a bulletin board.
Certificate Transparency Logs. Certificate Transparency (CT) (Certificate Trans-
parency 2017) is a public audit log operated by a coalition of browser vendors
and certificate authorities. CT allows individual certificate authorities to post
newly-issued certificates to a public log. These entries are then (1) signed
by the log maintainer, and (2) added to a Merkle hash tree. The root of the
hash tree is also signed by (one or more) log maintainers and published to the
world.
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A collection of users known as monitors can access the CT log to view
the contents of certificates. While the CT log is itself not fundamentally
tamper resistant – since the servers operating it can remove portions and/or
be disabled by remote network attacks – any tampering is detectable due to
the structure of the Merkle hash tree. The location of the entry within the
Merkle hash tree also serves to act as a proxy for a monotonically increasing
sequence number.
Under the assumption that the existing CT logs are reliable and trustworthy,
we can use CT to build fairness systems by entombing the required public data
into a component of an X.509 certificate signing request and requesting the
certificate from a free certificate authority such as LetsEncrypt (Let’s Encrypt
2017). Because LetsEncrypt submits all certificates to a public log5 it is possible
for any party to recover these certificates and verify a cryptographic proof
that the entries have been published.
Public blockchains. Crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin or Etherium rely on
a publicly available data structure called a blockchain. Block-chains are an
append-only ledger that is maintained by an ad-hoc group of network peers.
Blockchains come in two basic types. The first type use computational proofs
of work to determine which peer should be allowed to add a new block of
transactions to the blockchain. Clients accept the longest chain that contains
well formed transactions; as a result the system is secure as long as a super-
majority of the computational power in the network is controlled by honest




mean 1.180± 0.112 0.039± 0.001
mean 0.002± 0.000 0.037± 0.001
Table 4.1: Performance of SGX enclave setup and decryption (not MPC). Average and
standard deviation of 500 runs.
honest parties in advance.
An alternative approach uses proof of stake (Bentov, Gabizon, and Mizrahi,
2016). In these systems a quorum of peers is sampled from the network
with probability proportional to the fraction of monetary holdings controlled
by each peer. This quorum is responsible for producing the next block and
selecting the next quorum by the same mechanism. The peers authenticate
the resulting block by signing it using a secure digital signature scheme. The
security assumption here assumes that the parties with the largest share of
the cryptocurrency have a vested interest in keeping it running. Proof of stake
systems are in their infancy both in terms of deployment and theory. However,
they provide an interesting middle ground between the costs of a pure proof
of work approach and the challenges with selecting a set of trusted parties a
priori to maintain the bulletin board.
4.6 Implementation
In this section we present an implementation of the protocol given in Sec-
tion 4.4, and show that the protocol is efficient. Our implementation consists
of three major pieces: the bulletin board instantiated using Bitcoin, the MPC
protocol instantiated using the SPDZ framework (Damgard et al., 2012; Mul-
tiparty computation with SPDZ online phase and MASCOT offline phase 2017),
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and a “witness decryptor” instantiated using an Intel SGX secure enclave. We
describe each component in more detail below.
Bitcoin as a bulletin board. For our prototype implementation we use the
Bitcoin network, which supports a limited scripting system called Bitcoin
Script. In Bitcoin each transaction contains a script that is evaluated to ensure
the transaction is authorized. This scripting system supports an instruction
named OP_RETURN, which allows the sender of a transaction to embed up to 40
bytes of arbitrary data into a transaction that is transmitted for inclusion in
the Bitcoin blockchain. Each block of transactions in the blockchain contains a
computational proof of work (PoW) that is computed by the network. This
proof is bound cryptographically to all of the transactions within a block,
as well as to the hash of the previous block. At current network difficulty,
computing a proof of work for a single block requires an expected 264 invoca-
tions of the SHA2 hash function on the standard Bitcoin network. To verify
publication on the bulletin board, our implementation requires a fragment
consisting of six consecutive blocks (where the transaction is located in the
first block of the fragment). The cost of forging such a fragment scales linearly
in the number of blocks required.
We note that the use of a computational proof of work bulletin board pro-
vides somewhat different fairness properties than a signature-based bulletin
board, e.g., Certificate Transparency or a proof-of-stake blockchain. Specifi-
cally, in this setting an attacker with sufficient time or computational power
can always “forge” a satisfying chain of blocks, and use this private result
as a witness to enable decryption. Such an attack would be economically
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costly, since the corresponding effort – if applied to crypto-currency mining –
would be worth a substantial sum of money.6 However, we can further restrict
this attacker by employing a trusted clock within the witness decryptor (e.g.,
Intel SGX) 7. This optimization requires the attacker to complete the forgery
within a pre-defined time limit that approximates the expected time for the
full Bitcoin network. Thus a successful attacker must possess most of the
available hashpower of the Bitcoin network (which currently approximates
the electrical consumption of Turkmenistan).
For our experiments, we use the public Bitcoin testnet. The Bitcoin testnet
functions similarly to the main Bitcoin network, but uses a zero-value currency
and a low difficulty setting for the proof of work. We selected testnet for
our experiments mainly because blocks are mined extremely rapidly and
transactions require no monetary expenditure for “transaction fees”. However
our code can use the production Bitcoin blockchain without any code changes.
MPC Protocol. Our protocol can be used to extend any MPC scheme that
supports efficient symmetric encryption. We note that one could employ Intel
SGX directly to perform a naive form of MPC. However, our goal in this work
is to demonstrate that our approach works efficiently even when instantiated
with a “cryptographic” MPC protocol.8
6At present rates as of July 2017, this opportunity cost is approximately $28,000 per block
forged.
7Correctly accessing trusted time from within an enclave is part of the Intel SGX specifica-
tion, but it is not yet supported as it relies on platform services which are not active. In our
implementation, we include code to properly access trusted time, but do not include it in our
measurements because of the lack of support.
8Additionally, we remark that if SGX is used to implement the MPC protocol itself, a
security breach of the SGX system will result in the loss of all security properties provided by
the MPC. On the other hand, if we employ a cryptographic MPC protocol, then a failure of
Intel’s SGX risks only the fairness property. We view this as a benefit of our approach.
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Thus for our implementation we use the SPDZ-2 framework developed
by the University of Bristol (Multiparty computation with SPDZ online phase
and MASCOT offline phase 2017). SPDZ-2 is designed to tolerate dishonest
majorities during computation. In SPDZ circuits are designed in python and
then compiled down into a circuit structure. The computation is done in two
phases: an offline phase that does not require the computation inputs and
an online phase that performs the actual computation. In order to optimize
the running time of the online phase, the pre-computation and compilation
phases are relatively more time consuming.
The maintainers of SPDZ-2 have implemented the AES-128 cipher in or-
der to benchmark its efficiency. We repurpose this code to build a simple
authenticated encryption system for that uses 3 rounds of AES to encrypt
and authenticate one 128-bit block of data output from the computation. The
encryption scheme takes as input each party’s private computation input xi
and keyshare ki. It computes as output a ciphertext C encrypted under msk.
We also use this AES-128 cipher to implement a commitment scheme. The
randomness of the commitment scheme is used as the key to the cipher, with
the commitment message as the plaintext.
We construct an MPC circuit for SPDZ-2 that takes in a private input
xi, a keyshare ki, a randomness share ri, and commitment to the master
key com(msk; r). The first circuit computes the output of the desired MPC
functionality f (x1, . . . , xN). Next it computes r = ⊕1≤i≤Nri and opens the
commitment. It compares ⊕1≤i≤Nki with the msk from the commitment. If
they do not match, sets f (x1, . . . , xN) = 0. Finally, the circuit computes the
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encryption of f (x1, . . . , xN) using msk and outputs the final ciphertext.
SGX as Witness Decryptor. Intel’s SGX is a set of extensions to the x86
instruction set that allows for code to be executed in a protected enclave.
SGX programs are segmented into two pieces: an untrusted application and a
trusted enclave. The application consists of standard software running on a
standard operating system and we assume that it may behave maliciously if
the ith player is corrupted. Code within an enclave is verified upon startup
and isolated from inspection and tampering, even from an adversary that
controls the system’s operating system. The root of trust of an SGX enclave is
the Intel processor, which enforces the enclave’s isolation. It is worth noting
that the code run within an enclave is not private; however secrets may be
generated or retrieved after the enclave is initialized. Note that the enclave has
no direct access to network communications, and must rely on the untrusted
part of the application.9
We adapt an existing SGX-bitcoin client called Obscuro (Obscuro 2017) to
perform the role of the Witness Decryptor. This enclave is instantiated by each
of the N parties participating in the protocol. A single master instance of the
enclave uses the sgx_read_rand function, supplied by the SGX environment,
to generate an AES master key msk that will eventually encrypt the output
of the MPC circuit. Additionally, the master enclave generates a random
320-bit release token t that must be verifiably posted to a bulletin board
before the ciphertext can be decrypted. Next, the master applies a secret
sharing scheme to derive secret shares (k1, . . . , kN) of msk and (t1, . . . , tN) of
9This enables the application to censor or tamper with communications between the
application and the network.
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t. Finally, the master computes a commitment com(msk; r) and secret shares
the randomness into r1 . . . rN. Now for i = 1 to N it distributes the tuple
(ki, ti, msk, t, com(msk; r), ri) to the ith enclave via a secure channel.10
Once all secrets have been distributed by the master enclave, the channels
are closed and each enclave outputs its key share ki to the application. The
users now invokes SPDZ to conduct the MPC protocol, using as its private
inputs xi, ki, ri, and com(msk; r). If the MPC protocol does not complete
successfully, the application aborts and a full restart is required. Otherwise, the
application obtains a ciphertext C output by the MPC protocol and provides
this as input to the enclave. The enclave attempts to decrypt the ciphertext
under msk and if and only if this decryption check completes successfully (and
the result is the proper format and length), it releases ti, which the application
then transmits to all of the remaining parties.
To access the encrypted output of the MPC, at least one party must re-
compute the release token as t = (t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tN) and post this value to the
Bitcoin network inside of a transaction. Each user’s application monitors the
Bitcoin network using RPC calls to a local Bitcoin client bitcoincli which is
running on the user’s machine. This userland code then feeds the resulting
blockchain fragment (which consists of six consecutive blocks) back to the
enclave, which confirms that the release token matches its stored value t, and
also verifies the proofs of work on each block. While an adversarial user can
block this response, they are unable to falsify or tamper with it due to the fact
that such tampering would require an impractical amount of computation.
10SGX supports the creation of authenticated, secure channels using attestation and DHKE.
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The application also supplies the enclave with the output of the MPC C.
If all verifications succeed, the enclave decrypts the ciphertext C using
an authenticated encryption scheme under msk, and outputs the resulting
plaintext.
Optimizations. In a bid to optimize the implementation, there are a few
differences from the described protocol in Section 4.4. They do not make a
difference to the security of the protocol, and are briefly described here:
– Instead of each party generating its key and token shares, a designated
master enclave chooses them and distributes them to the other enclaves.
– Instead of a commitment for each share of the key, there is only a single
“master commitment” of the key.
Sample computation and performance. For proof of concept, we imple-
mented a search program that takes as input a search value x from one party
and a list (y1, . . . , yn), from the other party. These circuits each calculate an
integer output M and encrypt the result as Enc(
⨁i=n
i=1 ki; M). Since these are
two-party functions we tested with N = 2 and n = (100, 500, 1000).
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Figure 4.4: Mean runtimes for a linear search on n items using SPDZ taken over 50
iterations. Only the online portion of the MPC is shown. In blue, we show the cost of
running the search without any provision for fairness. In red, the overhead from AES
encryption needed for fairness.
Figure 4.5: Mean runtimes for our AES circuit varied over the number of players
participating. Only the online portion of the MPC is shown. This circuit is dominated
by 3 AES operations.
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Cost of fairness in the MPC. Our implementation demonstrates that our
approach can be used add fairness to MPC schemes efficiently using current
technology. We recall that fairness in MPC is particularly important when the
output of the MPC is extremely valuable. While adding three rounds of AES
to a simple MPC scheme represents a high cost, it adds a only a negligible cost
when considering more time consuming computations. In Figure 4.4 we show
the average runtime over 50 trials of a number of different circuits in SPDZ-2.
The cost of encryption is clearly dwarfed by large search problems and set
intersection.
While we ran the MPC experiments with N=2 players, SPDZ-2 allows
computations with more players. In Figure 4.5 we consider only the cost of
running the encryption component of the MPC protocol with higher numbers
of players. Because each player contributes a key share, the cost of running
the protocol increases with each player. While the runtime of the encryption
operation does increase, we note that it is still adds only a fraction of one
second of online computation time up to N = 6.
SGX Runtime. Intel SGX offers an extremely efficient method of trusted
program execution. We benchmark our SGX Enclave over 500 trials of the
two party protocol for some fixed parameters. We run our test on an Intel
i5-6600K 3.5GHz processor with 16 GB of RAM running Ubuntu 14.04 and
SGXSDK-1.7, running both the master and minion on the same hardware.
For the purpose of benchmarking, we hardcode into the master enclave the
master AES key and fix the release token to be the results of an OP_RETURN
instruction in a known block of the Bitcoin Testnet. Additionally, we run
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the MPC protocol once to generate a valid ciphertext. With the pre-fixed
values, we can effectively check the running time of the various parts of the
enclave’s execution. All key exchange and interaction with the bitcoincli
is still run as in the real protocol. In Table 4.1 we show the average running
times of the various segments of the enclave, both for the master instance and
minion instance. For the minion’s execution time, we pause the timer while
it is waiting for the minion to open a network connection. It is clear that the
slowest piece of the program is the enclave initialization. This is because the
enclave must provision all memory that it may require from the SGX driver
during initialization. Our implementation allocates more memory than it will
use to be conservative.
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Abuse Resistant Law Enforcement
Access Systems
5.1 Introduction
Communication systems have increasingly begun to deploy end-to-end (E2E)
encryption as a means to secure physical device storage and communications
traffic. End-to-end encryption systems differ from traditional link encryption
mechanisms such as TLS in that keys are held by endpoints — typically
end-user devices such as phones or computers — rather than by service
providers. This approach ensures that plaintext data cannot be accessed by
service providers or manufacturers, or by attackers who may compromise
a provider. Widely-deployed examples include messaging protocols (Signal
Secure Messaging System; WhatsApp, 2017; iMessage), telephony (FaceTime),
and device encryption (iCloud security overview; Encrypt your data - Pixel Phone
Help), with many systems deployed to billions of users.
The increased adoption of E2E encryption in commercial services has pro-
voked a backlash from the law enforcement and national security communities
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around the world. This is based on concerns that encryption will hamper agen-
cies’ investigative and surveillance capabilities (Watt, Mason, and Traynor,
2015; Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2014; Barr, 2019). In the United States, the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation has mounted a high-profile policy campaign
around these issues (Going Dark). Similar efforts have resulted in legislative
pushes in the United States (Poplin, 2016) and adopted legislation in Aus-
tralia that requires providers to guarantee access to plaintext in commercial
communication systems (Tarabay, 2018).
The proposals made by law enforcement have ignited a debate between
technologists and policymakers. Some technical experts have expressed con-
cerns that these proposals, if implemented, will undermine the security offered
by encryption systems (Abelson et al., 2015; National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2016; Sing, 2020), either by requiring unsafe
changes or prohibiting the use of E2E encryption altogether. Law enforce-
ment officials have, in turn, exhorted researchers to develop new solutions
that resolve these challenges (Barr, 2019). However, even the basic technical
requirements of such a system remain unspecified, complicating both the
technical and public debates.
Existing Proposals for Law Enforcement Access. A number of recent and
historical technical proposals have been advanced to resolve the technical
questions raised by the encryption policy debate (Denning, 1994; Savage, 2018;
Bellovin et al., 2018; Wright and Varia, 2018; Tait, 2016; Levy and Robinson,
2018; Bellare and Rivest, 1999). With some exceptions, the bulk of these
proposals are variations on the classical key escrow (Denning and Branstad,
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1996) paradigm. In key escrow systems, one or more trusted authorities retain
key material that can be used to decrypt targeted communications or devices.
Technologists and policymakers have criticized key escrow systems (Abel-
son et al., 2015; Encryption Working Group, 2019; National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018), citing concerns that, without addi-
tional protection measures, these systems could be abused to covertly conduct
mass surveillance of citizens. Such abuses could result from a misbehaving
operator or a compromised escrow keystore. Two recent policy working group
reports (Encryption Working Group, 2019; National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2018) indicate an expert consensus that extant
key escrow proposals provide insufficient protections against abuse, except
possibly for the special case of device encryption: a setting where physical
possession of a device poses a natural barrier to mass surveillance. Reflect-
ing this consensus, some recent high-profile technical proposals have been
proposed for the device encryption case; these include physical countermea-
sures to mitigate surveillance risks (e.g., tamper-resistant hardware) (Savage,
2018; Bellovin et al., 2018). Expanding similar precautions to messaging or
telephony is difficult, as there is no secure hardware equivalent for data in
motion.
Mitigating Illicit Surveillance Risk. Escrow-based access proposals suffer
from three primary limitations. First, key escrow requires that highly-trusted
parties maintain and protect valuable key material, possibly against sophis-
ticated, nation-state supported attackers. Second, if key material is surrepti-
tiously exfiltrated from a keystore, it may be difficult or impossible to detect
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its subsequent misuse. This is because escrow systems designed to allow
lawful access to encrypted data typically store decryption keys, which can be
misused without producing any detectable artifact.1 Finally, these access sys-
tems require someone to interface between the digital escrow technology and
the non-digital legal system, which raises the possibility of misbehavior by
operators. These concerns are not theoretical: wiretapping and surveillance
systems have proven to be targets for both nation-state attacks and operator
abuse (Bryan-Low, 2006; Nakashima, 2013; Gorman, 2013).
Overcoming these challenges is further complicated by law enforcement’s
desire to access data that was encrypted before an investigation initiated.2
In this work we will divide access systems into two categories: prospective
and retrospective. When using a prospective system, law enforcement may
only access information encrypted to or from suspects after they have been
explicitly identified for surveillance: this is analogous to “placing an alligator
clip on a wire” in an analog wiretap. A retrospective access system allows
investigators to decrypt past communications, even those from suspects who
were not the target of surveillance when encryption took place. Retrospective
access clearly offers legitimate investigators more capabilities, but may also
present a greater risk of abuse.
Towards Abuse-Resistant Law Enforcement Access. Some past work has
investigated the problem of securing law enforcement access systems against
1This contrasts with the theft of e.g., certificates or signing keys, where abuse may produce
artifacts such as fraudulent certificates (Nightingale, 2011) that can be detected through
Internet-wide surveillance.
2For example, several recent investigations requested the unlocking of phones following a
crime or terrorist attack (Lichtblau and Goldstein, 2016).
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abuse, e.g., (Blaze, 1996; Bellare and Rivest, 1999; Wright and Varia, 2018).
Bellare and Rivest (Bellare and Rivest, 1999) proposed a mechanism to build
probabilistic law enforcement access, in order to mitigate the risk of mass
surveillance. Wright and Varia (Wright and Varia, 2018) proposed crypto-
graphic puzzles as a means to increase the financial cost of abuse. These
techniques have practical limitations: law enforcement are unlikely to tolerate
prohibitive costs or arbitrary barriers to legitimate investigations. Moreover,
these proposals do little to enable detection of key theft or prevent more subtle
forms of misuse.
In this work we investigate a different approach to this problem. Our goal
is to achieve a balance: enforce protections that limit abuse, without placing
impractical restrictions on law enforcement capabilities. We develop access
systems that weave accountability features into the basic definitions of the
system. More concretely, our goal is to construct systems that achieve the
following three main features:
Accountability. To prohibit abuse by authorized parties, access systems must
enforce specific and fine-grained global policies that restrict the types of
surveillance may take place. These policies could, for example, encom-
pass limitations on the number of messages decrypted, the total number
of targets, and the types of data accessed. They can be agreed upon in
advance and made publicly available. This approach ensures that global
limits can be developed that meet law enforcement needs, while also
protecting the population against surveillance.
Detectability. We require that any unauthorized use of escrow key material
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can be detected, either by the public or by authorized auditing parties.
Achieving this goal ensures that even fully-adversarial use of escrow
key material (e.g., following a key exfiltration) can be detected, and the
system’s security can be renewed through rekeying.
Operability. At the same time, escrow systems must remain operable, in the
sense that honest law enforcement parties should be able to access mes-
sages sent through a compliant system, even in settings where dishonest
users seek to evade the escrow properties.
The most critical aspect of our work is that we seek to enforce these policies
through the use of cryptography, rather than relying on correct implementation of
key escrow hardware or software, or proper behavior by authorities. Achiev-
ing this goal in the challenging setting of retrospective key escrow, where
encryption may take place prior to any use of escrow decryption keys, is one
of the most technically challenging aspects of this work.
Our contributions. More concretely, in this work we make the following
contributions.
• Formalizing security notions for abuse resistant access systems. We
first provide a high-level discussion of the properties required to pre-
vent abuse in a key escrow system, with a primary focus on the gen-
eral data-in-motion setting: i.e., we do not assume that targets possess
trusted hardware. Based on this discussion, we formalize the roles and
protocol interface of an Abuse-Resistant Law Enforcement Access Sys-
tem (ARLEAS): a message transmission framework that possesses law
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enforcement access capability with strong accountability guarantees.
Finally, we provide an ideal functionality FARLEAS in Canetti’s Universal
Composability framework (Canetti, 2001).
• A prospective ARLEAS construction from lossy encryption. As a warmup
to our main result, we show how to realize ARLEAS that is restricted
to the case of prospective access: this restricts the use of ARLEAS such
that law enforcement must identify surveillance parameters before a
target communication occurs. We show how this construction can be
built efficiently from lossy encryption and efficient simulation-sound
NIZK. For our example construction, we rely primarily on a variant of a
lossy tag-based scheme proposed by Hofheinz (Hofheinz, 2012).
• A retrospective ARLEAS construction from proof-of-publication ledgers
and extractable witness encryption. As the primary technical contribu-
tion of this work, we show how to realize ARLEAS that admits retro-
spective access, while still maintaining the auditability and detectability
requirements of the system. The novel idea behind our construction
is to use secure proof-of-publication ledgers to condition cryptographic
escrow operations. This paradigm of proof-of-publication ledgers has
recently been explored in several works (Choudhuri et al., 2017; Goyal
and Goyal, 2017; Kaptchuk, Green, and Miers, 2019; Scafuro, 2019). Such
ledgers may be realized using recent advances in consensus networking,
a subject that has been the subject of a significant amount of research.
• Evaluating minimal assumptions for retrospective systems. Finally,
we investigate the minimal assumptions for realizing retrospective access
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in accountable law enforcement access system. As a concrete result, we
present a lower-bound proof that any protocol realizing the ARLEAS
functionality implies the existence of extractable Witness Encryption
scheme for some language L which is related to the ledger functionality
and policy functions of the system. While this proof does not imply
that all ARLEAS realizations require extractable Witness Encryption
(i.e., it may be possible to construct languages that have trivial EWE
realizations), it serves as a guidepost to illustrate the barriers that re-
searchers may face in seeking to build accountable law enforcement
access systems.
5.1.1 Towards Abuse Resistance
In this work we consider the problem of constructing secure message transmis-
sion (SMT) protocols, as formalized in the UC framework by Canetti (Canetti,
2001; Canetti, Krawczyk, and Nielsen, 2003). To these protocols, we add
new interfaces that allow law enforcement to access messages under specific
conditions. Prior to introducing formal definitions for accountable access, we
first discuss several of the security properties required of such a system.
Abuse-Resistant Law Enforcement Access System. At setup time an AR-
LEAS system is parameterized by two functions, which we refer to as the
global policy function p(·) and warrant transparency function t(·). The system is
comprised of three types of party:
1. Users: Users employ a secure message transmission protocol to ex-
change messages with other users. From the perspective of these users,
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this system acts like a normal messaging service, with the ability to view
public audit log information about the use of warrants on information
send through the system.
2. Law Enforcement: Law enforcement parties are responsible for initi-
ating surveillance and accessing decrypted messages. This involves
determining the scope of a surveillance request, obtaining a digital war-
rant, and then accessing the resulting data.
3. Judiciary: The final class of parties act as a check on law enforcement,
determining whether a surveillance request meets the necessary legal
requirements cause. In our system, any surveillance request must be
approved by a judge before it is activated on the system. In our model we
assume a single judge per system, though in practice this functionality
can be distributed.
In addition to these parties, our proposals assume the existence of a public
broadcast channel, such as an append-only ledger. While this ledger may be
operated by a centralized party, in practice we expect that such systems will
be highly-distributed, e.g. using blockchain or consensus network techniques.
Operation. To initiate a surveillance request, law enforcement must first
identify a specific class of messages (e.g. by metadata or sender); it then
requests a surveillance warrant from a judge. The judge reviews the request
and authorizes or rejects the request. If the judge produces an authorized
warrant, law enforcement must take a final step to activate the warrant in
order to initiate surveillance. This activation process is a novel element of
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an abuse-resistant access scheme, and it is what allows for the detection of
misbehavior. To enforce this, we require that activation of a warrant ŵ results
in the publication of some transparency data that is viewable by all parties in
the system: the amount and nature of the data to be published is determined
by a global transparency function t(ŵ).
For a system to be considered abuse-resistant, it must satisfy the following
intuitive properties:
Warrant Security. A system must provide strong cryptographic security
against attackers who are not authorized to receive messages (i.e. every-
one except the legitimate sender and receiver). Moreover, if a judge has
not issued a warrant that allows a message to be decrypted, attackers
should be unable to learn any information about the content of messages,
excluding public metadata and length.
Accountability. Surveillance requests must always obey a set of global limits
defined by the public policy function which was chosen during system
setup. Only surveillance requests that satisfy the limits defined by this
function can be approved within the system, even in cases where all es-
crow authorities (i.e. law enforcement and judges) collude. This flexible
mechanism allows operators to prevent certain forms of surveillance
even in cases where all key material becomes compromised.
Detectability. To enable detection of abuse, or theft of key material, we
require that every warrant activation must produce a public artifact that
can be detected by the public or by authorized auditing parties. The
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simplest form of detection would simply require law enforcement to
publish the full contents of each warrant request; however, doing so
might imperil the secrecy of ongoing investigations. As a compromise
between these outcomes, we allow system operators to define a public
warrant leakage function L(·) at system setup. To activate a warrant W,
law enforcement must publish L(W) to all parties in the system. This
publication must occur even in cases where all escrow parties collude.
Target anonymity. To preserve the integrity of investigations, users should
learn no information about the contents of a warrant beyond what is
revealed by the leakage function.
Escrow verifiability. Escrow authorities must be assured that the access
system will work properly. Because senders can always behave dis-
honestly (e.g. using an alternative encryption mechanism to transmit
messages), this guarantee cannot be enforced for all possible sender
behavior. Instead, we mandate a weaker property that we call escrow
verifiability: this ensures that recipients and/or service providers can
publicly detect and filter non-compliant messages. This ensures that
any compliant message will be accessible by escrow authorities under
appropriate circumstances.
In Section 5.3 we formalize this intuition and present concrete security defini-
tions for the ARLEAS concept.
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5.1.2 Intuition
We now present an overview of the key technical contributions of this work.
We will consider this in the context of secure message transmission systems,
which can be generalized to the setting of encrypted storage.
Accountability From Ledgers. For an abuse-resistant access system the most
difficult properties to satisfy are accountability and detectability. Existing
solutions attempt to achieve this property by combining auditors and key
escrow custodians; in order to retrieve key material that facilitates decryption,
law enforcement must engage with an auditor. This solution, however, does
not account for dishonest authorities, and is therefore vulnerable to covert
key exfiltration and collusion. In our construction, we turn to public ledgers
— a primitive that can be realized using highly-decentralized and auditable
systems — as a way to reduce these trust assumptions.
Ledgers have the property that any party can access their content. Im-
portantly, they also have the property that any parties can be convinced that
other parties have access to these contents. Thus, if auditing information is
posted on a ledger, all parties are convinced that that information is truly
public. We note that using ledgers in this way is fundamentally different than
prior work; our ledger is a public functionality that does not need to have any
escrow secrets. As such, if it is corrupted, there is no private state that can be
exploited by an attacker.
Warm up: Prospective ARLEAS. To motivate our main construction, we first
consider the simpler problem of constructing a prospective access system, one
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that is capable of accessing messages that are sent subsequent to a warrant
becoming active. For our practical construction, we make a further simplifying
assumption that law enforcement will target specific parties for surveillance,
rather than targeting messages by a more powerful and complex predicate —
a subject we discuss in later sections.
A key aspect of this construction is that we consider a relatively flexible
setting where parties have network access, and can receive periodic commu-
nications from escrow system operators prior to transmitting messages. We
employ a public ledger for transmission of these messages, which provides
an immutable record as well as a consistent view of these communications.
The goal in our approach is to ensure that escrow updates embed information
about the specific of surveillance warrants that are active, while ensuring
that even corrupted escrow parties cannot abuse the system to misuse the
surveillance apparatus.
Escrow lossy encryption. The basic intuition of our approach is to construct
a “dual-trapdoor” public-key encryption system (Bresson, Catalano, and
Pointcheval, 2003) that senders can use to encrypt messages to specific parties.
This scheme is designed to ensure that ciphertexts can be decrypted by the
intended recipient using a normal secret key, while allowing decryption by
the escrow authorities only if the recipient is under active surveillance. A
feature of this scheme is that for all recipient not so targeted, it should leak no
additional information about the plaintext.
We can realize this construction using an efficient tag-based variant of
lossy encryption (Peikert and Waters, 2008; Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek,
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2009; Hemenway et al., 2011; Hofheinz, 2012) that we call none-but-N lossy-
tag-based encryption, or LTE. In this scheme, key generation creates public
parameters R with respect to the set of user identifiers (tags) T that are under
active surveillance, along with a secret decryption key. When encrypting a
message, a sender encrypts under both the recipient’s public key and tag,
along with R.
Our scheme must satisfy three main security properties. First, if the param-
eter generation process is run honestly with some set of user identifiers T and
any (even biased) random coins r, then no adversarial escrow agent should be
able to retrieve the message M if the receiver is not in T . Second, to ensure
that escrow decryption is possible, we require that adversarial encryptors
cannot produce a ciphertext that appears correctly formatted but does not
admit decryption. Finally, to provide anonymity for the escrow authorities,
we require that R must at least computationally hide the set of users that are
being target for surveillance, i.e. no efficient adversary given R should be
able to recover any information about T beyond for the size of its description.
In Section 2.2.4.1 we discuss candidate constructions for LTE schemes, and
discuss generalizing this construct to allow the tag set to be replaced by a
general predicate.
Building prospective ARLEAS from LTE. Given an appropriate lossy tag-
based encryption scheme, the remainder of the ARLEAS construction proceeds
as follows. The global parameters of the scheme are created at setup: these
include a public verification key for the judge(s) presiding over the system, as
well as a pair of global leakage and transparency functions L, P agreed on by
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system participants.
When a law enforcement agency wishes to create a warrant w that em-
beds a specific set of users T to be surveilled, it first runs the LTE parameter
generation algorithm to obtain R on T and stores the corresponding secret
key. It now calculates transparency information T ← L(w). Law enforce-
ment next contacts the judge(s) to obtain a signature over the warrant, and
proceeds to generate a NIZK π̂ that the following statements hold: (1) the
prover possesses a signature on w from the judge(s), (2) the parameter R was
correctly generated with respect to the user-set T specified in the warrant,
(3) the warrant w does not violate the global policy function P, and (4) the
transparency information T was calculated correctly. Finally, it transmits
(R, T, π̂) to a global ledger. Each participant in the system must ensure that
this message was correctly published, and verify the proof π̂. If this proof
verifies correctly, the participants will accept the new parameter R and employ
this value for all subsequent messages they encrypt.
A critical security property of this system is that, even if law enforcement
and judges collude (e.g., if both parties become catastrophically compromised),
users retain the assurance that no warrant can be issued in violation of the
global policy P. Moreover, even in this event, the publication of a trans-
parency record T ensures that every warrant activated in the system produces
a detectable artifact that can be used to identify abuse.3
3The flexible nature of the transparency function t ensures that these records can contain
both publicly-visible records (e.g., a quantized description of the user set size, as well as
private information that can be encrypted to auditors.
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From Prospective to Retrospective. The major limitation of the ARLEAS con-
struction above is that it is fundamentally restricted to the case of prospective
access. Abuse-resistance derives from the fact that “activation” of a warrant
results in a distribution of fresh key material to participants, and each new
escrow parameter targets renders only a subset of communications accessible.
A second drawback of the prospective protocol is that it requires routine com-
munication between escrow authorities and the users of the system, which
may not be possible in all settings.
Updating these ideas to provide retrospective access provides a stark il-
lustration of the challenges that occur in this setting. In the retrospective
setting, the space of targeted communications is unrestricted at the time that
encryption takes place. By the time this information is known, both sender
and recipient may have completed their interaction and gone offline. Using
some traditional, key based solution to this problem implies the existence
of powerful master decryption keys that can access every ciphertext sent by
users of the system. Unfortunately, granting such power to any party (or set
of parties) in our system is untenable if we assume that this key material may
be compromised. The technical challenge in the retrospective setting is to
find an alternative means to enable decryption, such that decryption is only
possible on the conditions that (1) a relevant warrant has been issued that is
compliant with the global policy function, (2) a detectable artifact has been
made public. This mechanism must remain secure even when encryption
occurs significantly before the warrant is contemplated.
Ledgers as a cryptographic primitive. A number of recent works (Choudhuri
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et al., 2017; Goyal and Goyal, 2017; Kaptchuk, Green, and Miers, 2019; Choud-
huri, Goyal, and Jain, 2019; Scafuro, 2019) have proposed to use public ledgers
as a means to condition cryptographic operations on published events. This
paradigm was initially used by Choudhuri et al. (Choudhuri et al., 2017) to
achieve fairness in MPC computations, while a variant was proposed by Goyal
and Goyal (Goyal and Goyal, 2017) to construct one-time programs without
the need for trusted hardware. Conceptually, these functionalities all allow
decryption or program execution to occur only after certain information has
been made public. This model assumes the existence of a secure global ledger
LVerify that is capable of producing a publicly-verifiable proof π that a value
has been made public on the ledger. In principle, this ledger represents an
alternative form of “trusted party” that participates in the system. However,
unlike the trusted parties proposed in past escrow proposals (Denning, 1994),
ledgers do not store any decryption secrets. Moreover, recent advances in
consensus protocols, and particularly the deployment of proof-of-work and
proof-of-stake cryptocurrency systems. e.g., (Kiayias et al., 2017; David et al.,
2018; Gazi, Kiayias, and Zindros, 2019; Pietrzak, 2019; Boneh et al., 2018),
provide evidence that these ledgers can be operated safely at large scale.
Following the approach outlined by Choudhuri et al. (Choudhuri et al.,
2017), we make use of the ledger to conditionally encrypt messages such that
decryption is only possible following the verifiable publication of the leakage
function evaluated over a warrant on the global ledger. For some forms
of general purpose ledgers that we seek to use in our system, this can be
accomplished using extractable witness encryption (EWE) (Boyle, Chung,
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and Pass, 2014).4 EWE schemes allow a sender to encrypt under a statement
such that decryption is possible only if the decryptor knows of a witness ω
that proves that the statement is in some language L, where L parameterizes
the scheme. While candidate schemes for witness encryption are known for
specific languages (like hash proof systems (Cramer and Shoup, 2002; Garg
et al., 2012)), extractable witness encryption for general languages is unlikely
to exist (Garg et al., 2014).
Building Retrospective ARLEAS from EWE. Our prospective ARLEAS con-
struction assumes the existence of a global ledger that produces verification
proofs π that a warrant has been published to a ledger. As mentioned before,
we aim to condition law enforcement access on the issuance of a valid war-
rant and the publication of a detectable artifact. Thus, in this construction, a
sender encrypts each message under a statement with a witness that shows
evidence that these conditions have been met. This language reasons over (1)
the warrant transparency function, (2) a function determining the relevance
of the warrant to ciphertext, (3) the global policy function, (4) the judge’s war-
rant approval mechanism, and (5) the ledger’s proof of publication function.
Unlike the prospective solution described above, there is no limitation on the
structure of warrants; the relevance of a warrant to a particular message may
be structured as an arbitrary predicate included in the EWE language.
On the Requirement of Extractable Witness Encryption: We justify the use
of extractable witness encryption in our construction by showing that the
existence of a secure protocol realizing retrospective ARLEAS implies the
4Using the weaker witness encryption primitive may be possible if the ledger produces
unique proofs of publication.
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existence of a secure extractable witness encryption scheme for a related lan-
guage that is deeply linked to the ARLEAS protocol. Intuitively, the witness
for this language should serve as proof that the protocol has been correctly
executed; law enforcement should be able to learn information about a mes-
sage if and only if the accountability and detectability mechanisms have been
run. For the concrete instantiation of retrospective we give in Section 5.5, this
would include getting a valid proof of publication from the ledger. If the
protocol is realized with a different accountability mechanism, the witness
encryption language will reason over that functionality. No matter the details
of the accountability mechanism, we note that it should be difficult for law
enforcement to locally simulate the mechanism. If it were computationally
feasible, then law enforcement would be able to circumvent the accountability
mechanism with ease.
Importantly, this proof does not mean that extractable witness encryption
for general languages is required to realize retrospective ARLEAS. Instead, we
require extractable witness encryption that can reason over the accountability
mechanisms. Currently, constructions of extractable witness encryption for
non-trivial functionalities are not known, and there are implausibility results
regarding the existence of the primitive for general languages (Garg et al.,
2014). This indicates that realizing ARLEAS in the retrospective setting will
be extremely difficult in practice.
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5.2 Related work
The past decade has seen the start of academic work investigating the notion
of accountability for government searches. Bates et al. (Bates et al., 2012)
focus specifically on CALEA wiretaps and ensuring that auditors can ensure
law enforcement compliance with court orders. In the direct aftermath of the
Snowden leaks, Segal et al. (Segal, Ford, and Feigenbaum, 2014) explored
how governments could accountably execute searches without resorting to
dragnet surveillance. Liu et al. (Liu, Ryan, and Chen, 2014) focus on mak-
ing the number of searches more transparent, allow democratic processes to
balance social welfare and individual privacy. Kroll et al. (Kroll, Felten, and
Boneh, 2014; Kroll et al., 2014) investigate different accountability mechanisms
for key escrow systems, but stop short of addressing end-to-end encryption
systems and the collusion problems we address in this work. Backes consid-
ered anonymous accountable access control (Backes, Camenisch, and Sommer,
2005). Goldwasser and Park (Goldwasser and Park, 2017) investigate similar
notions with the limitation that policies themselves may be secret, due to
national security concerns. Frankle et al. (Frankle et al., 2018) make use of
ledgers to get accountability for search procedures, but their solution cannot
be extended to the end-to-end encryption setting. Wright and Varia (Wright
and Varia, 2018) give a construction that uses cryptographic puzzles to im-
poses a high cost for law enforcement to decrypt messages. Servan-Schreiber
and Wheeler (Servan-Schreiber and Wheeler, 2019) give a construction for
accountability that randomly selects custodians that law enforcement must
access to decrypt a message. Panwar et al. (Panwar et al., 2019) attempt to
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integrate the accountability systems closely with ledgers, but do not use the
ledgers to address access to encryption systems. Finally, Scafuro (Scafuro,
2019) proposes a closely related concept of “break-glass encryption” and give
a construction that relies on trusted hardware.
5.3 Definitions
In this section we present definitions for abuse-resistant law enforcement
access systems.
5.3.1 Abuse-Resistant Law Enforcement Access Systems
We now formally define the notion of an Abuse-Resitant Law Enforcement
Access System (ARLEAS). This is a form of message transmission system
that supports accountable law enforcement access. We base our definitions
on the Secure Message Transmission (FSMT) notion originally introduced by
Canetti (Canetti, 2001). Indeed, our systems can be viewed as an extension of
a multi-message SMT functionality (Canetti, Krawczyk, and Nielsen, 2003),
with added escrow capability.
System parameters. An ARLEAS system is parameterized by three functions,
which are selected during setup:
• t(w): the transparency function takes as input a warrant w and outputs
specific information about the warrant and the use of the backdoor that
can be published to the general public. One property that we require
from the leakage functionality is that it is binding for w.
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• p(w): the global policy function takes as input a warrant w and outputs
TRUE if this warrant is allowed by the system.
• i(w, aux): takes as input a warrant w and per-message metadata aux. It
outputs true if aux is in scope of w for surveillance.
Parties. An ARLEAS is an interactive protocol run between several parties.
We describe these as:
• User Pi: This is a user of the end-to-end encrypted service or application.
They interact with the system by simply sending and receiving messages.
• Judge PJ : The judge is responsible for determining the validity of a search
and issuing search warrants to law enforcement. The judge interacts
with the system by receiving warrant requests and choosing to deny or
approve the request.
• LawEnforcement PLE: Law enforcement is responsible for conducting
searches, pursuant to a valid warrant authorized by a judge. Law en-
forcement interacts with the system by requesting warrants from the
judge and collecting the plaintext messages relevant to their investiga-
tions.
A concrete ARLEAS function is initiated through a trusted setup phase,
in which the parties agree on three functions: a global policy function p,
a transparency function t and a targeting function i, whose purposes are
described above.
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A UC ideal functionality. We present a formal definition of the ideal function-
ality FARLEAS in Figure 5.1. This functionality is parameterized by the three
functions p, t and i as well as a mode parameter that determines whether the
system supports retrospective or prospective surveillance, mode ∈ {pro, ret}.
Ideal World. For any ideal-world adversary S with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
input vector x, and security parameter λ, we denote the output of the ideal
world experiment by IdealS ,F ℓ,t,p,i,modeARLEAS
(1λ, x, z).
Real World. The real world protocol starts with the adversary A selecting a
subset of the parties to compromisePA ⊂ P , wherePA ⊂
{
{Pi}, {PLE}, {PLE, PJ}
}
.
We limit the subsets of parties that can be compromised to these cases, be-
cause any other combination doesn’t make much sense in this setting. In our
model we don’t worry about the other combinations, because if both Pi and Pj
would be corrupted, there is nothing stopping them from not using the sys-
tem. Moreover, we also don’t consider the case where PJ is the only corrupted
party, as it could only block the whole protocol, but they don’t really have
an output. Finally, we consider the view of the system participants to always
be compromised, because all other parties are also part of the general public.
All parties engage in a real protocol execution Π, the adversary A sends all
messages on behalf of the corrupted parties and can choose any polynomial
time strategy.
In a real world protocol we assume that communication between Pi and
Pj happens over a transparent channel, meaning all other parties are able to
receive all communication. We make this choice to simplify the protocol and
security proofs, in the real world, this can be modeled with a service provider
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Functionality F ℓ,t,p,i,modeARLEAS
The ideal functionality is parameterized by a metadata generation function ℓ : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗, the transparency function t, the global policy function p, and the target function-
ality i. The three latter functions are as defined above. We have several parties:
• P1, . . . , Pn: participants in the system
• PJ : the generator of a warrant
• PLE: Law enforcement that can read the message given a valid warrant
Send Message: Upon receiving a message (SendMessage, sid, Pj, m, b) where b ∈ {0, 1}
from party Pi, the trusted party computes the metadata for that as message as aux ←
ℓ(Pj∥m) and sends (Sent, sid, aux) to the adversary. If (sid, c) is received from the adver-
sary,
• If b = 0, send (Sent, sid, aux, c, m) to Pi and send (Sent, sid, aux, c, 0) to PLE.
• If b = 1 and there is no entry w in the active warrant table Wactive send
(Sent, sid, aux, c, m) to Pi and Pj, and send (Sent, sid, aux, c) to PLE.
• If b = 1 and there is an entry w in the active warrant table Wactive send
(Sent, sid, aux, c, m) to Pi, Pj, and PLE.
Finally, store (Sent, sid, aux, c, m) in the message table M.
Request Warrant: Upon receiving a message (RequestWarrant, sid, w) from PLE, the
trusted party first checks if p(w) = 1,responding with ⊥ and aborting if not. Other-
wise, the trusted party sends (ApproveWarrant, w) to PJ . If PJ responds with (Disapprove),
the trusted functionality sends ⊥ to PLE. If PJ responds with (Approve), the trusted
functionality sends (Approve) to PLE, and stores the entry w in the issued warrant table
Wissued.
Activate Warrant: Upon receiving a message (ActivateWarrant, sid, w) from PLE, the
trusted party checks to see if w is in Wissued, responding with ⊥ and aborting if not. If w
is in Wissued, the trusted functionality adds the entry w to the active warrant table Wactive,
computes t(w), and sends (NotifyWarrant, t(w)) to all parties and the adversary.
Verify Warrant Status: Upon receiving message (VerifyWarrantStatus, sid, c, aux, w) from
PLE, if mode = pro, it responds with ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, if (Sent, sid, aux, c, m) is in
M and w is in Wactive such that i(w, aux) = 1, the trusted party returns 1. Otherwise, it
returns 0.
Access message: Upon receiving message (AccessData, sid, c, aux, w) from PLE, if if
mode = pro, it responds with ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, if (Sent, sid, aux, c, m) is in
M and w is in Wactive such that i(w, aux) = 1, the trusted party returns m. Otherwise, it
returns ⊥.
Figure 5.1: Ideal functionality for an Abuse Resistant Law Enforcement Access Sys-
tem.
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relaying messages between Pi and Pj, this service provider will always comply
with law enforcement and hand over encrypted messages when there is a
valid warrant. Moreover, this service provider could also validate if messages
are well-formed to make sure Pi and Pj follow the real protocol.
For any adversary A with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗, input vector x, and
security parameter λ, we denote the output of Π by RealA,Π(1λ, x, z).
Definition 16 A protocol Π is said to be a secure ARLEAS protocol computing
F ℓ,t,p,i,modeARLEAS if for every PPT real-world adversary A, there exists an ideal-world PPT
adversary S corrupting the same parties such that for every input x and auxiliary
input z it holds that
IdealS ,F ℓ,t,p,i,modeARLEAS
(1λ, x, z)
c≈ RealA,Π(1λ, x, z)
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Protocol RealA,Π(1λ, x, z)
RealA,Π(1λ, x, z) is parameterized by the protocol
Π = (Setup, SendMessage, RequestWarrant, ActivateWarrant,
VerifyWarrantStatus, AccessMessage) and a variable
mode ∈ {pro, ret}.
1. When RealA,Π(1λ, x, z) is initialized, the all parties en-
gage in the interactive protocol Π.Setup
2. When Pi is activated with (SendMessage, sid, Pj, m, 1),
parties Pi, Pj, and PLE engage in the interactive protocol
Π.SendMessage. PLE should learn some aux about the
message.
3. When Pi is activated with (SendMessage, sid, Pj, m, 0),
parties Pi, and PLE engage in the interactive proto-
col Π.SendMessage (with Pj not getting output). PLE
should learn some aux about the message.
4. When PLE is activated with (RequestWarrant, sid, ŵ),
parties PLE and PJ engage in the interactive protocol
Π.RequestWarrant.
5. When PLE is activated with (ActivateWarrant, sid, w),
all parties engage in the interactive protocol
Π.ActivateWarrant.
6. When PLE is activated with
(VerifyWarrantStatus, sid, c, aux, w), if mode = pro,
PLE returns ⊥. Otherwise, PLE calls the non-interactive
functionality Π.VerifyWarrantStatus(c, aux, w)
7. When PLE is activated with (AccessData, sid, c, aux, w),
if mode = pro, PLE returns ⊥. Otherwise,
PLE calls the non-interactive functionality
Π.AccessMessage(c, aux, w)
Figure 5.2: The real world experiment for a protocol implementing F ℓ,t,p,i,modeARLEAS
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5.4 Prospective Solution
In this section we describe an efficient prospective ARLEAS scheme. Recall
that in the prospective case, warrants must be activated before targets perform
encryption. The implication of this setting is that new key material can be
sampled and distributed to clients each time law enforcement updates the set
of active warrants.
The need for accountability restricts us from using many other crypto-
graphic tools. For example, Identity Based Encryption (IBE) systems provide
a natural form of key escrow. Unfortunately, in a standard IBE scheme this
key escrow is absolute: the master authority can decrypt any ciphertext in
the system. To enable limited surveillance, we require a system in which
only a subset of communications will be targeted at any time epoch, and no
additional information about non-targeted plaintexts will be revealed to the
authorities.
Rather than using a fully-escrowed scheme such as IBE, we instead make
use of the ΠLTE scheme presented in Section 2.2.4.1. Depending on the inputs
to the key generation algorithm, encrypting to certain recipients will result in
a ciphertext that can be decrypted by law enforcement, while encrypting to
other recipients will result in a ciphertext that is statistically independent of
the message. Importantly, the scheme we present in Section 2.2.4.1 supports
efficient proofs that the public parameters were correctly constructed. We
make use of this feature in our construction.
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5.4.1 UC-Realizing Prospective Abuse-Resistant Law Enforce-
ment Access Systems
Our construction makes use of a CCA secure encryption system ΠEnc, a SUF-
CMA secure signature scheme ΠSign, a lossy-tag encryption scheme ΠLTE
(presented in Section 2.2.4.1). We now present a protocol πt,p,iPRO in the LVerify,





• All users send (CRS) to FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS to retrieve the common reference
string for the NIZK scheme.
• Pj computes (pkj, skj) ← ΠEnc.KeyGen(1λ) and selects a unique tag idj
and sends (pkj, idj) to PLE and to each Pi via FAUTH.
• PJ computes (pksign, sksign) ← ΠSign.KeyGen(1λ) and send pksign to all
other users via FAUTH.
• PLE runs π
t,p,i





• The sender Pi computes the ciphertext (c1, c2, π, aux) as follows, and
sends it to Pj and PLE via FAUTH:
– Send (GetCounter) to LVerify and receive the current counter t. Then
query LVerify on (GetVal, t) to receive the latest posting (t, x, πpublish).
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Parse x as (params, π, L). If ΠNIZK.ZKVerify(params, L, π) = 0 or
LVerify.Verify(t∥(params, π, L), πpublish) = 0 return ⊥ and halt.
– c1 ← ΠEnc.Enc(pkj, m; r1), where r1
$←− {0, 1}λ
– c2 ← ΠLTE.Enc(params, idj, m; r2) where r2
$←− {0, 1}λ
– Use ΠNIZK.ZKProve to compute π such that
π ← NIZK
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩(m, r1, r2) :
c1 = ΠEnc.Enc(pkj, m; r1)∧
c2 = ΠLTE.Enc(params, idj, m; r2)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
– Create aux ← idj
• Upon receiving c from Pi, Pj calls π
t,p,i
PRO.VerifyMessage on c. If the output




• Any party parses (c1, c2, π, aux) ← c and verifies that π and aux are




• PLE sends (RequestWarrant, id) to PJ . PJ then either decides to send
(Disapprove) to PLE and halt or executes the following:
– Verify that p(id) = 1. If not send (Disapprove) to PLE and abort.
– π ← ΠSign.Sign(sksign, id)





• PLE adds the new warrant w to the set of valid warrants W . It then
extracts the set of tags T ← {id|(id, σ) ∈ W}
• Compute (params, msk)← ΠLTE.KeyGen(1λ, T ; r) for r
$←− {0, 1}λ
• Compute L← {t(w)|w ∈ W}
• Use ΠNIZK.ZKProve to compute π such that
π ← NIZK{(W , T , msk, r) : L = {t(w)|w ∈ W}∧T ← {id|(id, σ) ∈ W}∧
(params, msk) ∈ ΠLTE.KeyGen(1λ, T ; r)∧
∀(id, π) ∈ W , ΠSign.Verify(pksign, id, π) = p(id) = 1}
• Send (Post, (params, π, L)) to LVerify and receiver (t, x, πpublish).
Theorem 5 Assuming a CCA secure public key encryption scheme ΠEnc, a SUF-
CMA secure signature scheme ΠSign, a NIZK scheme ΠNIZK, and a lossy-tag encryp-




ARLEAS initialized in prospective mode in the
LVerify, FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS , FAUTH−hybrid model.
5.4.1.1 Proof of Security
Proof. We prove that the above construction securely realizes F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS by
showing that there does not exist a distinguisher Z that can distinguish
between an interaction with the ideal functionality and a simulator S and the
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real protocol πt,p,iPRO. We define the interaction with the real protocol as follows:
The experiment is initialized with N users P1, . . . PN , law enforcement PLE and
a judge PJ . The adversary A chooses a subset of these users to corrupt. Then,
users run πt,p,iPRO.Setup, with A controlling the actions of the corrupted parties.
Honest users then, according to their arbitrary strategy, run πt,p,iPRO.SendMessage
to exchange messages with other users. Law enforcement interacts with the
judge to get warrants via πt,p,iPRO.RequestWarrant and uses π
t,p,i
PRO.ActivateWarrant
to start surveilling a user. Honest parties follow an arbitrary strategy, but
follow the protocol and corrupted parties are controlled by the adversary.
We start our proof by first considering the case where a single user Pi is
corrupted.
Pi is corrupted.
We begin by showing that πt,p,iPRO UC-realizes the F
ℓ,t,p,i,pro
ARLEAS when a user Pi
is compromised. We construct the simulator S as follows:
1. S generates the common reference string for the NIZK scheme directly,
and stores the trapdoor τ. S runs (pksign, sksign)← ΠSign.KeyGen(1λ) as
the judge would in the real protocol, and outputs pksign to the adversary
A. S initializes an instance of the ideal functionality in prospective mode.
Finally, S runs πt,p,iPRO.ActivateWarrant with an empty active warrants set.
2. S computes (pkj, skj) ← ΠEnc.KeyGen(1λ) and samples a unique idj ←
Zp for all honest Pj and sends (pkj, idj) to A. Additionally, S waits to
receive pki, idi from Pi.
3. When S receives (c1, c2, π, aux) from A intended for uncorrupted Pj, S
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begins by verifying π and checking that aux is correct. If these checks
pass, set b← 1, and b← 0 otherwise. S computes m← ΠEnc.Dec(skj, c1).
S then sends (SendMessage, Pj, m, b) to the ideal functionality.
4. Upon receiving (Sent, aux, c, m) from the ideal functionality, S computes
(c1, c2, π, aux) using π
t,p,i
PRO.SendMessage and forwards it to Pi.
5. Upon receiving (NotifyWarrant, t(w)) from F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS , S aggregates t(w)
from all (NotifyWarrant, ·) messages seen so far into L. S then ran-
domly chooses a set of tags T such that |T | = |L| and computes
(params, msk) ← ΠLTE.KeyGen(1λ, T ). S then simulates the proof π
and sends (Post, (params, π, L)) to LVerify.
We proceed with a hybrid argument. LetH0 denote the distribution of the
view of A in the real world interaction.
H1 : LetH1 be the same asH0, but instead of having the common reference
string generated by the FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS , the common reference string is gener-
ated using (crs, τ) ← ΠNIZK.ZKSetup(1λ). Note that the common reference
string is selected from exactly the same distribution, so the difference in the
distribution of the view of A betweenH0 andH1 is 0.
H2 : Let H2 be the same as H1, but when an honest PLE sends (Post,
(params, π, L)) to LVerify, the proof π is instead simulated with τ. Because of
the perfect zero-knowledge property of ΠNIZK, the adversary’s view in H2
andH1 is statistically close.
H3 : Let H3 be the same as H2, but when an honest PLE sends (Post,
(params, π, L)) to LVerify, let params be generated with an random set of tags
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with the correct size. Because of the indistinguishability of tag sets property
of ΠLTE, the difference in the distribution in the view of the A is negligible.
Because the view of A inH3 is distributed the same as in the ideal world
with simulator S , the proof is done. Notice that this proof extends directly to
multiple corrupt users, as the views of the users are independent, except when
they send messages to each other. However, such messages do not require
simulation. Thus it suffices to simulate each one independently.
PLE is corrupted. We now extend the previous proof to include corrupted PLE.
We extend S to simulate the view of PLE. Note that step 5 described in S above
is no longer applicable for corrupted users, as the notification mechanism
from the actual protocol will look correct.
1. S generates the common reference string for the NIZK scheme directly,
and stores the trapdoor τ. Then, S sets ValidParameters to true. S then
runs ΠSign.KeyGen(1λ)→ (pksign, sksign) as the judge would in the read
protocol, and outputs pksign to the adversary A. S initializes an instance
of the ideal functionality in prospective mode. S computes (pkj, skj)←
ΠEnc.KeyGen(1λ) and samples a unique idj ← Zp for all honest Pj and
sends (pkj, idj) to A. When S detects (params, π, L) posted on LVerify, it
verifies the proof π, and sets ValidParameters to false if it does not verify
or |L| ̸= 0. S then initializes an empty warrant table W.
2. We split the case of receiving (Sent, aux, c) from F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS intended for
PLE into three cases. All begin by S extracting the recipient Pj from aux:
(a) If ValidParameters is false, S silently drops the message.
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(b) If ValidParameters is true and Pj is not corrupted, S and chooses a
message m0 such that ℓ(m0) = aux, and computes the ciphertext
(c1, c2, π, aux) by encrypting m0 using π
t,p,i
PRO.SendMessage(pkj, idj, m0).
(c) If ValidParameters is true and Pj is corrupted, S will also receive
(Sent, aux, c, m) from the ideal functionality, intended for Pj. S then
encrypts m using πt,p,iPRO.SendMessage(pkj, idj, m)
Finally, S sends the resulting ciphertext to A.
3. Upon receiving (Sent, aux, c, 0) from F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS intended for PLE, S sam-
ples a random message and creates a ciphertext with πt,p,iPRO.SendMessage.
Then, it generates a false proof instead of the real proof.
4. Upon receiving (Sent, aux, c, m) from F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS due to an active warrant,
if ValidParameters is true, S calls the send message algorithm of the real
protocol on πt,p,iPRO.SendMessage(pkj, idj, m) and sends the output to A.
5. Upon receiving (RequestWarrant, idj) from the adversary, intended for
PJ , S generates a warrant w for the ideal functionality that only tar-
gets Pj and sends (RequestWarrant, w) to F
ℓ,t,p,i,pro
ARLEAS . If F
ℓ,t,p,i,pro
ARLEAS answers
with (Approve), S uses the sksign for PJ to form and sign (idj, σ) as in
the real protocol and adds (w, False) to W. If F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS responds with
(Disapprove), S send ⊥ to the adversary.
6. S monitors LVerify. Upon seeing a new post on the ledger, S performs
the following steps
(a) Retrieve the post by sending (GetCounter) to LVerify and receive the
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current counter t. Then query LVerify on (GetVal, t) to receive the
latest posting (t, (params, π, L), πpublish)
(b) Verify ΠNIZK.ZKVerify(params, L, π) = 1. If the proof does not
verify, the S sets ValidParameters to false and halts.
(c) Set ValidParameters to true and runs (W , T , msk, r)← Extract(crs, τ, x, π).
If extraction fails, the simulator halts with an error.
(d) If there is an entry (w, False) in W for w ∈ W S sends (ActivateWarrant, w)
to the ideal functionality and sets the entry to be (w, True).
We proceed with a hybrid argument. LetH0 denote the distribution of the
view of A in the real world interaction.
H1 : LetH1 be the same asH0, but instead of having the common reference
string generated by the FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS , the common reference string is gener-
ated using (crs, τ) ← ΠNIZK.ZKSetup(1λ). Note that the common reference
string is selected from exactly the same distribution, so the the distribution in
the view of A betweenH0 andH1 is statistically close.
H2 : LetH2 be the same asH1, except the proof of ciphertexts consistency
in a ciphertext (c1, c2, π, aux) bound for an honest user for which there is no
active warrant is simulated. Due to the zero-knowledge property of ΠNIZK,
the difference in the view of the adversary inH2 andH1 is negligible.
H3 : LetH3 be the same asH2, when S receives a ciphertext (c1, c2, π, aux)
bound for an honest user for which there is no active warrant, S samples a
message m0 that would result in the same metadata and sets
c1 ← (ΠEnc.Enc(pkj, m0; r1)
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. By the CCA security of ΠEnc the advantage of A in distinguishing between
H3 andH2 is negligible.
H4 : LetH4 be the same asH3, except the second ciphertext element c2 in a
ciphertext (c1, c2, π, aux) bound for an honest user for which there is no active
warrant is computed as ΠLTE.Enc(params, idj, m0; r2). By the lossy property of
ΠLTE,H4 andH3 are statistically indistinguishable.
H5 : LetH5 be the same asH4, except the proof of ciphertexts consistency
in a ciphertext (c1, c2, π, aux) bound for an honest user for which there is no
active warrant is computed honestly with respect to the plaintext message m0.
Again, by the zero-knowledge property of ΠNIZK, the difference in the view
of the adversary inH5 andH4 is negligible.
H6 : LetH6 be the same asH5, except whenA detects (params, π, L) being
posted on the ledger, we attempt to run the extractor ΠNIZK.Extract and abort
the experiment if it fails. However, because the extractor only fails with
negligible probability, the difference in the view of the adversary betweenH6
andH5 is negligible.
H6 has the same distribution as S , concluding the proof. In the real world,
PLE would be denied warrants at the same rate as in the ideal world, as
an honest PJ handles warrant requests in the same way. One note is that
law enforcement can “deactivate” warrants in way not possible in the ideal
functionality. However, when warrants are deactivated, honestly encrypting
the message still hides the plaintext from the adversary.
PJ and PLE are corrupted. We now focus on the case when PJ and PLE are both
corrupted. Note that step 4 of the above simulator description is no longer
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relevant, as the warrant request is handled internally by A. Our simulator
requires on minor changes to steps 1 and 5, which we show below.
1. Do the setup as before, but waiting to receive pksign from A
...
5. S monitors LVerify. Upon seeing a new post on the ledger, S performs
the following steps
(a) Retrieve the post by sending (GetCounter) to LVerify and receive the
current counter t. Then query LVerify on (GetVal, t) to receive the
latest posting (t, (params, π, L), πpublish)
(b) Verify ΠNIZK.ZKVerify(params, L, π) = 1. If the proof does not
verify, the S sets ValidParameters to false and halts.
(c) Set ValidParameters to true and runs
(W , T , msk, r)← Extract(crs, τ, x, π).
If extraction fails, the simulator halts with an error.
(d) for each warrant w ∈ W for which there does not exist an entry
(w, True) in W, the S executes the following steps
i. S generates a warrant w for the ideal functionality that only
targets Pj and sends (RequestWarrant, w) to F
ℓ,t,p,i,pro
ARLEAS .
ii. When F ℓ,t,p,i,proARLEAS sends (ApproveWarrant, w) to the S intended to
PJ , S responds (Approve) on behalf of PJ
iii. S sends (ActivateWarrant, w) to the ideal functionality
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iv. S adds (w, True) to W
In fact, the hybrid argument above holds directly in this case as well. First
notice that there are no additional messages that require simulation. By giving
the adversary control of PJ , we give it the ability to create valid warrants
independently. However, there is no change in behavior expected until those
warrants are activated. As such, those warrants can be requested from the
ideal functionality right as they are being activated.
Prospective Solution with Arbitrary Predicates. The prospective solution
we have presented is limited in the flexibility of warrants; unlike the ideal
functionality, warrants were limited to specifying a single individual. It is
clear that it would be better to support warrants whose applicability to some
aux could be checked with arbitrary functions i. While we do not specify a full
solution, we quickly give the intuition for how such a system could work.
First, we note that directly extending the existing solution’s intuitions
is insufficient, as creating a one-to-one correspondence between tags and
aux would clearly result in exponentially sized public parameters. Instead,
we require a mechanism that evaluates the in-scope predicate i(w, aux) and
outputs the message only if the result is 1. Clearly this can be accomplished
using extractable witness encryption, and indeed we will use extractable
witness encryption to accomplish a similar goal in Section 5.5. However, we
are able to leverage the prospective nature of this case to realize prospective
ARLEAS from garbled circuits.
As before, the sender send a ciphertext c1, c2, π. c1 is a normal public key
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ciphertext for the recipient, c2 is a ciphertext that can be decrypted by law en-
forcement under the proper conditions, and π is a consistency proof between
them. To allow for the arbitrary predicate function i(·, ·), c2 will be computed
as a garbled circuit of i with the message and metadata hardcoded. This
garbled circuit will be evaluated by law enforcement, and output the message
if and only if the existing warrants satisfy i(·, ·). When law enforcement calls
ActivateWarrant (before this message is encrypted), law enforcement also posts
the first message of the oblivious transfer protocol for each bit in the warrant.
When the sender is encrypting, it finishes the oblivious transfer protocol to
send the proper labels law enforcement, and includes these oblivious transfer
message in c2. To attempt to recover the message, law enforcement recovers
the input labels corresponding to its warrant from the oblivious transfer mes-
sages and evaluates the circuit. Note that the sender includes a proof that
the garbled circuit is correctly formatted and that the oblivious transfer was
completed correctly.
We now describe this protocol more formally. For simplicity, let all war-
rants w have some fixed length |w| (which can be accomplished by choosing
some maximum length and padding). Let Cm,auxk be a circuit representation
of the functionality Ik(m, aux, w1, w2, . . . , wk) with m and aux hardcoded, such
that
Ik(m, aux, w1, w2, . . . , wk) = m ∧ (i(aux, w1) ∨ . . . ∨ i(aux, wk)).
This function evaluates the in-scope functionality on the metadata over k
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different warrants. If any of the evaluate to true, the message is output. Other-
wise, Ik outputs 0. When publishing a set of warrants, law enforcement runs
the receiver side of the OT scheme with the bits of the warrants as input and
proves that these messages are formed correctly. When sending a message, the




and then appends the sender messages for the OT scheme. The proof included
in the ciphertext not only proves that the garbled circuit is correctly formed,
but also that the OT sender messages are well formed. Note that the number of
warrants is an explicit parameter of the function and its circuit representation.
5.5 Retrospective Solution
In the previous section we proposed a protocol to realize ARLEAS under the
restriction that access would be prospective only. That protocol requires that
law enforcement must activate a warrant and post the resulting parameters
on the ledger before any targeted communication occurs. In this section we
address the retrospective case. The key difference in this protocol is that law
enforcement may activate a warrant at any stage of the protocol, even after a
target communication has occurred.
Our construction makes use of an extractable witness encryption scheme
ΠEWE as defined in Definition 9. This scheme is parameterized by a language
LWE that is defined with respect to the transparency function t, the policy
function p, the targeting function i, the warrant signing key pksign, and the






∃w, (t, x, πpublish) s.t.
w = (ŵ, σ)
x = t(w);
Verify((t∥x), πpublish) = 1;
p(ŵ) = 1;
ΠSign.Verify(pksign, ŵ, σ) = 1;
i(ŵ, aux) = 1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Our construction also makes use of a simulation-extractable NIZK scheme




(c1, c2, pk, aux)





⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐∃(ŵ, π) s.t. ΠSign.Verify(pksign, ŵ, σ) = 1 ∧x ← t(w)
}
We will describe our protocol in a hybrid model that makes use of several
functionalities. These include LVerify, FDCRS, GpRO and FAUTH.
5.5.1 UC-Realizing Retrospective Abuse-Resistant Law Enforce-
ment Access Systems




• All users send (CRS) to FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS to retrieve the common reference
string for the NIZK scheme.
• Pj computes (pkj, skj) ← ΠEnc.KeyGen(1λ) and selects a unique tag idj
and sends (pkj, idj) to PLE and to each Pi via FAUTH.
225
• PJ computes (pksign, sksign) ← ΠSign.KeyGen(1λ) and sends pksign to all




• Pi performs the following steps, on input a metadata string aux and a
plaintext M:
– Sample r ← {0, 1}λ
– Query the random oracle to obtain the hashes:
(HashConfirm, r1)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“ENC”∥r∥m)),
(HashConfirm, r2)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“WE”∥r∥m)), and
(HashConfirm, r3)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“RP”∥r))
– c1 ← ΠEnc.Enc(pk, r; r1), c2 ← ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r; r2), and c3 ← m⊕
r3
– Use ΠNIZK.ZKProve for L1NIZK to compute
π ← NIZK{(r, r1, r2) : c1 = ΠEnc.Enc(pkj, r; r1)∧ c2 = ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r; r2)}
– Send (send, c) = (c1, c2, c3, π, aux) to Pj and PLE.
• Upon receiving (send, c), Pj performs the following steps:
– Call πt,p,iPRO.VerifyMessage on c, aborting if the output is 0;
– Compute r′ ← ΠEnc.Dec(skj, c1);
– (HashConfirm, r3)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“RP”∥r′));
– Compute m′ ← c3 ⊕ r3;
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– (HashConfirm, r1)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“ENC”∥r′∥m′));
– (HashConfirm, r2)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“WE”∥r′∥m′));
– Then to verify that the message has not been mauled, Pj recomputes
c′1 ← ΠEnc.Enc(pkj, r′; r1) and c′2 ← ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r′; r2). If c1 ̸= c′1




• Any party parses (c1, c2, c3, π, aux) ← c and verifies that π and aux are




• PLE formulates a warrant request ŵ and sends (RequestWarrant, ŵ) to PJ
via FAUTH
• Upon receiving (RequestWarrant, ŵ) from PLE, PJ either outputs ⊥ or





• PLE computes x ← t(w); uses ΠNIZK.ZKProve for L2NIZK to compute
π ← NIZK{(w) : w = (ŵ, σ), ΠSign.Verify(pksign, ŵ, σ) = 1∧ x ← t(w)};





• PLE calls ΠEWE.Dec(c2, aux, (ŵ, σ), (t, x, πpublish)). If the output is ⊥, re-




• PLE computes r′ ← ΠEWE.Dec(c2, aux, (ŵ, σ), (t, x, πpublish)).
• (HashConfirm, r3)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“RP”∥r′));
• Recovers m′ ← c3 ⊕ r3.
• (HashConfirm, r1)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“ENC”∥r′∥m′));
• (HashConfirm, r2)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“WE”∥r′∥m′));
• Recomputes c′1 ← ΠEnc.Enc(pkj, r′; r1) and c′2 ← ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r′; r2). If
c′1 = c1 and c
′
2 = c2, PLE returns m
′ and ⊥ otherwise.
Theorem 6 Assuming a CCA-secure public key encryption scheme ΠEnc, an ex-
tractable witness encryption scheme for LWE, a SUF-CMA secure signature scheme





in the LVerify,FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS ,GpRO−hybrid model.
5.5.1.1 Proof of Security
As in the prospective case in Section 5.4, we show that πt,p,iRET UC-realizes
F ℓ,t,p,i,retARLEAS in a series of steps. First, we prove this for a single corrupt user,
then extend that argument to multiple users. We then expand our analysis to
consider corrupted law enforcement and corrupted judges.
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Pi is corrupted. We begin with the simple case of a single corrupted user Pi
controlled by an adversary A. We construct a simulator S to mediate A’s
interaction with the ideal functionality as follows.
1. S begins by generating (pksign, sksign) as PJ would do. S then performs
key generation for each honest party Pj. S then outputs all the public
information to A. Finally, S receives pki from A.
2. When receiving a (CRS) request from A, S generates (crs, τ)← ΠNIZK.
ZKSetup(1λ) and returns crs to A and keeps τ.
3. Whenever S receives (send, c) from Pi intended for Pj, S parses c = (c1,
c2, c3, π, aux) and verifies π. If it does not verify, set b ← 1, and set
b ← 0 otherwise. Next, (r, r1, r2) ← ΠNIZK.Extract(crs, τ, x, π), queries
the random oracle (HashConfirm, r3) ← GpRO(HashQuery, (“RP”∥r)). It
then computes m ← c3 ⊕ r3 and verifies the structure of c1, c2 by re-
computing the ciphertexts c1, c2 as in the real protocol. If some passes do
not check, set b ← 0. Finally, it sends (SendMessage, sid, Pj, m, b) to the
ideal functionality.
4. When S receives (Sent, sid, aux, c, m) from the ideal functionality des-
tined for Pi, it identifies the public key for Pi and computes the cipher-
text c = (c1, c2, c3, π, aux) as in the real protocol. It sends the resulting
ciphertext to Pi.
5. When S receives (NotifyWarrant, t(w)) from the ideal functionality, it
simulates the proof π, and sends (Post, (t(w), π)) to LVerify.
229
We prove that A’s interaction with the real protocol and the ideal func-
tionality, mediated by S are computationally indistinguishable by using the
following hybrids.
LetH0 denote the distribution of the view ofA in the real world interaction.
H1 : LetH1 be the same asH0, but instead of having the common reference
string generated by the FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS , the common reference string is gener-
ated using (crs, τ) ← ΠNIZK.ZKSetup(1λ). Note that the common reference
string is selected from exactly the same distribution, therefore, the distribution
of the view of A betweenH0 andH1 is the same.
H2 : In this hybrid we will use the extractor ΠNIZK.Extract to get the ran-
domness and create the ciphertext as in step 3. H1 andH2 are computationally
indistinguishable as Extract will only fail with negligible probability.
H3 : At this point we will simulate the proof π when publishing on the
ledger. H2 and H3 are indistinguishable because of the zero knowledge
property of ΠNIZK.
The view of the adversary inH3 is the same as its view when talking with
S in the ideal world, which concludes the hybrid argument.
This argument extends to multiple parties as all ciphertexts can be properly
simulated by either extracting from the NIZK or actually receiving the message
in case the receiver is corrupted.
Subset of users and PLE are corrupted. We now extend S from above to
handle a corrupt PLE. Note that step 5 of the above description is not longer
relevant, as notifications will come directly from the ledger for the corrupt
parties.
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1. S runs the same setup as above. Additionally, S initializes an empty
message equivocation table T.
2. When receiving a (CRS) request from A, S generates (crs, τ)← ΠNIZK.
ZKSetup(1λ) and returns crs to A and keeps τ.
3. We split the case of receiving (Sent, sid, aux) from F ℓ,t,p,i,retARLEAS intended for
PLE into two cases:
(a) If Pj is not corrupted, S samples r, r1, r2, r3 ← {0, 1}poly(λ) (where
poly(·) is a polynomial function that upper-bounds the longest
random string necessary) and computes the ciphertext components
as follows
• c1 ← ΠEnc.Enc(pk j, r; r1)
• c2 ← ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r; r2)
• c3 ← r3




⏐⏐⏐⏐ c1 = ΠEnc.Enc(pk, r; r1) ∧c2 = ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r; r2)
}
S adds an entry (r, r1, r2, r3, c1, c2, c3, π, aux) to T.
(b) If Pi or Pj is corrupted, S will also receive (Sent, sid, aux, c, m) from
the ideal functionality, intended for Pj. S then encrypts m using
π
t,p,i
RET.SendMessage, programming the random oracle honestly as
needed.
S then sends the resulting ciphertext to both the ideal functionality and
A.
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4. Upon receiving (Sent, aux, c, 0) from F ℓ,t,p,i,retARLEAS intended for PLE, S sam-
ples a random message and creates a ciphertext with πt,p,iRET.SendMessage.
Then, it generates a false proof instead of the real proof.
5. When S receives (RequestWarrant, ŵ) from A, intended for PJ , S sends
(RequestWarrant, ŵ) to the trusted party. If the trusted party responds
with ⊥, S sends (Disapprove) to A. Otherwise, S generates a warrant ŵ
and signs it with σ = ΠSign.Sign(sksign, ŵ) and sends w = (ŵ, σ) to A.
6. When S notices new posts on LVerify it retrieves that information by
sending t ← (GetCounter) and (t(w), π)) ← (GetVal, t) to LVerify. S
uses τ to extract w from π. Without loss of generality, let w be for user
Pi. S sends (ActivateWarrant, w, Pj) to the ideal functionality. Next, S
checks to see if there is an entry (r, r1, r2, r3, c1, c2, c3, π, aux) for which
i(ŵ, aux) = 1 in T and sends (AccessData, (c1, c2, c3, π), w) to the ideal
functionality for all such records. If the ideal functionality responds with
⊥, abort. Otherwise, the ideal functionality will return a message m. S
then programs the random oracle by sending (ProgramRO, r, (r3 ⊕m)),
(ProgramRO, (“WE”r∥m), r2) and (ProgramRO, (“ENC”∥r∥m), r1), and
responds to the initial query.
To show that the simulation above is computationally indistinguishable from
the real experiment in the view of A, we proceed with a hybrid argument. Let
H0 denote the distribution of the view of A in the real world interaction.
H1 : LetH1 be the same asH0, but instead of having the common reference
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string generated by the FΠNIZK.ZKSetupCRS , the common reference string is gener-
ated using (crs, τ) ← ΠNIZK.ZKSetup(1λ). Note that the common reference
string is selected from exactly the same distribution, therefore, the distribution
of the view of A betweenH0 andH1 is the same.
H2 : In this hybrid we change the NIZK proof for L1NIZK to be a simulation.
Because of the zero knowledge property of ΠNIZK,H2 is statistically close to
H3.
H3 : Choose r1, r2, and r3 uniformly at random in {0, 1}λ to replace the ran-
domness used to compute c1, c2, and c3 respectively. Also, send (ProgramRO,
(“ENC”∥r∥m), r1), (ProgramRO, (“WE”∥r∥m), r2), and (ProgramRO, r, r3) to
GpRO. Clearly the only way the view betweenH1 and H2 can differ is when
GpRO was queried on these inputs before S programs them, in which case the
protocol aborts, but this only happens with negligible probability which we
prove in Lemma 5.
H4 : Change the simulated NIZK proof back to a real proof. Again, by the
zero-knowledge propertyH3 andH4 are indistinguishable.
H5 : Now, do everything as described in step 5 to recover the message m.
Next, we change the ciphertext c3 in step 3 to be r3 and change the program-
ming of GpRO to be (ProgramRO, r, m⊕ r3) in step 5. Note that by security of
the one-time padH4 andH5 are indistinguishable.
Now, the view of the adversary inH5 is exactly the same as its view when
talking with S in the ideal world, which concludes the hybrid argument.
Lemma 5 For any adversaryA againstH4 in the security proof of π
t,p,i
RET where PLE is
compromised, the probability that A queries or programs GpRO on r, “ENC”∥r∥m, or
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“WE”∥r∥m without sending (Post, (t(w), π)) toLVerify is negligible, for r $←− {0, 1}λ
and m uniformly at random from the message space, both used insideH4.
Proof. Assume such adversaryA exists, then ifA has queried or programmed
GpRO on one of the inputs it must have had r. Either A has selected r by
accident which can only happen with probability 2−λ, or it has extracted it
from the ciphertext, which we will now show with a series of hybrids can only
happen with negligible probability.
H′0 : This looks exactly the same as H4. The encryption is created in the
following way:
• sample r ← {0, 1}λ
• (HashConfirm, r1)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“ENC”∥r∥m)),
• (HashConfirm, r2)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“WE”∥r∥m)), and
• (HashConfirm, r3)← GpRO(HashQuery, (“RP”∥r))
• Create the components or the encryption in the following way:
– c1 ← ΠEnc.Enc(pk j, r; r1)
– c2 ← ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r; r2)
– c3 ← m⊕ r3
– Use ΠNIZK.ZKSimulate to simulate the proof
H′1 : Replace all three calls to GpRO with uniform random values r1, r2, r3.
By the properties of GpRO the view of A doesn’t change betweenH′0 andH′1.
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Note that we only care about the view of A up until it calls GpRO on one of the
three values, so we don’t have to program GpRO accordingly.
H′2 : Now we replace c1 by ΠEnc.Enc(pk j, r′; r1), which is possible because
the proof is simulated. By the security of ΠEnc the view of the adversary
doesn’t change.
H′3 : Next, we replace c2 with ΠEWE.Enc(aux, r′; r2). If there would be a
distinguisher for H′2 and H′3 we can build a distinguisher for ΠEWE, by the
extractable security of ΠEWE we can now extract a witness, but this is in
contradiction with the ideal functionality Gledger, as we assumed it was not
called. Therefore,H′2 andH′3 must be indistinguishable.
We see that H′3 does not contain any reference to r, and A would not
have changed its strategy as the difference between its view inH′0 andH′3 is
computationally indistinguishable.
Subset of users, PJ , and PLE are corrupted. We further extend our analysis to
cover both corrupt law enforcement and corrupt judges. Notice that step 4 of
the previous simulator description is no longer relevant, as these requests are
handled inside A. The proof is exactly the same is in the previous case.
5.6 On the Need for Extractable Witness Encryp-
tion
The retrospective solution we present in Section 5.5 relies on extractable wit-
ness encryption. Intuitively, this strong assumption is required in our con-
struction because a user must encrypt in a way that decryption is only possible
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under certain circumstances. Because the description of these circumstances
can be phrased as an NP relation, witness encryption represents a “natural”
primitive for realizing it. However, thus far we have not shown that the use
of extractable witness encryption is strictly necessary. Given the strength (and
implausibility (Garg et al., 2014)) of the primitive, it is important to justify its
use. We do this by showing that any protocol ΠA that UC-realizes F
ℓ,t,p,i,ret
ARLEAS
implies the existence of extractable witness encryption for a related language.
Before proceeding to formally define this related language, we give some
intuition about its form. We wish to argue that a protocol ΠA acts like an
extractable witness encryption scheme in the specific case where an adver-
sary has corrupted the escrow authorities PLE and PJ (along with an arbitrary
number of unrelated users). Recall that in order to learn any information
about a message sent in ΠA, the following conditions must be met: specifi-
cally, law enforcement must correctly run the protocol for ΠA.RequestWarrant
and ΠA.ActivateWarrant such that if ΠA.VerifyWarrantStatus were to be called,
it would output 1.5 For the protocol we presented in Section 5.5, this corre-
sponds to obtaining a correct proof of publication from the ledger. Importantly,
it must be impossible for law enforcement and judges to generate this infor-
mation independently; if it were possible, it would be easy for these parties to
circumvent the accountability mechanism.
We give a formal definition of this language L below. We denote the view
of a user Pi as VPi , where this view is a collection of the views of running
5As specified in the ideal functionality, during verification it will be checked that a warrant
was properly requested and activated.
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all algorithms that appear. We abuse notation slightly and denote the pro-
tocol transcript resulting from a sender PS sending a message m to PR as







VP0 , . . . ,VPn
⎫⎬⎭
⎞⎠ s.t.
c, aux ← ΠA.SendMessage(sid, PS, PR, m),
(Approve)← ΠA.RequestWarrant(sid, w),
(NotifyWarrant, t(w))← ΠA.ActivateWarrant(sid, w),
1← ΠA.VerifyWarrantStatus(sid, w, aux, c)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
In this language, the statement comprises some specified metadata and a
valid instance of the protocol ΠA from the perspectives of the parties PLE, PJ ,
and the users Pi without the sender and receiver. This setup specifies all
the relevant components of the protocol (including the ledger functional-
ity, in the case of the protocol presented in Section 5.5). The witness is a
valid transcript starting with that setup, that includes the sending party send-
ing a message with the appropriate metadata and concludes with a call to
ΠA.VerifyWarrantStatus that returns 1. Note that if VerifyWarrantStatus returns
1, then in the real protocol, AccessMessage would return the relevant plaintext.
Unlike other common witness encryption languages, we note that all correctly
sampled statements are trivially in the language and have multiple witnesses.
Therefore, we need the strong notion of extractable witness encryption. As we
will discuss, finding a witness for the statement remains a difficult task.
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Consider the implications if it were computationally feasible for an ad-
versary to generate a witness for an honestly sampled statement for L. This
would imply that an adversary corrupting PLE and PJ interacting with the real
protocol has a correct witness, which includes a call to ActivateWarrant, this
implies our accountability property. Such a protocol could never succeed in
meeting our original goals; law enforcement would always be able to simulate
the steps required for proper accountability. An accountability mechanism
that can be locally simulated cannot guarantee that all parties can monitor the
mechanism, undermining the purpose of the protocol.
To formalize this intuition, we begin by describing an extractable witness
encryption scheme ΠEWE for language L given access to an ARLEAS protocol
ΠA.
– Enc(x, m) parses (aux, sid) from x and calls ΠA.SendMessage(sid, m, PS,
PR) such that it outputs aux, c. It then returns the views {VPLE ,VPJ ,VP0 ,
. . . ,VPn} resulting from that run, excluding the private information
associated with sending the message.
– Dec(c, ω) parses c, w, aux, sid from c and ω, calls m← ΠA.AccessMessage(sid,
w, aux, c) and returns the result.
It is easy to see that this construction satisfies the correctness property of
extractable witness encryption. Notice that a valid witness needs to contain in-
puts to VerifyWarrantStatus such that it outputs 1. Because VerifyWarrantStatus
is defined to return 1 exactly when AccessMessage will return a message, the
above decryption algorithm will return a message only with a valid witness.
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We introduce the metadata in the statement in order to fix a witness to a
particular statement. Note that our protocol generates an encryption as run-
ning part of the protocol, actually generating part of the witness. If metadata
is not included in the statement, then any witness for a particular setup can
be used to decrypt any ciphertext generated by the encryption oracle under
the same statement. While this is not inherently problematic for extractable
witness encryption, it no longer corresponds neatly to ARLEAS. Recall that
warrants in ARLEAS specify the metadata for which they are relevant through
the in-scope funtionality i and this property must be enforced in the language.
We now proceed to our main result, showing that the above scheme ΠEWE
satisfies extractable security if ΠA UC-realizes F
ℓ,t,p,i,ret
ARLEAS.
Theorem 7 Given a protocol ΠA that UC-realizes F
ℓ,t,p,i,ret
ARLEAS , ΠEWE is a secure
extractable witness encryption scheme for the language L.
Security Proof. Given an adversary A that has non-negligible advantage in
the extractable witness encryption game for language L, either
1. We construct an extractor ExtA(1λ, x, aux) by verifying if the adversary
A ran the following parts of ΠA:
– ΠA.RequestWarrant(sid, w)
– ΠA.ActivateWarrant(sid, w)
such that ΠA.VerifyWarrantStatus(sid, w, aux, c) = 1. If this was the case,
the extractor would have all information to form a witness that it can
output;
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2. else, if such extractor does not exist, we construct a distinguisher Z that
distinguishes between ΠA and ARLEAS ideal functionality. Z proceeds
as follows
(a) When A asks to sample a statement, Z instantiates ΠA with parties
{PLE, PJ , P0, . . . Pn, PS, PR} on honest random coins. Z then gener-
ates some arbitrary metadata aux associated with a message that PS
could send in the future. and returns aux, sid to A.
(b) When A sends the challenge plaintexts m0, m1 (such that |m0| =
|m1|) on statement x, Z then flips a coin b
$←− {0, 1}, Z has PS call
ΠA.SendMessage(sid, mb, PS, PR) such that it outputs c, aux. Z then
returns the updated views of PLE, PJ and the N other users to A.
(c) When A outputs the guess b′ and halts, Z outputs b′ == b, where
1 indicates the real world and 0 indicates the ideal world.
Note that in the ideal functionality, the joint views of law enforcement
and the judge contain no information about the plaintext, because the
ciphertext is chosen by the ideal world adversary without access to
the plaintext. As such, if the adversary is able to distinguish between
messages with non-negligible probability, Z must be interacting with
the real world protocol.
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In this work, we have explored new applications of public ledgers. In Chap-
ter 3, we presented a new computational paradigm called enclave ledger
interaction (ELI). ELI defines a protocol between a trusted execution environ-
ment (e.g. TEEs or cryptographic obfuscation) and a public ledger, mediated
by a host machine. The first application of ELI is to provide enclaves protec-
tion against rollback attacks, in which a malicious host attempts to re-execute
the enclave on old state with new inputs. More importantly, ELI allows for
general purpose, conditional execution over secret data. Put another way, the
program embedded in the enclave can execute in response to information
posted on the public ledger. This can be used to realize an array of applica-
tions, including smart contracts executing on secret data, limited password
guessing, and autonomous ransomware.
In Chapters 4, we explored an additional application of conditional exe-
cution: achieving fairness in MPC. Since the 1980’s, it has been well known
that achieving fairness in the presence of a dishonest majority of protocol
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participants is impossible. This means that fair multiparty computation is im-
possible in the dishonest majority setting. We have showed that it is possible
to overcome this impossibility if the protocol participants have access to a
public ledger. Importantly, the public ledger is innately fair — once a piece of
information is posted on the ledge, all players can retrieve that information.
The protocol participants can use a conditional execution primitive to make
recovering the output of the MPC protocol contingent on posting information
on a public ledger. Using this approach, we show that fairness can be achieved,
either assuming the existence of witness encryption or TEEs.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we showed that conditional execution can be used
to build an abuse resistant law enforcement access system. The system we
described ensures that law enforcement must post transparency information
before decrypting a ciphertext. Transparency of this kind protects against
government abuse of power, as well as key material theft by a external mali-
cious actors. We gave a workable construction of such a system, providing
law enforcement only needs to access messages encrypted after a warrant
was issued and activated. If law enforcement requires the ability to perform
retrospective surveillance, the existence of such a system implies the existence
of extractable witness encryption for some non-trivial languages.
These applications are all different embodiments of conditioning execution
on public events. More specifically, fairness in MPC and abuse resistant
law enforcement access systems require only conditional decryption. We
believe there are many more applications of conditional execution that have
yet to be explored, particularly when considering issues of transparency. The
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technology underpinning public ledgers will continue to evolve and become
more efficient. If public ledgers are only used to enable cryptocurrencies, the
potential impact of public ledgers will be wasted. To harness the true power
of public ledgers, we must continue to find novel applications, like those




(Contact Me For Address)
(Contact Me For Phone Number)
EDUCATION
2015 — 2020 (Expected) Ph.D. in Computer Science
The Johns Hopkins University, Whiting School of Engineering
• Co-advised by Professor Avi Rubin and Professor Matthew Green
• Specializing in applied cryptography
2015 — 2018 Master of Science in Computer Science
The Johns Hopkins University, Whiting School of Engineering
2011 — 2015 Bachelor of Science
The Johns Hopkins University, Whiting School of Engineering
• Double Major in Computer Science (Honors) and Electrical Engineering
• Minor in Mathematics
WORK EXPERIENCE
Fall 2019 – Spring 2020 Visiting Scholar
Hariri Institute, Boston University, Boston MA
Fall 2019 – Present Cryptographic Engineer
Bolt Labs Inc, Baltimore MD
• Deploying the first payment channel protocol for anonymous payment networks
• Helped design and develop initial prototype
Summer 2018 Cryptography Fellow
Senator Ron Wyden’s Personal Office, United States Senate, Washington DC
• Funded as a summer fellow by Tech Congress
• Assisted in identifying and addressing policy issues related to information security
• Met with leaders from industry, military, NIST, and NSA
• Developed and refined legislation related to information security
Summer 2017 Research Intern
Intel Labs, Portland OR
• Designed new applications for Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX)
• Helped clarify vision for Intel SGX, including future updates and features
2015 – 2018 Research Scientist
Harbor Labs, Baltimore MD
• Advised legal team and edited expert witness testimony for patent litigation
• Performed security reviews and penetration test of widely deplyed medical devices
• Analyzed cryptographic protocols being deployed in novel security applications
Summer 2013, 2014 DevOps Intern
Onshape, Boston MA
• Interned with team developing leading, cloud-based, computer aided 3D design product
• Assisted in development of cloud architecture and automated testing framework
• Modeled release-time computational requirements for product
• Implemented matchmaking algorithms for routing internal traffic
2013 – 2014 Technical Lead
Procia, Baltimore MD
• Led technical team for student-founded company developing automated cancer dia-
gnostic system
• Developed computer vision and machine learning algorithms for system back-end
251
Spring 2015
Fall 2012 – Spring 2015
Johns Hopkins Undergraduate Admissions
• Senior Undergraduate Admissions Intern
• Tour Guide
PUBLICATIONS
NDSS 2019 Giving State to the Stateless: Augmenting Trustworthy Computation with Ledgers
Gabriel Kaptchuk, Ian Miers, and Matthew Green
ACM CCS 2017 Fairness in an Unfair World: Fair Multiparty Computation from Public Bulletin Boards
Arka Rai Choudhuri, Matthew Green, Abhishek Jain, Gabriel Kaptchuk, and Ian Miers
Financial Cryptography 2017 Outsourcing Medical Dataset Analysis: A Possible Solution
Gabriel Kaptchuk, Matthew Green, and Aviel D. Rubin
USENIX Security 2016 Dancing on the Lip of the Volcano: Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMessage
Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Ian Miers, and Michael Rushanan
Annual Security Conference
2016
A Practical Implementation of a Multi-Device Split Application for Protecting Online
Poker
Gabriel Kaptchuk and Aviel D. Rubin.
PRESENTATIONS
December 2019 The Hill We Must Die On: Cryptographers and Congress
Invited talk at Boston University Cyber Alliance
NDSS 2019 Giving State to the Stateless: Augmenting Trustworthy Computation with Ledgers
Real World Cryptography 2019 The Hill We Must Die On: Cryptographers and Congress
Joint presentation with Shaanan Cohney
Fall 2017 Blockchain Technology Beyond Cryptocurrencies
• Invited talk at US Naval Academy
• Guest Lecture at Hagerstown Community College (Hagerstown, MD) covering new
research on blockchains for non-cryptocurrency applications
ACM CCS 2017 Fairness in an Unfair World: Fair Multiparty Computation from Public Bulletin Boards
Financial Cryptography 2017 Outsourcing Medical Dataset Analysis: A Possible Solution
Annual Security Conference
2016
A Practical Implementation of a Multi-Device Split Application for Protecting Online
Poker
TEACHING
Spring 2020 Computer Networks
• Teaching one section with 60 seats. Second section taught by Prof Avi Rubin.
Summer 2019 Data Structures
• 19 students attending a four week term covering full Data Structures curriculum
(normally a 13 week term).
• Course had 13 hours of lecture per week. Workload included 8 programming
assignments, 2 midterm exams, and a final exam.
• Course reviews available here .
• Course received a 4.33/5.00 in ”Course Quality” category
– School Average: 4.06/5.00. Department Average: 3.75/5.00.
• Course received a 4.47/5.00 in ”Instructor Teaching Effectiveness”
– School Average: 4.13/5.00. Department Average: 3.97/5.00.252
Fall 2018
Fall 2019
HEART - Introduction to Computer Security and Applied Cryptography
• 1 credit pass/fail course targeted at freshman engineering students
• Goal of the course was to expose students to high-level research ideas in field
• 10 week course. Fall 2018 two sections (total of 23 students) and Fall 2019 one
section (9 students)
• Course reviews available for F18 Section 1 and F18 Section 2 . F19 course reviews
not yet released
• Course received 4.69/5.00 rating in ”Course Quality” category
– School Average: 4.06/5.00. Department Average: 3.75/5.00.
• Course received 4.96/5.00 rating in ”Instructor Teaching Effectiveness” category
– School Average: 4.13/5.00. Department Average: 3.97/5.00.
Spring 2016, Spring 2017 Guest Lecturer for Computer Network Fundamentals
• Lecture entitled “Networking Tools Practicum” covered the tools required to explore
and diagnose problems with computer networks
Spring 2015 Head Teaching Assistant for Practical Cryptographic Systems
• Received a rating of 3.8/5 from student course reviews
Fall 2014 Course Assistant for Introduction to Algorithms
Spring 2014 Course Assistant for Automata and Computation Theory
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
Fall 2018 Member of External Department Head Search Committee
• Interviewed candidates and advocated for PhD student perspectives
Fall 2018 – Present
Fall 2018, Fall 2019
Member of Computer Science Graduate Student Council
• Developed, organized, and facilitated incoming PhD student orientation
• Containedmultiple sessions, including Baltimore life, academic advice, and advisor-
advisee relationships
Fall 2016 – Present Member of Computer Science Curriculum Committee
• First and only student representative on curriculum committee
External Reviewer
Eurocrypt 2020, ACM HEALTH, ACMCCS 2019, USENIX 2019, Financial Cryptography
2019, FOCI 2018, USENIX 2016, Financial Cryptography 2015
253
